DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

November 27, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. The records are enclosed for your use.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to China Intelligence Services, ZF400090W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and 13 pages are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 1.5(b) and 1.5(c) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.5(b) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to foreign government information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.5(c) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Since the release of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

In addition, information has been sanitized from the records and 12 of the same pages withheld under (b)(1) are also denied in their entirety as the release of the information would reveal the identity of confidential sources and sensitive investigative methodologies. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) and (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources and sensitive investigative methodologies.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that the information bracketed in black is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(C).

The withholding of the information by the INS constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the INS. If you decide to file an appeal, may write to Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530, within 30 days of the receipt of this letter. Both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal".

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Air Force of Special Investigation (AFOSI) that the information bracketed in black is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(C).

The withholding of the information by the AFOSI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the AFOSI. If you decide to file an appeal, you have 60 days from the date of this letter to appeal in writing to the Department of the Air Force, 11CS/SCSR (FOIA), 1000 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1000.

In addition, coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the information bracketed it in black is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F97-01649 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have been informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that information has been sanitized from the records and 71 pages are denied in their entirety as the information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 5 (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(7)(C) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the FBI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530-0001, within 60 working days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or Information Appeal". Please cite FBI FOI/PA #424715 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Additionally, we have been informed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized from the records and seven pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ATTN: SVI-1-FOIA, Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA #0647-97 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

The amount for professional review of the first 100 pages has been waived. The reproduction cost of $47.55 remains due and should be forwarded by postal money order or certified check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case #756F-01.

Sincerely,

Russell A. Nichols

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN T O P D O C U M E N T

DOSSIER NO. ZF 400019 CV

As of 15MAY79 (Date) all material

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E. Ward 15MAY79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOIS E. WARD 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER [illegible] DATE 30 SEP 86

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
JP AR 381-10 K DARGAN DATE Sept 28 92
REVIEWER

REVIEWED BY ARCHIVIST
DATE OCT 1 1992

THIS MUST REMAIN T O P D O C U M E N T

IC Form 315
1 Sep 72

001

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[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

ACSI-DSCA 1 OCT 1964

SUBJECT: Communist China, Chinese Communist Illegals (U)

TO: See Distribution

(U) The inclosed report on Chinese Communist illegals is forwarded for your information and retention.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

1 Incl
as (1 cy) (SECRET)

not received (U) 15 Aug 64

GORDON FLAHERTY
Colonel, GS
Deputy Director of Security

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[redacted]

002

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CI ANALYSIS BRANCH

SECRET

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Maj Beardsley/kw/72434/CIAB/CI Div

ACSI-DSCA
MEMO FOR RECORD: (30 Sep 64) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Communist China, Chinese Communist Illegals (U)

CURRENT: Inst corres is ltr of transmittal fwding (—) rpt to interested US Army commands. (b)(1) per CIA

STATUS: Completed.

RATIONALE: Action nec to fwd matl of intelligence interest.

CABLE JUSTIFICATION: None required.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer [illegible]

Actg Ch, CIAB TC Hughes

for Ch, CI Div [illegible]

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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R
Per CIA

003

SECRET

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☑ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 4-5

IACPA-CSP Form 6-R
1 Sep 91

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

35 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☑ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☑ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☑ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

_____ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

_____ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

_____ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

_____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

☐ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
Pgs 6-16

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
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Mr. Wood/7395//wsp/CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

ACSI-SCA
MEMO FOR RECORD: 24 Jul 63 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

SUBJECT: Suspected Chicom Intelligence Agents (U)

CURRENT and BACKGROUND: On 27 Feb 61 and 3 Jun 63 G-2 USARCARIB (USARSO) fwd int rept re actvof Frederico LOU and Kong C. CHEN. By ltr dtd 10 Jun 63 G-2 USARCARIB fwd add doc mat re same and req aval info on their actv. OACSI files cntn no add info. Inst memo fwd docu mat to FBI and () rept G-2 USARCARIB req and req CIAS be ntfy of any aval info.

(b)(1) per CIA

STATUS; Pending reply.

RATIONALE: To fill req G-2, USARSO and fur nec info FBI and ()

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 2 hours
Typist Time: 1 hour

Action Officer [signature]
Ch, CIAS T Hughes for R Pyle LtCol AGS
Chief, CI Br J.L. DOWNE FOR C.R. WRIGHT JR
Ch, Sec Div [signature]

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ON 27 SEP 2000 BY
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R
Per CIA

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SECRET

13 June 1963
01643

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE SERVICES' METHODS OF OPERATING

CI in Intell act

Which Services Conduct Espionage

1. The Investigation Department (Tiao Ch'a Pu - 6383/2435/6752) of the Communist Party of China, usually referred to as the "ID," is the Chinese Communist service most widely engaged in covertly collecting intelligence abroad. The Intelligence Department (Ch'ing Pao Pu - 1906/1200/6752) of the People's Liberation Army also conducts espionage, at least in the Far East. These are the two most likely to be active in Japan. The Ministry of Public Security, together with the Party's Social Affairs Department (She Hui Pu - 4357/2133/6752), seems to confine its foreign activities to counter-espionage work in Hong Kong and Macao, while the "liaison subdivision" of the Army's General Political Department, which is said to specialize in attempts to induce Chinese Nationalist personnel to defect, probably operates only against Taiwan. (Actually, reports of this alleged subdivision are so few that we cannot be sure it exists. It is supposed to be the successor to the Party's former Enemy Work Department (Ti Chu Kung Tso Pu - 2480/6511/0362/0155/6752).

2. Although the ID appears to be Communist China's most important service - it operates on a world-wide basis and collects all types of intelligence - it is still a young organization. It was given its present name in 1955, when it was enlarged and placed under the Central Committee of the Communist Party - an indication of its importance to the regime. Originally, it had been under the government (1949-55) and called the Intelligence Administration ([illegible]) then under the Army and called the Liaison Department (5113/0170/6752).

3. The Army's Intelligence Department grew out of the various scattered military intelligence units which worked fairly independently during the war years, before 1949. After that date these units were gradually consolidated into the present organization. This service seeks mainly military intelligence but will also collect other types if it is convenient to do so. It has not yet been detected in any covert operations outside the Far East. As will be seen below, it has operated against Japan.

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Investigation Department (ID)

4. Cover Abroad. Some ID case officers operate abroad under official cover, others under non-official cover. Chinese Communist embassies and consulates are widely used as official cover for ID officers. NCNA offices abroad are used as cover for intelligence officers who are apparently ID. Intelligence officers in NCNA offices abroad sometimes lack previous journalistic experience and are unable to perform convincingly in their cover role. In this connection, it has been reliably reported that ID has difficulty finding experienced intelligence men who are also journalists. While there may be exceptions to this, it offers at least a possible means of identifying intelligence personnel in an NCNA office: look for those persons who seem to know little about journalism and do little journalistic work. One could also look for those who regularly meet local persons who appear to have no connection with the journalistic work of NCNA, but this task is complicated because NCNA offices regularly conduct a number of fairly secret non-journalistic activities other than espionage. These activities are described in the attached study entitled "Secret Functions of NCNA Offices Abroad."

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5. ID case officers who operate abroad under non-official cover have been known to pose as businessmen, and other non-official occupations are probably used. Before going to the country in which they will operate (the "host" country), these case officers to go Hong Kong, Macao, or some other place where they can falsely obtain local passports. (In the case of Hong Kong, they obtain Hong Kong identification cards, which can serve as passports.) This documentation is genuine (not forged), although obtained under false pretences and sometimes by bribery. A possible weakness of this system, of course, is that a careful investigation in the country which issued the passport might show the ID case officer was not born there and never really lived there. To avoid this, the ID sometimes chooses a place where it is known that all the official records were destroyed, by fire for example, and alleges that the man was born or lived there.

6. Mission. ID case officers regard their chief mission abroad to be the recruitment of special sources of information obtainable in the "host" country. Ideally, these sources are to be persons who are not generally known to be sympathetic to Communist China or to Communism. For example, in Japan the final goal of an ID officer would be to recruit wall-place agents who are ethnic Japanese and not known as Communist Party members or sympathizers. Such sources could continue to provide secret information even in times of tension or war between Communist China and the "host" country. In this respect they are superior to the usual, non-intelligence channels which Communist China uses: diplomats, visiting delegations, local communist parties and front organizations. In times of stress these latter channels would not be available, and local communists, as well as all ethnic Chinese persons, would probably be in disfavor by the host government, which would deny them access to sensitive information. This is the reasoning by which the ID case officers abroad seek to recruit, ideally, "clean" host country nationals. (Such ideal agents are not easy to obtain, however, and ID case officers usually begin by recruiting local overseas Chinese who are easier for them to meet and to motivate).

7. Targets. There is no information on the precise targets the ID would work against in Japan, but a certain amount is known about the types of targets the ID has chose in other countries. The number of subjects on which the ID seeks intelligence abroad is very large. Secret information on a country's politics, economics, military power, scientific work and technology are all potential intelligence targets of the ID. Which types of intelligence will be collected in a particular country depends partly on whether a certain type is important to Communist China and is unobtainable by overt means. It also depends on whether that type is easy or difficult to collect in that country. In Asia generally, it is not unusual for overseas Chinese to have fairly high-level government, industry, and military connections; here it is relatively easy for ID officers, using local Chinese as agents, to collect important secret political, economic, and military information. In non-Asian countries, however, the overseas Chinese seldom have friends in such high-level circles; hence, ID officers cannot easily get access to political, economic, or military secrets. Therefore, they tend to direct their efforts into the scientific and technical fields, where Chinese persons may be working or studying. A few years ago the ID was giving highest priority to information on any secret aspects of the relations which Japan, U.S. or England conducted with other nations. For example, the secret details of a particular country's military, economic, or political connections with Japan would have been considered a prime intelligence target. We have no reason to

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believe that the ID has changed its views on this in the last few years, although there is no current information on this point. If this type of information is still given high priority, it would seem that Japan-U.S. relations would also be a prime target of ID operations in Japan. Science and technology, highly developed in Japan, might well be another. Finally, since the U.S. is a particularly difficult area for Chinese Communist agents to penetrate, the ID is interested in persons who can go to U.S. to reside for a long period. Sailors on ships calling at U.S. ports are also interesting to the ID as potential couriers.

8. Types of Agents. As suggested above, ID doctrine emphasizes that ID case officers abroad should work toward the eventual recruitment of a few, highly-placed agents, preferably ethnic host country nationals, who could provide a steady flow of information even in times of stress in relations between the host country and Communist China. The ID feels that only a few are needed, if they are well placed. After recruitment, they are to be used sparingly - asked to report information only when the need is crucial - so that they can remain undetected indefinitely. This is regarded as the long-term goal of ID case officers. In practice, however, as noted above, ID case officers usually begin by recruiting local Chinese. In some countries the ID has recruited local Chinese students, in others it has recruited local Chinese businessmen who have contact with government officials. It has also recruited persons who can provide inside information on local Chinese Nationalist embassies.

9. Spotting Methods. Besides employing the normal methods which intelligence services generally use for spotting prospective agents, the ID has some special techniques. The ID has been known to spot and recruit local Chinese residents of certain countries when they go to Communist China to visit relatives. During their stay on the Mainland, they are recruited and told to return to their home country and await eventual contact there by an ID case officer. It seems less likely that this method would be used in Japan, however, because fewer influential Chinese make visits to Communist China from Japan than from a number of other countries.

10. The ID is known to place some of its members in various Chinese Communist governmental and other overt organizations on the mainland for spotting purposes. Examples are seamen's unions in Tientsin, Shanghai, and other port cities, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, the China Travel Service (which supervises the itineraries of foreign visitors), and the organizations concerned with foreign trade. These organizations are constantly receiving and entertaining people from foreign countries, and they maintain many contacts with foreigners abroad. The ID also places its men in centers for Japanese on the Mainland who are awaiting repatriation, in overseas Chinese hostels, overseas Chinese students' hostels, schools on the Mainland where overseas Chinese students are enrolled, and in towns where home-coming overseas Chinese are concentrated.

11. Ideological Emphasis. Most ID officers, before they joined the ID, acquired their early intelligence experience in covert revolutionary work during the Communist struggle for power on the Mainland. Their methods show some influence from this. In recruiting agents they try to develop revolutionary enthusiasm in the agent prospect, to inspire him to join their cause rather than to depend on inducements. ID officers spend much time and effort indoctrinating

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prospective agents politically prior to recruitment, and after recruitment they continue to instruct the agents in Communist theory and in the Party line. Often more than half the time of ID case officer-agent meetings is devoted to this instruction. The ID prefers not to use money as inducement for agents but it does so occasionally.

12. Communication with the Mainland. ID case officers under diplomatic cover can, of course, use the diplomatic pouch. If they are under New China News Agency (NCNA) cover, then can - without being conspicuous - send their messages to the Mainland in secret code through the normal NCNA communication channels: private radio transmitter or commercial cable. They can do this without arousing suspicion because NCNA normally uses secret code for certain messages which regularly flow between its offices abroad and the Mainland. These messages are evidently on matters which NCNA particularly wishes to keep secret; the bulk of NCNA traffic with the Mainland is not in code. (Some NCNA offices abroad have their own radio transmitters and receivers, which they use in conjunction with teletype machines; others use commercial cable facilities to communicate with the Mainland.)

13. ID case officers under non-official cover, such as businessmen, must of course use some clandestine means to communicate with the Mainland. One of the chief means is the use of Chinese seamen as couriers. Another is the use of secret writing in ordinary mail which the ID case officers send to addresses on on the Mainland or in Hong Kong where the letters are then forwarded to the Mainland. Radio broadcasts from the Mainland serve as another means of communication with ID case officers abroad. Certain of the regular Mainland short-wave radio stations periodically broadcast a series of four-digit numbers; some of these are coded messages for ID case officers abroad, who decode them and convert them to Chinese characters by the standard Chinese telegraphic code book. The ID case officer abroad can easily receive these messages on an ordinary short-wave receiver, which he can purchase locally. This is, of course, only a one-way channel. No cases have yet been reported in which an ID case officer has sent messages to the Mainland by radio transmitter.

14. The seaman couriers are Chinese sailors on foreign vessels which call at Mainland ports. They are often recruited by ID men who work in seamen's "Unions," which sailors visit when they go ashore. The seamen couriers often carry messages to ID case officers abroad in the form of exposed photographic film which has been soaked in an acetate solution to separate the emulsion from the celluloid backing. The emulsion, which carries the image of the message, is extremely thin and can be concealed in a fountain pen, cigarette or other small object. The seamen couriers are told where to meet the ID case officers abroad and recognition signals are arranged, but they are not told the true identity of the case officer.

15. Headquarters Organization. The ID has a headquarters in Peking and several sub-headquarters or "stations" in other Mainland cities, such as Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton and Kunming. The Peking headquarters directs ID case officers abroad who are under diplomatic or other official cover; the "stations" direct those who are abroad under non-official cover. The most logical stations to conduct operations against Japan would be Tientsin and Shanghai, but there is no reliable information on this point.

27 SEP 2000

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SECRET

(Military) Intelligence Department (Ch'ing Pao Pu - 1906/2032/6752)

16. The Intelligence Department is believed to be subordinate to the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, rather than to the Communist Party. Like all elements of the army or government, however, it is subject to a high degree of Party control, even though its chain of command may run to the military. The Party element which exercises this control is the Military Affairs Commission (Chun Shih-wei Yuan Hui - 6511/0057/1201/0765/2585) of the Party's Central Committee.

17. Although the Intelligence Department is chiefly responsible for collecting military intelligence abroad, it will also collect together other types of intelligence if convenient to do so. Not much is known about the types of cover and espionage methods used by the Intelligence Department but, thus far, it does not appear to make extensive use of official cover on a world-wide basis, as does the ID.

18. Operations into Japan. Intelligence Department operations into Japan are the responsibility of the Tientsin office of the Intelligence Department. As of 1956, its chief target was U.S. military forces in Japan, and its secondary target was Japan's own self-defense Forces. As early as 1950, the Tientsin office, which was then called the Intelligence Division of the North China Military District Headquarters, commenced recruiting intelligence agents among the many Japanese on the Mainland who were to be repatriated to Japan. The Tientsin office sent some of its personnel into Shansi, Shantung and northern Honan provinces and into Manchuria to recruit these Japanese as agents. The total number sent to Japan was estimated to be between 30 and 100, although a large percentage were said to be poor agent material, particularly since many were recruited under duress. Some, however, were reportedly genuine Communists and good agent material. All these agent recruits were brought to Tientsin for training. The training was fairly simple. It stressed political indoctrination and agent discipline, and it included intelligence collection techniques and identification of aircraft, warships, and weapons. As of 1956, most, if not all, of these Japanese agents were told to do nothing in Japan until such time as case officers (probably Chinese) should arrive in Japan to direct them. It is believe that these case officers had not yet been sent to Japan by 1956, but they probably were sent later. Some of these Japanese agents entered Japan by mingling with other Japanese who were being repatriated, others entered illegally. The latter were smuggled into Japan from HONG KONG by ship. In order to facilitate this, the Tientsin military intelligence office established a sub-office in Canton, the Mainland city nearest to Hong Kong. This Canton sub-office also recruited Chinese seamen as intelligence couriers. (The military Intelligence Department, like the ID, recruits such couriers in Canton, Shanghai, Tientsin and Hong Kong. Intelligence Department personnel have been secretly placed for this purpose in the Tientsin Seamen's Union). The identities of these Japanese agents and their activities in Japan are not known. There is no information regarding subsequent operations of the Intelligence Department in Japan, but it can be presumed that this intelligence service continues to operate against military and perhaps other targets in Japan.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

SECRET

NUMBER 4

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As was mentioned on page 2 of the study concerning CCIS Method of Operating, the task of identifying espionage activities conducted out of NCNA offices is complicated by the fact that NCNA also carries on a number of secret activities other than espionage. These are activities which ordinary news agencies do not conduct; because of their nature NCNA does many of them secretly.

Propaganda. NCNA is engaged primarily in furthering Communist China propaganda program; the collection and distribution of news abroad is regarded chiefly as a means to that end. Though it is listed as an organ of the government, it was founded by the Communist Party and takes its policy direction from the Party's Central Committee through the Politburo and Party Secretariat. The Communist Party of China regards propaganda work as something to be done both overtly and covertly. (An example of its covert propaganda activity is the operation of "Radio Free Japan" from Peking, 1952-55.) NCNA offices abroad, where possible, conduct covert propaganda activity of various sorts, such as funding and directing local Communist-oriented newspapers.

Overt Intelligence Collection. NCNA offices abroad systematically collect overt, non-journalistic data on the countries in which they are located. This documentary information, such as maps, detailed technical and scientific data, trade statistics, and minutes of parliamentary debates, is not journalistic in nature; it appears to be collected for purposes of intelligence analysis. This type of data would be considered secret in Communist countries, but in free countries it is made public. NCNA, therefore, can collect it without resorting to actual espionage, but secret means are sometimes used. For example, NCNA sometimes orders such data by mail from a false mailing address.

Consular Functions. In countries with which Communist China has no diplomatic relations, NCNA offices perform many functions which would normally be conducted by an embassy or consulate. It gives approval for persons and delegations to travel to Communist China and makes travel arrangements for them, including visas. It approves and assists in travel formalities of Chinese citizens returning to the Mainland. It accepts trade offers and refers them to the nearest Chinese Communist embassy or to Peking. It has even delivered official Chinese Communist protests to local governments, as in Yugoslavia, January 1959.

Communist Contacts. Probably NCNA's most secret function is its role in maintaining Peking's contact with local Communist parties and front organizations. It has transmitted funds from Peking to local Communist parties, and has passed propaganda to local China friendship associations.

Espionage Functions. It appears that the NCNA's secretive contact with local overseas Chinese national Communist Party elements and Friendship Associations includes intelligence-gathering activity, guided and supported by Chinese officials of NCNA. Several credible reports have been received alleging clandestine operations on the part of NCNA officials in various countries of the world.

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27 SEP 2000

IDENTIFIED [illegible] OFFICERS IN JAPAN

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Correspondent	Mikhail Aleksandrovich ALEKSANDROV	GRU
Torgpred	Felikz Aleksandrovich BOLSHCHIKOV	KGB
Embassy	Vyacheslav Nikolayevich BUNIN	GRU
Embassy	Ludvig Aleksandrovich CHIZHOV	RIS, Service Unknown
MilAtt	Yuriy Sergeyevich DEVIN	GRU
Embassy	Mikhail Ivanovich IVANOV	GRU
MilAtt	Eduard Sergeyevich KHAVINOV	GRU
Embassy	Aleksandr Vasilyevich KHRAPCHENKOV	GRU
Torgpred	Valentin Innokentyevich KOPEYKIN	GRU
MilAtt	Kuzma Grigoryevich MELESHKOV	GRU
Embassy	Stanislav Stepanovich MUDENOV	GRU
MilAtt	Anatoliy Mitrofanovich SAYKIN	GRU
Embassy	Aleksey Ivanovich SEMATOSOV	GRU
Embassy	Sergey Ivanovich SERGEYEV	GRU
MilAtt	Konstantin Yefimovich SESKIN	GRU
MilAtt	Nikolay Mikhaylovich SOBOLEV	GRU
Torgpred	Anver Izmailovich YAKUBOV	GRU
Embassy	Georgiy Mikhaylovich ZHIVOTOVSKIY	KGB
Torgpred	Yuriy Pavlovich SHIPOV	Probably GRU

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4

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☑ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 25-26

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Mr. Wood/car/73957/CIAS/CI Br/Scty Div

ACSI-SCA
MEMO FOR RECORD: (31 Jul 63) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Suspected Intelligence Agents for Communist China (U)

CURRENT AND BACKGROUND: On 7 Jun 63, G2 USARSOUTHCOM fwd IR No 2230009463, subj as above and add doc mat. Req info on extent contacts and poss act of pers in rept. Inst Ind info G2 USARSOUTHCOM no info available OACSI and req fwd FBI () CIAS will ntfy of reply. OACSI also ntfy G2 USARSOUTHCOM that rept very well prep and further rept on subj are desired.

(b)(1) per CIA

STATUS: Pending reply from () and FBI.

RATIONALE: To info G2 USARSOUTHCOM of act on his req.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 2 hr
Typist Time: 1 hr

Action Officer [signature]
Ch, CIAS [signature]
Chief, CI Br [signature]
Ch, Sec Div [signature]

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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

J Per CIA

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ACSI-MC

AUG 15 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Hong Kong Based Chinese Espionage Ring (U)

(b)(3) per CIA

1. (S) Reference is made to a meeting on 22 November 1961 between a representative of this office [redacted]

2. (S) OACSI has recently received information that TSENG Cho-Ko, also John Choo-Ko TSANG, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Hong Kong, who was identified as part of the Hong Kong espionage apparatus, allegedly has a brother attending a Japanese University to whom he is sending funds. Also of possible interest is a report from the Consul General, Hong Kong, that the 16 July issue of the Communist Hong Kong newspaper TA KUNG PAO lists TSENG as a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Kwangtung Provincial Committee, Sub-Group on Foreign Affairs, which met on 12 July 1962.

3. (S) OACSI would appreciate receiving any information developed by your office regarding subject matter.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

MERRILL L. [redacted]
Counterintelligence Branch

JACK L. WEGAND, Col, GS
Acting Chief, Security Division

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RECORD SECTION CIC
Counterintelligence Br

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
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AUTHORITY OF [redacted]

4/1/93

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Mr. Monzeglio/72434/fey/CIAS/CI Br/Sec Div

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (14 Aug 62) (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

SUBJECT: Hong Kong Based Chicom Espionage Ring (U)

CURRENT AND BACKGROUND: Inst action to determine () can furnish any info re subj; which can be fwded to G2 USARPAC who has current interest in subj.

(b)(1) Per CIA

STATUS: Pending.

RATIONALE: To obtain info () which can be fwded to G2 USARPAC.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None.

Action Officer Time: 1 hr
Typist Time: 1 hr

Action Officer
Ch. CIAS T C Hughes for R Pyle, Lt Col (AI)
Chief, CI Br
Ch. Sec Div for Merrill Kelly

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Per CIA

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ACSI-SC

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUG 9 1962

ATTN: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Communist Chinese Espionage/Subversive Training Centers (U)

(b)(3) PercIA

(U)

1. (C) Reference is made to memorandum, this office, File ACSI-SC, subject: Communist Chinese Espionage/Subversive Training Centers (U), dated 17 April 1962, which requested available information regarding subject matter and Chinese agent training methods for intelligence operation in Southeast Asia.

2. (U) This office would appreciate being informed when a reply may be expected.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

(Sgd) MERRILL T. KELLY
Chief
Counterintelligence Branch

(For)

JACK L. WEIGAND, Col, GS
Acting Chief, Security Division

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Mr Monzeglio/rfl/ 34/CIAS/CI Br/Sec Div

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (8 Aug 62) UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Communist Chinese Espionage/Subversive Training Centers (U)

CURRENT AND BACKGROUND: Inst memo is followup to correspondence to which no reply has been received. A telephonic inquiry was made to (_____) on 16 July at which time (_____) stated he would take action to expedite the answer to our request. (b)(3) per CIA

STATUS: Pending.

RATIONALE: Req info re status of reply to OACSI req.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: ½hr
Typist Time: 1hr

Action Officer
Ch, CIAS
Chief, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div for Merrie Kelly

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ACSI-SC

(b)(3) per CIA

AUG 6 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

G-2 REGISTRY
NO. 25

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Essential Elements of Information (EEI) (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your letter, ()

(b) (3) per CIA

2. (C) Examination of this office's report, file ACSI-SC, subject: Soviet Bloc Essential Elements of Information (EEI), dated 5 November 1961, reveals that the EEI re "deployment of Honest John and security measures taken during transport to field exercises" was attributed to the Chinese Communists because of a typographical error; the "X" indicating the origin of the EEI should have appeared in the next column to the right, under East Germany.

3. (C) However, a review of our holdings indicates that the Chinese Communists have often evidenced interest in US rockets, missiles, and field artillery. For example, a Chinese Communist cover firm, the Apollo Book Company with offices at 42 Wellington Street, Hong Kong, requested in January 1961 a total of 141 US Army Field manuals by number and, in most cases, title. Included in this list were FM 100-31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons; FM 6-60, The Field Artillery Rocket 762mm; and FM 21-40, Defense Against CBR Attack. In the same month the firm requested a total of 213 current technical papers on US rockets and missiles. Among them were the following:

Redstone Arsenal Ballistic Range, by E. L. Carroll, Redstone Arsenal.

Design & Performance Data of Space Ships with Logic Emulsion Systems, by E. Stuhlinger, ABMA, Redstone Arsenal.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

[redacted]

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AUG 6 1962

ACSI-SC
SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Essential Elements of Information (EEI) (U)

[redacted]

Precision Frequency Control for Guided Missiles, by M. A. Gerber, Army Signal Research & Development Laboratory.

Equations for Transformation of Position and Velocity of Projectile Between Several Systems of Coordinate Measurement, by Everett L. Gilman, Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency.

Aberdeen Proving Ground Ballistic Data, by Mitchell E. Bennett, Aberdeen Proving Ground.

4. (C) (U) In response to paragraph three of your letter, which states your general interest in any information regarding the Chinese Communist intelligence services, inclosed are five pertinent extracts of reports received by this office from Army sources together with appropriate analytical comment on their content.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

(Sgd) MERRILL T. KELLY
Chief
Counterintelligence Branch
(For)

JACK E. WEIGAND, Col, GS
Acting Chief, Security Division

5 Incl
as (CONFIDENTIAL)

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[redacted]

SUBJECT: Training Organs for Special Operations Personnel (C) Date of Info: Feb 61

EVALUATION: B-3 (U)

1. (U) (C) In early Feb 61, eighteen Chinese railway technicians were dispatched from Peiping to the Canton Railway Bureau to undergo practical training in railway construction and administration. After completion of training, they will be dispatched to Cambodia. Sixteen of these technicians were graduated from the Peiping Railway Institute last year and were subsequently dispatched to the Central Overseas Operations Department (CHUNG-YANG HAI-WAI KUNG-TSO-PU -- STC 0022/1135/3189/1120/1562/0155/6752) to undergo training for special operations (TE-WU KUNG-TSO -- STC 3676/0523/1562/0155); the remaining two technicians graduated from the Peiping Foreign Language Institute (PEI-CHING WAI-YU HSUEH-YUAN -- STC 0554/0079/1120/6133/1331/7108) and were assigned last September to the Railway Ministry's Basic Construction and Engineering Bureau for practical training.

2. (U) (C) Since early Feb 51, a special training class has been established at the Peiping Foreign Language Institute for over sixty technical officers (lieutenants and captains) dispatched from the army's railway branch. Upon completion of training, these officers will be dispatched to Cambodia and Laos.

COMMENT: When CHOU En-lai was in Cambodia in May 59, he prompted Prince SIHANOUK to start construction of the PHNOM-PENH -- SIHANOUKVILLE Railroad; during SIHANOUK's visit to Peiping in Dec 60, SIHANOUK probably compelled Chinese Communist assistance on this railway project as the price of a friendship treaty. The projected dispatch of Chinese Communist railway construction technicians to Cambodia appears feasible in the light of Chinese Communist commitments.

3. On-the-job Cadre Study Class is for training special agents who will eventually be dispatched overseas as foreign trade cadre. At present it has more than 50 students.

COMMENT: Available files do not permit accurate assessment of this information. Position listed for TSOU Te-pi'end as vice chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries is correct.

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ON 2 Jun 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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1455) ACSI 410.1 China 6 Aug 62

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Training Organs for Special Operations Personnel (U) (C) Date of Info: Apr 61

EVALUATION: B-3

1. (U) (C) Around Jan 61, the Overseas Operations Department (KAIGAI KOSAKU BU) (STC 3189/1120/1562/0155/6752) under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee was changed to the Overseas Bureau (KAIGAI KYOKU) (STC 3189/1120/1444).

2. (U) (C) In early April, the special operation personnel who were receiving training since March last year at the Mining Engineers Staff Officials Accelerated Training Squad (KOKO KANBU SOKUSEI KUNREN HAN) (STC 1562/4349/1631/6752/6643/2052/6064/4886/3803) located at PA-LI-CUANG (STC 0360/6849/5445) in the western suburbs of Peiping, were graduated.

3. (U) (C) Of the graduates, 36 departed for KATMANDU, Nepal as surveyors and helpers in the latter part of April by taking advantage of the Economic Construction Assistance Agreement negotiations between Nepal and Communist China. The remaining 58 persons were sent to technical enterprises, such as, the metallurgy department, construction project department and farming machinery department. It is anticipated that these persons will also be sent to Nepal as technicians in connection with the construction assistance program.

4. (U) (C) Since 1961, the Chinese Communist operations against Nepal have been strengthened, and at present there are approximately 15 special operation personnel in Nepal as members of the Chinese Communist Embassy or reporters of the Hsin-hua-she (STC 2450/5478/4357).

910.1 China 6 Aug 62

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[redacted]

SUBJECT: Training Organs for Special Operations Personnel (U) (C)
Date of Info: Apr 61
Evaluation: B-6

1. (U) (C) TSOU Ta-p'eng (STC 6760/1129/7720) is the chief of the Second Department (in charge of liaison with foreign countries) of the Central Overseas Bureau (STC 0022/1135/1120/1444/4574/0059/6752) (Tr: Possibly of the Chinese Communist Party) in Communist China. His official title is vice chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in the State Council. TSOU was formerly deputy chief of the Central Overseas Operations Department and has held the present position since the establishment of the Overseas Bureau. Between the end of April and early May 61, TSOU together with CHI Kung (STC 2516/7255) (former director, International Liaison Bureau, Central Social Affairs Department) and CHU Ming (STC 2612/2494) (responsible for the training of special agents to be dispatched overseas) visited the Foreign Trade Institute (STC 0948/7139/7070/0190/1331/7108), Political Institute (STC 2398/3112/1331/7108), Public Security Institute (STC 0361/1344/1331/7108), International Relations Institute (STC 0948/7139/7070/0190/1331/7108), Military Affairs Institute (STC 6511/0057/1331/7108) and Foreign Language Institute (STC 1120/6133/1331/7108). They selected 120 students who are expected to graduate from these institutes and sent them to the Special Agent Training Class established by the Overseas Bureau on the western outskirts of PEIPING. These students allegedly will receive three-month training and will be dispatched to various countries in Latin America and Asia in the middle and latter part of August.

2. (U) (C) In the middle of Apr 61, 18 special agents who were studying at the Japanese Language Class of the Foreign Language Institute were sent to On-the-Job Cadre Study Class (STC 0961/5120/1631/6752/4282/4496/3803) at the Foreign Trade Institute. Of the 18 persons, eight are 1959 class graduates of the Peiping Cultural Institute (STC 0564/0079/2429/0953/1331/7108).

1465) ACSI 910.1 China 6 Aug 62

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SUBJECT: Training Organs for Special Operations Personnel (U) (C) Date of Info: Jun 61

EVALUATION: B-3

1. (U) (C) In early June 1961, 26 propagandists who had been undergoing training in the western suburbs of Peiping since 1 Oct 60, were graduated. The training was conducted by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee Propaganda Department.

a. The students, selected from provincial committee propaganda departments and new agencies, were required to have a Party career of five years and be active in a propaganda department.

b. PAO Chih-ching (STC 0545/0037/7234), Chief of the Newspaper and Publications Office, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, was responsible for the training. Instructors were P'ENG Chen (STC 1756/4176), CHANG Tzu-i (STC 1728/1311/1942), WU Leng-hsi (STC 0702/0397/6007), and CHANG Wen-chin (STC 4545/2429/2516).

2. (U) (C) Five of the 26 graduates will be sent to the Hanoi Broadcasting Station; two to the Hsin Hua She (STC 2450/5478/4357) (New China News Agency) branch office in Hanoi; and four to the Battle Voice of Laos Broadcasting Station. The remainder will be sent to New China News Agency branch offices in Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Personnel destined for North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are scheduled to reach there not later than 1 Jul 61; those destined for Burma will leave in early July, and the remainder will leave in the middle of July.

NOTE: "Battle Voice of Laos" is probably the clandestine Radio Pathet Lao Station. Individuals named as instructors hold other positions; however, all are logical choices for part-time instructors in propaganda activities.

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[redacted]

SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Organizations (U) Date of Info: May 61

Evaluation: B-3

1. Central Headquarters, Chinese Communist Party: The supreme guidance organ of foreign intelligence operations in the Central Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party is the Central Standing Committee; when the committee is not in session, the Central Political Bureau takes over this function. Under the committee is the Diplomatic Operations Committee (First Secretary: CH'EN I (STC 7115/3015)) which in turn controls the following five departments: United Front Operations, International Liaison, Finance and Trade Operations, Central Propaganda and Central Social Affairs.

a. United Front Operations Department: It carries out various domestic and foreign political operations. It is headed by LI Wei-han (STC 2621/4650/3352) and has eight deputy chiefs. Ever since the Overseas Operations Committee was merged into the departments, LIAO Ch'eng-chih (STC 1675/2110/1807, has been in charge of overseas intelligence operations. CHANG Chih-I (STC 1728/1013/0001) is in charge of various democratic parties and HSU Ti-hsin (STC 6079/3321/2450) is in charge of those people operating in commercial and industrial fields.

b. International Liaison Department: It maintains contact with the Communist Parties of other countries. LIU Ning-I (STC 0491/1380/0001) is the chief, but on major operations he receives instructions from CHANG Ch'eng-chih. The deputy chiefs confirmed are WU Hsiu-ch'uan (STC 0124/0208/2938, who devotes himself to operations against foreign countries and CH'EN Yu (STC 7115/1342), an assistant to LIU Ning-I.

c. Finance and Trade Operations Department: It is headed by MA Ming-fang (STC 7456/2494/5364). Of its deputy chiefs, YAO I-lin (STC 1202/0181/2651) is in charge of the collection of export goods, while LIN Hai-yun (STC 2651/3189/7189) is in charge of customs affairs. Department personnel as a rule do not directly engage in foreign intelligence operations; but department members stationed overseas have missions of their own connected with intelligence operations.

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SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Organizations (U)

d. Central Propaganda Department: It carries out propaganda operations within and outside the country. LU Ting-I (STC 7120/1353/0001) is the chief. Of the eight deputy chiefs, the following two persons are engaged in foreign operations: CH'EN Po-ta (STC 7115/0130/6671) taking charge of theoretical activities, and HU Ch'iao-mu (STC 5170/0829/2606) in charge of publication activities.

e. Central Social Affairs Department: It mainly carries out counter-intelligence activities and is headed by HSIEH Fu-chih (STC 6200/1381/3112). The names and missions of its deputy chiefs are: HSU Tzu-jung (STC 1776/1311/2837) public peace; YANG Shih-ch'ing (STC 2799/1102/3237), public peace; LI T'ien-huan (STC 2621/1131/3562) Chief of the Guard Sections of the General Staff Department; TSOU Ta-p'eng (STC 6760/1129/7720) intelligence operations; LI K'o-nung (STC 2621/0344/6593) deputy chief of the CCF General Staff and in charge of intelligence; and LI Shih-ying (STC 2621/1102/5391), deputy chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuracy.

2. Central Government: The Foreign Affairs General Office, which is under the direct control of the Premier, is in charge of foreign operations in the central government. It is headed by CHEN I. Through its deputy chiefs (LIAO Ch'eng-chih, LIU Ning-I, K'UNG Yuan (STC 1313/0626) and CHANG Yen (STC 1728/1750), it controls organs such as the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

a. Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs: It is in charge of infiltration of foreign countries utilizing overseas Chinese. LIAO Ch'eng-chih is the chairman of the commission. Its vice chairmen are FANG Feng (STC 2455/2455), LI Jen-jen (STC 2621/0117/0088) CHUANG Hsi-ch'uan (STC 5445/1565/3123, HUANG Ch'eng-shui (STC 7806/7022/3055) and CHUANG Ming-li (STC 5445/2494/3810).

b. All-China Federation of Trade Unions: In charge of penetration and conspiracies through labor unions of other countries. It is headed by LIU Ning-I.

c. Ministry of Foreign Trade: Although it is headed by YEH Chi-chuang (STC 5509/1323/5455) it is actually under the direction of K'UNG Huan. Its

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SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Organizations (U)

deputy chiefs are LEI Jen-min (STC 7191/0117/3046) LI Ch'iang (STC 2621/1730), LIN Hai-yun (STC 2651/3189/7189), CHIANG Ming (STC 3068/2494), LU Hsu-chang (STC 4151/4872/4545) and PAI Hsiang-yin (STC 4101/0686/6692).

d. Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries: It is headed by CHANG Hsi-jo (STC 1728/1153/5387), but it is actually under the control of CHANG Yen. Its deputy chiefs are CH'U T'u-nan (STC 2806/0956/0589), CHANG Chih-hsiang (STC 1728/5268/4382), TING Hsieh-lin (STC 0002/3610/2651), CH'U Wu (STC 1448/2976), TSOU Ta-P'eng and LO Chun (STC 5012/0193).

(1) CHANG Hsi-jo age 73, successively held the professorship at Central University, Ch'ing-hua (STC 3237/5478) University, Peking University and Southwest Associated University. He does not belong to any political party. Chinese Communist leaders use him as a figurehead.

(2) CH'U T'u-nan is the most active among the deputy chiefs. Although he is a vice chairman of the China Democratic League, he has long been a member of the Chinese Communist Party.

(3) CHANG Chih-hsiang is an outstanding figure in the literary circles of Communist China with the pen name of KUAN-T'UNG (STC 4619/1749). He is also the founder of a literary artists' organization called the KAI-CH'IEH-SHE (STC 5556/0011/4357).

(4) TING Hsieh-lin was once a professor at Peking University. He is an authority on physics and is the president of the Institute of Physics in the Central Research Institute. He is also well-known as a playwright. The Chinese Communist Party uses him as a figurehead.

(5) TSOU Ta-p'eng is in charge of intelligence activities in the cultural field.

(6) LO Chun is a man well-posted on finance and economics.

e. Religious Affairs Bureau: Its director is HO Ch'eng-hsiang (STC

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 June 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Organizations (U)

0149/2052/3276), who is also an influential member of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

f. Physical Culture and Sports Commission: HO Lung (STC 6320/7893) is the chairman. The vice chairmen are TS'AI T'ing-chieh (STC 5591/1693/6946), LI Te (STC 2621/6671) LU Han (STC 4151/3352) JUNG Kao-t'ang (STC 2637/7559/2768) and HUANG Chung (STC 7806/0022).

COMMENT: Records of this office contain no other information on a Diplomatic Operations Committee directly under the Central Committee of the CCP and over the five departments listed.

(U)
2. Following comments pertain to specific paragraphs of this report:

a. Ref par 1: Agree with field comments on Diplomatic Operations Committee. If information is accurate, appears logical that CH'EN I, who is member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), one of the vice-chairmen of the National Defense Council (NDC), one of the Vice Premiers of the State Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, would head this Diplomatic Operations Committee. In addition, the breakdown of the five departments of the CCP falling under the jurisdication of CHEN I seems logical (excludes Organization Dept, Rural Works Dept, Industrial Works Dept, and Communications Work Dept. It is felt, however, that if such an organization does exist, that CHEN I is merely a figurehead and some other individual within the hierarchy is the actual head of the operations. Unclear here as to '1st Secretary' title of CHEN I.

b. Ref par 1a: Listing of LI Wei-han and eight deputy chiefs agree with US Army holdings. Agree on point that LIAO Ch'eng-chih is head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission which is operationally under the State Council, but there is no information to date that this commission was merged into the United Front Operations Department. Both CHANG Chih-I and HSU Ti-hsin have been carried as Deputy Directors of the United Front Operations Dept.

c. Ref par 1b: WU Hsiu-ch'uan, listed as deputy in the report, carried as director of the International Liaison Department. It may be true that LU Ning-I

[redacted]

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Organizations (U)

Is the director since he is one of the Deputy Directors of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council; however, there is no information to substantiate this. Further, no information exists on CHANG Ch'eng-chih mentioned as actual head related to major operations. Our files show that CH'EN Yu is presently listed as one of the six secretaries of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the CCP.

d. Ref par 1c: Agree on MA Ming-fang and YAO I-lin. There is no information on LIN Hai-yun, carried as one of the Vice Ministers of Foreign Trade up to Mar 61, having been transferred to the Finance and Trade Operations Dept.

e. Ref par 1d: Agree with LU Ting-I reported as chief of department. CH'EN Po-ta is carried as one of seven deputies under LU and concurrently Chief Editor of Red Flag. HSU Li-ch'un also carried as head of the Theoretical Propaganda Division under the Propaganda Dept. No information on HU Ch'iao-mu and head of the Press Division of the Propaganda Dept.

f. Ref par 1e: LI K'o-nung listed in our file as head of the Social Affairs Department. HSIEH Fu-chih reported as head is carried as Director of the Political and Legal Affairs Office under the State Council and not a department of the CCP. Concurrently he is Minister of Public Security, indicating possibly he may be head of this department. Of the six deputies reported, HSU YANG and LI are carried as Vice Ministers under the Ministry of Public Security. TSOU is carried as one of the Vice Chairmen of Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries under the State Council. Agree on position of LI Shih-ying, but no information on his transfer to this department. If composition of this department is factual, considerable personnel reshuffle appears to have occurred in this department.

g. Ref par 2: Personalities and positions agree with holdings but unable to comment on chain of command on the reported organs under the Foreign Affairs General Office.

h. Ref par 2a: All personalities reported agree with our holdings.

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Organizations (U)

j. Ref par 2b: Agree on personality reported.

j. Ref par 2c: All personalities agree with our holdings except for K'UNG Yuan; K'UNG carried as one of deputy directors of Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council.

k. Ref par 2d: All personalities agree with our holdings except for CHANG Yen; who carried as one of deputy directors of Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council.

l. Ref par 2e: Agree with our holdings.

m. Ref par 2f: Agree with our holdings.

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ON 20 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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SECRET

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Capt McJunkin/73958/Mr Monzeglio/72434/wsp/CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (3 Aug 62) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Essential Elements of Information (EEI) (U)

(b)(1) per CIA

CURRENT and BACKGROUND: By ltr, ([redacted]) ref OACSI pub, Sov Bloc EEI (U), 9 Nov 61 (Proj 76), and req details re entry in annex A, P-3, which showed one CHICOM EEI as "deployment of Honest John and security measures taken during transport to field exercises." ([redacted])

RATIONALE: ([redacted]) (b)(1) per CIA

STATUS: Closed.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 5 hrs
Typist Time: 4 hrs

Action Officer
Ch, CIAS
Chief, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div

RECRADED SECRET
ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

per CIA

SECRET

044

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL [illegible]

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS [illegible]

OPCA-20 (12-3-96)

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

35 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☑ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☑ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☑ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

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☐ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

pgs 45-47

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FBI/DOJ

15

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AGENT REPORT
(SR 340-320-10)

mdk

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

CARDED

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 July 1962

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
J/766/000139

5USC552 (b)(7)(C) per ARSEC

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 28 June 1962 [redacted] Special Agent, Office of Special Investigation (OSI), Etain Air Base, APO 27, US Forces, was interviewed in his office and stated substantially the following:

Source has recently received data from his headquarters in Paris (Seine), France, that one [redacted] CARDED is suspected of being an operative of the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service (CCIS). The information was received from the Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE). [redacted] is supposedly operating as a clothing merchant in the vicinity of Metz (Moselle) and Sarrebourg (Moselle), France. [redacted] in possession of two passports, not further identified, and is believed to have a family still residing in Communist China.

Source had no further information concerning [redacted] in that their activities have not come to his attention in any manner other than the basic data received from his headquarters.

RECORDS UNCLASSIFIED
ON Aug 25, 1997
BY [redacted] FOIPO
AUTHORITY E.O. 13526 DoD 5200.1-R

CARD/FILE
Ref: HE 500475
Subj: Chinese suspected of Espionage in France

This Document Has Been
Carded by C/R Section
Date 17 Aug 62 hr: 541

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.10

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

048

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[redacted]
766th INTC Det

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES DD AGO FORM [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) [illegible]

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

mdk

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

CHANG, Kung-heng aka: Chen, Kung Hang
DOB: [redacted]
POB: [redacted]

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 July 1962

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
J/766/000139

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(FILE CHECK) On 18 July 1962, files of the Sub-Central Registry, France, APO 58, US Forces, were checked concerning the following individuals with results as indicated:

CHANG, Kung-heng aka: Chen Kung Hang — No record

Ip, Siu-Chow aka: Yeh, Hsrao-chou — No record

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 049

5. TY [redacted] SPECIAL AGENT [redacted]

766th INTC Det

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 3-55-[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
Espionage Activities (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED
7 November 1962

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
J/766/001241

IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS CARDED IN... DEC. 13 1962

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 22 October 1962, G-140, a representative of Source 16000 who has provided reliable information in the past, was interviewed in his office and volunteered substantially the following information concerning suspicious Chinese nationals in Eastern France:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Source's agency is presently investigating several Chinese nationals who travel widely throughout France as representatives of Chinese firms. One of these is _____, Chinese national, born _____ in _____, a travelling salesman residing at _____. _____ entered France in 1930 and established residence in Colmar. He is married to _____, French national.

CARDED

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) _____ travels extensively to fairs and exhibits in Eastern France in relation to his professional position. He entertains a commercial contact with another Chinese national businessman, _____, who made several trips to Colmar in 1961. In correspondence, _____ asked _____ if the latter had any news concerning a transfer of funds from Switzerland to a bank in Hong Kong, British Crown Colony. In April 1962, _____ wrote to _____ to inquire if the latter had received news of _____, aunt, and _____, wife, who was then in Communist China.

CARDED

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Since 1960, _____ has made several trips within France and to several neighboring countries, particularly Switzerland and West Germany. He engages fraudently in the sale of Chinese embroidery imported from Hong Kong and Communist China. _____ and his wife, _____, both reside in Paris (Seine), France. In May 1962, _____ returned to France via Marseille after a trip to Hong Kong and to Communist China, where she has relatives. She had three suitcases in her possession when she arrived from Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhone), France. These suitcases were sent through the French postal system to the firm Orient-Waren in Switzerland, and therefore Source's agency could not determine their contents. However, through the use of X-ray equipment, Swiss postal authorities determined the contents to be merchandise.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) _____ is suspected of being an agent of the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service (CCIS) who maintains discreet contact with diplomatic officials of Communist China located in Berne, Switzerland. He is a representative of the above-mentioned firm, Orient-Waren, an import company with headquarters in Utzenstoff, Switzerland. This firm is suspected of being a cover organization for CCIS activities, and for this reason, all persons connected with the company are also suspected by Source's agency. Orient-Waren has two business representatives

(continued)

050 CARD/FILE

REF! HE 500 475

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C.P.I. CARDS PREPARED

5. TYPED BY
766th IntC Det

6. SPECIAL AGENT
(b)(7)(C)

CONTAINS DOCUMENT. 7 Dec 62 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CONFIDENTIAL INITIALS 547

DA FORM 1 APR 62 341

AGEZ 12-60-1000-1005

CONFIDENTIAL

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-325-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
Espionage Activities (U)	7 November 1962
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
	J/766/001241

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
(continued)

in Paris, and one in Germany. Although these individuals, all Chinese nationals, travel extensively, their professional duties for Orient Haven, which was established in 1959 and which sells embroidery and other products from Hong Kong, do not necessitate such wide travel.

Source is presently preparing an extensive report on these and similar Chinese national activities in Eastern France, and will provide a summary of this report to the undersigned.

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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ON 26 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

051

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

6. TYP[illegible] SPECIAL AGENT

766th MIC Det

DA FORM 1 APR 62 341

AGCK 12-60-400-1064

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~~SECRET~~

ACSI-SC (1 Nov 61) 1st Ind (S)
SUBJECT: SRI 130-61-CC Hong Kong Based Chicom Espionage Ring (U)

HQ, DA, OACSI, Washington 25, D.C. NOV 29 1961

1222100

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: Operations Division, APO 958, San Francisco, California

(a)

1. (S) As stated in paragraph 4, USARMLO Hong Kong CX-68-61, dated 17 November 1961, the Tokyo press report cited in paragraph 2, basic letter, appears to be an exaggeration of local Hong Kong press reports.

[redacted]

(b)(1) per CIA

[redacted]

(b)(1) per CIA

[redacted]

052

~~SECRET~~

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ACSI-SC
SUBJECT: SRI 130-61-CC Hong Kong Based Chicom Espionage Ring (U)

4. (C) (U) In view of the ramifications involved in this matter, it is requested that any dissemination of this information performed by your headquarters be held to an absolute minimum. Any subsequent information which becomes available will be furnished your headquarters immediately.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

JACK L. [illegible], Col, GS
Chief, [illegible] Branch

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
AUTH: [illegible] DOD 5200.1R

053

~~SECRET~~

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Capt McJunkin/cld/72434/CIAS/CI Br/Sec Div

Jn 38
p 72

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (27 Nov 61) ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

SUBJECT: SRI 130-61-CC Hong Kong Based Chicom Espionage Ring (U)

(b)(1) PER CIA

CURRENT: Inst action furnishes to Hq USARPAC info made available by

(b)(1) per CIA

BACKGROUND: SRI, Subject as above, was fwded by USARPAC 1 Nov 61.

STATUS: Tentatively closed, pending the possibility that the British later release details for dissemination.

RATIONALE: To fulfill USARPAC's SRI re a matter which superficially appeared to seriously concern that area; action informs USARPAC that press reports were exaggerated, and matter appears restricted to Hong Kong.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

(b)(3) per CIA

COORDINATION: On 22 Nov 61, Capt McJunkin, CIAS, contacted [redacted] to obtain available info on the case.

Action Officer Time: 6 hr
Typist Time: 2 hr

Action Officer Harold B. McJunkin
Ch, CIAS [illegible]
Chief, CI Br [illegible]
Ch, Sec Div [illegible]

054 ~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

16 12 '63 1191 Chgmt. CRF

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands 2/1 ZEI	27 September 1961
	3. Control Symbol or File Number HH-800027

4. Report of Findings

On 13 September 1961, Confidential Source CD-800, who has furnished usually reliable information in the past, made available for examination two pieces of mail addressed and with contents as follows: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

a. One envelope was addressed to [redacted] mailed by the Bank of America, Seventh and Olive, Office 20, P.O. Box 3609, Terminal Annex, Los Angeles 54, California, and postmarked 1 September 1961 at Los Angeles, California. The contents consisted of one Payment Order Number 22634 with letterhead reading International Banking Office, Los Angeles 54, California, and stating the following:

Credit Your Account: [redacted] US $Amount 500.00
Payment by Order of: [redacted]
Per Instructions From: Bank of America, Okinawa
Dated: 8-30-61
Paying Branch: Seventh and Olive No. 20.

b. One envelope was addressed to [redacted] mailed by the Bank of America, Seventh and Olive, Office 20, Los Angeles 54, California, and postmarked 8 September 1961 at Los Angeles, California. The contents consisted of one Deposit Slip, unnumbered, which contained the following information:

Deposit for Account (checking) No. [redacted]
Check 16-81 for $600.00
Name: [redacted]
CPO Box 104
Date: 9-8 1961
Naha, Okinawa

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

AGENT'S NOTES: On 27 September 1961, an examination of the files of the 526th INTC Detachment, disclosed two Reports of Investigation, subject: (U) [redacted] AKA: [redacted] (and other aliases), 43rd OSI District (USAF), file 27-22, dated 21 February 1961 and 26 June 1961, which contained the following information pertaining to [redacted]
Report of 21 February 1961 - "Information in files (43rd OSI District) reveal [redacted] Far Eastern Furnishings Company, and [redacted] Report of 26 June 1961 - "Files, this District Office (43rd OSI District) reveal [redacted] is an alias of [redacted] with [redacted] of the FAR EASTERN FURNISHINGS COMPANY. [redacted]

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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DOD DIR 5200.10

055

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent
526th INTC Det, [redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

CONFIDENTIAL

INTC Agent

CHANGE TO CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SUBJECT TO (b) (3) (b) (6) (7) (C)
5 USC 552 (b) (3) (b) (6) (7) (C)
DECLASSIFIED ON 25 AUG 97
BY SAF/AAIA FOIPO
AUTH NARA F-03 DoD 5200.1-R

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands	27 September 1961
2/1 ZEI	3. Control Symbol or File Number EH-800027

4. Report of Findings

maintain a joint checking account in the name of the FAR EASTERN FURNISHINGS COMPANY, OKINAWA." There was no additional information in file concerning [redacted]. There was no information in file concerning [redacted]. The monetary transactions establish that the two individuals have bank accounts in the United States. The significance of the monetary transactions is not known at the present time.

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C) for ATSI

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 25 Aug 97
BY [illegible]
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

(2)

(b)(6) & (b)(7)(C)

056

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent	6. Signature
[redacted], 526th INTC Det.	[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

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CRF

16 12 '63 1191

AGENT REPORT CONFIDENTIAL
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES (U)	27 November 1961
	3. Control Symbol or File Number
	XF-276032

4. Report of Findings

DOWNGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

W A R N I N G

DISCLOSURE OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT OUTSIDE OF INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS WILL RESULT IN THE COMPROMISE OF SOURCE

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

On 20 November 1961, the following information pertaining to SUBJECT was obtained from [redacted] who has provided information of undetermined reliablility in the past and who received the information from a Sub-source of unknown reliability located on the mainland of China:

During 1961, the following changes occurred in the structure of the Chinese Communist Overseas Espionage network:

The Overseas Intelligence Department (OID) is directly under the control and supervision of Communist China's Central Political Bureau and is currently headed by Wang, Chia-hsiang (3769/4471/4382), not further identified. Wang, Chia-hsiang is assisted by two deputy chiefs; Liao, Ch'eng-chih (1394/2110/1807) not further identified, and Li, Li-ch'u (2621/2746/0443) DOB: unknown; POB: [redacted] Current Address: Kuangchou (1684/1558), and a graduate of the National First High School Tokyo, in 1929. The headquarters of the OID is presently located on the 8th floor of the Aich'un Chiutien (1947/5028/6794/1648) (Wine Shop), in Kuangchou City. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

In February 1961, the Central Political Bureau directed the OID to enlarge its organization and as the result of this order the OID added the following two (2) new offices to the already established 11 divisions of the OID:

Investigation and Statistics Office: This office is responsible for the collection and correlation of military, economic and political statistics on all Southeastern and Northeastern Asian countries. The Chief of the Investigation and Statistics Office is Yang, Hsiu-sheng (2254/0208/3932), not further identified.

057

Office of Social Studies: This office receives all finalized studies prepared by the Investigation and Statistics Office and after a comprehensive study of these reports, prepares and submits final reports with recommendations for countermeasures to the Central Political Bureau. The Chief of the Office of Social Studies is Liang, Hsueh-jen (2733/1331/0117), not further identified.

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent

Fukuoka Office CONFIDENTIAL

US Army Liaison Det., Japan, APO 929

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PC
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1

AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10) CONFIDENTIAL

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES (U)	27 November 1961
	3. Control Symbol or File Number: XF-270032

4. Report of Findings

(b)(6) & (b)(7)(C)

The Overseas Strategic Control Bureau (OSCB), a detachment of the Central Strategic Control Department, is also located in the Aich'un Chiutien in Kuangchou City. Hu, (Illegible) -mu (5170/..../2606); approximately 50 years of age; POB: [redacted] a graduate of the Ch'ing-hua (3237/5478) University; and former Chief Editor of the Chung-ch'ing (0022/7230) (Chinese Youth), is the present Director of the OSCB. Hu is also the Assistant Chief of the Propaganda Department and Superintendent of the Newspapers General Agency. Two Special Agents, both working directly under the supervision and control of Hu, have been dispatched to Hongkong where they are engaged in the collection of intelligence information. These two Special Agents are identified as; Wang, Ching (3769/2529); approximately 38 years of age; POB: [redacted] and a graduate of the National Defense College of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), and Liu, Chien-shen (0491/0494/3932); approximately 43 years of age; POB: [redacted] and a graduate of the Szuch'uan Higher Teachers School.

Officers in charge of the various divisions of the OID are as follows:

Overseas Works Liaison Division: Li, I (2621/3015).

Latin American Intelligence Division: Chang, Yun-ch'uan (1728/7189/1557) or Chang, Yun-chou (1728/7189/1558).

British and French Intelligence Division: Hua, (Illegible) (5478/....) possibly Hua, Yun (5478/7189).

Taiwan Intelligence Division: Liu, T'uan-hsiung (0491/0957/7160).

West German and Italian Intelligence Division: Yang, Po-hsuan (2254/0130/6513).

Malayan and Singapore Intelligence Division: Lu, Chien-p'ing (0712/0494/1627).

Philippine Intelligence Division: Chiang, Lueh (3068/3970).

Japanese Intelligence Division: Pai, Yun-sheng (4101/7189/3932).

American Intelligence Division: Chang, Po-(Illegible) (1728/0130/....)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

058

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 52[redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent: Fukuoka Offi[redacted] 6. Sig[redacted]

US Army Liaison Det., Japan, APO 929

CONFIDENTIAL

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

FPRC, Japan

AGENT REPORT CONFIDENTIAL
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES (U)	27 November 1961
	3. Control Symbol or File Number XF-270032

4. Report of Findings

Ceylon and Pakistan Intelligence Division: Ho, Shao-liang (6230/1421/5328).

Foreign Currencies Counterfeit Printing Division: (American and Philippine Currency) - Kan, Ken-ch'ing (1626/2704/3237).

The Foreign Economy Liaison Bureau has been recently established in the CHICOM Cabinet and Fan, I (2455/3015); POB: [redacted] not further identified, was appointed as chief of the bureau. Officials dispatched by this bureau to various foreign countries have been selected from the Foreign Affairs Department, the International Trade Department and the National Affairs Committee of CHICOM.

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

059

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name and Organization of Special Agent | 6
Fukuoka Office CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted] Liaison Det., Japan, APO 929

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 26 1955

NOV 1 1961

GPPIN-OD

010737

SUBJECT: SRI 130-6E-CC Hong Kong Based Chicom Espionage Ring (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.

1. References: a. DALRIR I-9, Apr 60.
b. USARPAC ICP Annex B 217.000

2. (U) Background: Summarized below is an article from a Hong Kong newspaper:

The 13 Oct 61 issue of Japan Times contained a news article originating from Hong Kong newspapers on 12 Oct that British authorities had cracked an international spy ring based in Hong Kong and linked with cells in Tokyo, Bangkok, Saigon and Macao. Six persons, including highly placed officials, were reported arrested. The Hong Kong Government allegedly was non-committal.

3. (U) Request information pertaining to the spy ring to include: strength and organization, modus operandi (including funding, agent recruitment, training, penetration, cover, documentation, and technical facilities and equipment used in reproducing documents or for communication), targets and objectives, and personalities (including photos, if available, and detailed biographics on persons apprehended and identification of the agents or personalities in the cells) of the Communist Chinese spy ring. Also, identification of the organization which surfaced the spy ring and the circumstances surrounding its exposure.

4. (U) Request an initial reply by 30 Nov 61, and subsequent reports as information becomes available, be sent to this office, attn: Operations Division citing this SRI.

S. WHIPPLE, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

060

cc USARMLO Hong Kong

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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ON 29 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☑ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 61-62

IACPA-CSP Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY JAPAN
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2/G-3
APO 343, San Francisco, California

USARJ GEC-CI 30 August 1961

SUBJECT: FIVE SUSPECTED CHICOM SPIES (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
United States Army, Pacific
APO 958
ATTN: Operations Division

010931

Chinese Communist

CIF

1. (U) References:

a. Letter, your headquarters, dated 6 June 1961, subject as above.

b. Message, this office, number FM 911647, dated 27 July 1961, subject as above.

2. (U) Transmitted herewith two (2) Agents Reports, subject as above, dated 29 August 1961, which contain all information available to this office concerning SUBJECT.

3. (U) Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified material.

2 Incls
as

LANDON G. COX
Colonel GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2/G-3

Retained

OI 12 '61

[redacted]

[redacted]

DOD DIR 5200.10

063

14 20

[redacted]

29 August 1961

FIVE SUSPECTED CHICOM SPIES (U)

On 21 August 1961, the following was received from a [redacted] which has furnished reliable information in the past:

The following is the results of an investigation conducted concerning a fraud case perpetrated by 5 Chinese nationals residing in Japan, in an attempt gain ownership and sell property owned by Chao, Pi-yun (Cho, Heki En)(6392/4310/8827) former puppet government official in Manchuria, during Japanese occupation.

The following is identifing data concerning the 5 Chinese individuals mentioned above:

Name: [redacted]

Date of Birth: [redacted]

Place of Birth: [redacted]

Permanent Address: [redacted]

Present Address: [redacted]

Occupation: Unemployed

Date of Entry: 3 May 1935

Name: Ma, Yen-hsi (Ba, En Ki)(7456/1693/0823)

Date of Birth: 4 April 1892

Place of Birth: I-hao, Weifu-chieh, Fantien Province, China

Permanent Address: Same as above

Present Address: 824-banchi, Seijo-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo-to

Occupation: President of Southseas Enterprise Company, Ltd. (Nanyo Kigyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (南洋企業株式会社) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date of Entry: 30 October 1949

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7)(C)

[redacted]

CI Division, G-2/G-3, USARJ, APO 343

064

[redacted]

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29 August 1961

FIVE SUSPECTED CHICOM SPIES (U)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: [redacted]

Date of Birth: [redacted]

Place of Birth: [redacted]

Permanent Address: [redacted]

Present Address: [redacted]

Occupation: Unemployed

Date of Entry: 16 November 1953

Name: [redacted]

Date of Birth: [redacted]

Place of Birth: [redacted]

Permanent Address: Same as above

Present Address: [redacted]

Occupation: Student taking a postgraduate course at Hosei University

Date of Entry: 9 November 1952

Name: [redacted]

Date of Birth: [redacted]

Place of Birth: [redacted]

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[redacted]

CI Division, [redacted], USARJ APO 343

[redacted]

085

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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ON 6 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

29 August 1961

FIVE SUSPECTED CHICOM SPIES (U)

(b)(6)

Permanent Address: [redacted]

Present Address: [redacted]

Occupation: Trader

Date of Entry: 3 May 1955

During the interrogation of the above mentioned individuals concerning the real estate fraud case, there were allegations made to the effect that one or more of these individuals were agents for Communist China. However, further investigation proved these allegations to be false. The following are the allegations which were made:

Ma, Yen-Hui, during interrogation, stated that told him that was an expert from the "Overseas Economy Department of Communist China" and had access to Communist China official documents which have the letterhead of "Hsuanwu People's Government". receives these documents from Peking, China. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

However, during the interrogation of he stated that when he was 19 years of age he was forced to attend an intelligence school called the Chubi Gaasaku-sha (Chinese American Cooperative Association) located at Chengtu City, Szuchuan Province, China. , instructor at this school was an American and in June 1960 claims he met this American in the Ginza area of Tokyo. At this meeting, the American, who claimed to be a foreign trader, told that a labor delegation from Communist China was scheduled to come to Japan and stay at the Tokyu Hotel in Tokyo, Japan. was to stay at the Tokyu Hotel and keep the delegation under observation. The American reportedly gave approximately one million yen for his services. claimed he could not reveal the details of this operation because he was sworn to secrecy by the American. (b)(6)

Aben claimed that he met in 1954 at the Chinese Christian Church, Ochanomizu, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo and that even though may say he is a student at the Hosei University in realit As a Chinese Communist agent, with the title of Chief of the 6th Squad in Tokyo.

Source stated that through investigation the above allegations were proved false. Source also stated the following in regard to In the past there have been varried and numerous rumors to the effect that

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(b)(6)

CI Division, O-2/O-3, USARJ, APO 343

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7)(C)

29 August 1961

FIVE SUSPECTED CHICOM SPIES (U)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

was an Agent for Communist China and that himself, was the source of most of these rumors. It is the opinion of Source that is a habitual liar and a swindler. Therefore any statement made by has to be considered in this light.

This investigation did not reveal any espionage activity on the part of the individuals mentioned in the fraud case. However, the individuals are being charged with fraud in the real estate transation they illegally attempted to transact.

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)

067

CI Division, [redacted], USARJ, APO 343

29 August 1961

FIVE SUSPECTED CHICOM SPIES (U)

A check of the files of the Counterintelligence Repository, G-2/C-3, USARJ, APO 343, conducted in conjunction with Mr. Richard N. Wade, GS-6, MI Analyst, revealed the following concerning individuals whose name are similar but are not positively identified as the five suspected Chicom agents mentioned in the 15 March 1961 morning edition of the Japanese language newspaper Yomiuri:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) [redacted], other identifing data unknown. Suspected Chicom agent.

[redacted], approximate date of birth 1904; Male; Chinese; 6/3, Tamon-cho, Ikuta-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken; alien registeration number 5335447. Listed as a repatriate to depart Japan for Chicom on 9 February 1955 aboard the Koan Maru.

[redacted], address unknown, listed as a close personal friend of Ex-Prime Minister Kishi, whom he met in Manchuria during the Sino-Japanese War. (b)(6)

[redacted], curio dealer; 6-banchi, 3-chome, Kazun-cori, Ikuta-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken. Met with members of a Chicom trade mission on 24 April 1955. (b)(7)(C)

[redacted]a, Yen-hsi (馬 延 喜)(Chinese)(S-CI), a commercial entrant residing at [redacted] believed to be associating with known Communist.

[redacted], approximate date of birth 1916; Chinese; Male; 6/3, Tamon-cho, Ikuta-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken; alien registeration number 533550. Listed as a repatriate to depart Japan for Chicom on 9 February 1955 aboard the Koan Maru.

The above information was extracted from Unlist CIC Detachment Agent Reports, evaluated probably true. The only similarity between the individuals mentioned above and the individuals mentioned in the article in the Yomiuri newspaper are the chinese characters for their names and the approximate dates of birth. Therefore, positive identification between these individuals can not be made.

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 088

[redacted]
CI Division, G-2/C-3, USARJ, APO 343

[redacted]

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010937

ACSI-SC CANALBOAT (S) (U) MAY 1 1961

SUBJECT: Exchange of Information (LAX-61-20) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Caribbean
APO 834, New York, New York

1215996

1. (U) Reference letter, file CARGB, subject as above, dated 11 April 1961.

2. (U) Your revision of report LAX-61-13 and draft report concerning Fredrico LOU (aka LOR Ming Lai) are approved for release to Latin American G2's with whom you have been authorized to exchange information.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED J. B. CONMY
Col. GS

CLAUDE D. BARTON
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

RECOMMENDED RECLASSIFIED
ON 27 SEP 2000
[redacted]
AUTHORITY DOD 5200.12

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO CONFIDENTIAL
With Ltr dated June 63
BY E.O. 15 dated
MARY L. HADDEN, ASST. [redacted], R/S
18 June 63

Read from MFRB 3 May 61 JS

[redacted]

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069

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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Counterintelligence Br

IR2C Surfaces
CI/1117 P165

424.4 Panama 1 May 61 - 31 Dec 61

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ Mc Zilkie/car/7 7/CIAS/CI Br/Sec Div

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC CANALBOAT (S) (U)
MEMO FOR RECORD: (26 Apr 61) ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Exchange of Information (LAX-61-20) (U)

CURRENT and BACKGROUND: G2 USARCARIB submitted a change to LAX-61-13 for approval since he thought certain references in LAX-61-13 as submitted by OACSI might compromise source. (b)(1) per CIA consequently, it is doubted that the source would have been compromised. USARCARIB change to report does not affect contents; therefore, it was approved. G2 USARCARIB also submitted a draft of a contemplated release re Fredrico LOU (aka LOR Ming Lai) prepared from R-12-61, Panama for approval. Inst ltr approves release of info contained in G2 USARCARIB draft.

STATUS: Completed.

RATIONALE: In amplification of Exchange of Info Program and to comply with USARCARIB request.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: USARCARIB ltr CARGB, subj: Exchange of Information (U), dtd 11 Apr 61 with 3 Inclosures.

COORDINATION: For Concurrence: Foreign Disclosure Section (SMI)
Signature [signature] Date 27 Apr 61

Action Officer Time: 3 hr
Typist Time: 1½ hr

Action Officer [signature]
Ch, CIAS [signature] LT Col
Chief, CI Br [signature]
for Ch, Sec Div [signature]

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CANALBOAT (S) (U)
070

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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R
Per CIA

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DOD DIR 5200.10

OPCA-20 (12-3-96)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

35 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☑ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☑ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☑ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
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☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

_____ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

_____ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

_____ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

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☐ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

pgs 71-75

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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FBI/DOJ

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[redacted] Capt Kura[illegible]a/car/72[illegible] CIAS/CI Br/Sec Div

Q 34/34

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 2 1961

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: TSRI 112-OP-60, ChiCom Espionage Techniques (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Pacific
APO 956, San Francisco, California

1213391

1. (U) Reference: Letter G2, USARPAC, TSRI 112-OP-60, above subject, dated 6 December 1960.

2. (C)(U) To date, efforts to obtain additional information concerning JAMYANG GYANTSEN have been negative.

3. (C)(U) DACSI has received numerous reports on the exposure of Chinese Communist espionage activities in India. Attached is a summary of details of these exposures as now known. Inquiry continues to be made in an effort to develop operational material. Such information, when developed, will be made available to your command.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

1 Incl
as

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For
CLAUDE D. BARTON
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

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BY 27 SEP 2000
AUTH: DOD 5200.1R

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Rec'd from mtg PW & Feb 61 FS

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT None
BY AUTHORITY OF AG Regulations, Reg
DATE 1 Feb 61

APPLIES TO INCLOSURES ONLY

076

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Counterintelligence Br

44-C.1302 1P2C 1 encl 2C

910.1 China 4 Feb 61 Ltr Feb 61

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9-30-34

Summary of ChiCom Espionage Activities in India (C) 01057

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
per
CIA

[redacted]

910.1 China

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
PER
CIA

[redacted]

& Tibet 611 (6 June 61)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
per
CIA

[redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT None
BY AUTHORITY OF DCI Inquiries Dept.
DATE 1 Feb 61

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077

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4. (U) Excerpts from Indian press reports:

a. The Times of India, dated 30 August 1960: A deep rooted Chinese propaganda ring, active in the border districts of Darjeeling and Calcutta, where the bulk of West Bengal's 10,000 Chinese lived, was unearthed by the State Police recently. Some selected Chinese, who had been to Peking during the last few years on one pretext or another, were found engaged in propaganda work and collecting intelligence about new road building and location of Army and police installations in the border districts. The police had served notice on twenty (20) of them, ordering them to leave India. These included two high-ranking officials of the Bank of China.

b. The Hindustan Times, dated 30 August 1960: A former Tibetan district deputy chief of security under the Chinese in Amdo District of Tibet stated that the Chinese Communists in Tibet had set up a giant spying network in India. He disclosed that the Chinese spy network in India was being controlled from two offices in Tibet--one in Lhoka District in Southern Tibet, and the other near Gyantse, near the Sikkim border. Both offices, the former Chinese security officer said, were controlled directly by the top Chinese security organization at Lhasa and had no direct connection with the district security offices which were for internal spying only. The Chinese had planned their spying network for India at a meeting of their top security men at Lhasa about the middle of last year. He believed the Chinese had recruited and were recruiting Tibetans only from higher class families. Every time Indian traders went to Tibet, the Chinese security men made a determined bid to secure their services. The Tibetan recruits, he said, were being sent in the guise of refugees.

c. The Hindustan Times, dated 2 September 1960: While full details on the Chinese spying in India were not fully available, the border police had tracked down six Chinese agents among Tibetan refugees in recent months. The Chinese, it was said, assigned limited "mission" to this class of spies. During interrogations, many said they were forced into it by the threat of liquidating their family members who were held as hostages. There were, it was stated, two other classes of Chinese spies in India; Chinese nationals in India and Indians. It was these two classes which the Chinese were using to secure military secrets and create internal troubles. (USARMA, India, R-775-60, dtd 1 Dec 60).

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
per
CIA

[redacted]

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CIA

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Capt Kurata/
[redacted]mjh/72434/CIAS/CI Br, Sec Div

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (1 Feb 61) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: TSRI 112-OP-60, Chicom Espionage Techniques (U)

CURRENT: Instant ltr informs G2, USARPAC that to date no additional information is available on Jamyang Gyantsen, but inquiry continues to be made to obtain same. Transmitted w/ltr is summary of available reports on Chicom espionage activities in India relative to basic request.

(b)(1) per CIA

BACKGROUND: Ltr from G2, USARPAC, TSRI 112-OP-60, dtd 6 Dec 60 to OACSI requested additional available information on Chicom espionage techniques based on debriefing of arrested Chicom spy, Jamyang Gyantsen. Contact by CIAS, CI Br. with Eastern Div; Exploitation B[redacted] proved negative to date.

STATUS: Pending. Pertinent information to request will be forwarded to requestor as it becomes available.


RATIONALE: To answer G2, USARPAC's request for information.

DELAY: Reply was delayed in effort to exploit all possible sources to obtain additional information. Interim reply (negative) forwarded USARPAC 21 Dec 60.

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None required

Action Officer: 3 hr
Typist Time: 2 hr



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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1-R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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JOINT MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

1961 JAN 6 22 007

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
ACTION: ROUTINE			X			
INFO:						

FROM:
ACSI DA WASH DC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTR: ACSI/902d (CIAS)

TO:
USARMA NEW DELHI INDIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DA988277 From ACSI for USARMA, New Delhi, India. Reference: Joint WEEKA #42, from SANA, New Delhi, India, DTG 211600Z Oct 60.

1. (U) Army section of reference reports the arrest of Chinese Communist spy, JAMYANG GYANTSEN, in Kamseng Frontier Division (Border Bhutan) NEFA.

2. (U) OACSI desires as soon as available information resulting from the interrogation of this individual. OACSI is particularly interested in Chinese Communist espionage techniques— i.e. dispatching agency, vetting methods, mission assignments, penetration methods and cover stories, and communication channels.

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[redacted]

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 June 1999 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

E4

DATE	TIME
6	1630Z
MONTH	YEAR
Jan	1961

WRITER

SYMBOL: 988277
ACSI-SC
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): JOSEPH Y. KURATA, Capt, AI (Inf)
PHONE: 72434 | PAGE NR. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: JACK L. WEIGAND, Col, GS
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
For [redacted] 081
[redacted] Security Division
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3

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH IS OBSOLETE FOR ARMY USE.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955—O-347384

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Capt Kurata. 72434/CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (5 Jan 61) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Cable to USARMA, New Delhi, India re Information on Chinese Communist spy, JAMYANG GYANTSEN (U)

CURRENT: Instant cable requests available information resulting from interrogation of arrested Chinese Communist spy, JAMYANG GYANTSEN.

BACKGROUND: Ref ltr G-2, USARPAC, dtd 6 Dec 60, subject: TSRI 112-OP-60, Chicom Espionage Techniques (U), to ACSI requesting additional available information on the debriefing of JAMYANG GYANTSEN. Exploitation Br, DF[redacted] have no information on subject's debriefing. (b)(1) per CIA

STATUS: Pending receipt of information.

RATIONALE: To satisfy request of G2, USARPAC.

DELAY: None

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: For information with [redacted] Operations Branch, on 5 Jan 61 by Capt Kurata, CIAS, CI Br, Security Division.

Action Officer Time: 3 hr
Typist Time: 1 hr

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Action Officer
Ch, CIS
Ch, CI
Ch, Sec Div

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988277 082

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION ROUTINE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO			X			

FROM: ACSI DA WASH DC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTR: ACSI/902d
(CIAS)

TO: USARMA NEW DELHI INDIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DA988277 From ACSI for USARMA, New Delhi, India. Reference: Joint WEEKA #42, from SANA, New Delhi, India, DTG 211600Z Oct 60.

1. (U) Army section of reference reports the arrest of Chinese Communist spy, JAMYANG GYANTSEN, in Kamseng Frontier Division (Border Bhutan) NEFA.

2. (U) (C) OACSI desires as soon as available information resulting from the interrogation of this individual. OACSI is particularly interested in Chinese Communist espionage techniques— i.e. dispatching agency, vetting methods, mission assignments, penetration methods and cover stories, and communication channels.

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED ON 20 June 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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[redacted]

89

DATE	TIME
6	1630R
MONTH	YEAR
Jan	1961

WRITER
SYMBOL: ACSI-SC
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): JOSEPH Y. KURATA, Capt, AI (Inf)
PHONE: 72434 | PAGE NR. 1 | NR. OF PAGES 1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASER
SIGNATURE: JACK D. WEIGAND, Col, GS, Chief, Counterintelligence Branch
TYPED (or Stamped) NAME AND TITLE:
CLAUDE D. BARTON
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

083

PAGE NR

ORIGIN: ACSI
DISTR: ACSI(902D)

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DA 988277 (Jan 61) DTG: 062200Z hrd/5

2

SCO FORM 35-2 6 JUN 56 REPLACES OCS FORM 375-2, 1 AUG. 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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OPCA-20 (12-3-96)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

35 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☒ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☒ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

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☐ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

pg 84-93

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FBI/DOJ

16 12 '63 1191

CRE

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands	26 September 1960
2/1 ZEI	3. Control Symbol or File Number HH-800027

4. Report of Findings

(b)(6) THE CHINESE STANDARD TELEGRAPHIC CODE DATED AUGUST 1955 IS USED IN LIEU OF CHARACTERS FOR CHINESE NAMES IN THIS REPORT

(b)(7)(C) On 23 September 1960, the following information pertaining to the departure of [redacted] aka: [redacted] (U), from Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, was obtained from the International E/D Card which was furnished by the Ryukyuan Immigration Agents, Naha Civil Air Terminal, Naha, Okinawa:

Name	:	[redacted]
Date of Birth	:	[redacted]
Place of Birth	:	[redacted]
Nationality	:	Chinese
Occupation	:	Export
Home Address of Departing Passenger	:	[redacted]
Intended Address	:	Hong Kong
Last Address for Departing Passenger	:	Old English Inn
Passport Number	:	MT 0275 A6
Place & Date of Issue	:	16 April 1954
Date of Arrival (Okinawa)	:	29 July 1960
Date of Departure (Okinawa)	:	23 September 1960

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) [redacted] departed from the Naha Civil Air Terminal at 0520 hours, 23 September 1960, on Civil Air Transport Flight #45. He was to transfer at Taipei, Taiwan to JL705/23 for Hong Kong, B.C.C.

KEY: U Political Affiliation Unknown

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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DOD DIR 5200.10

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

094

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent	6.
[redacted] 526th CIC Det.	

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which

Army-Admin Com-Japan

IC 12 '63 1191

CONTINUATION REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands	2 September 1960
	3. Control Symbol or File Number
4. Report of Findings 2/1 ZEI	HH-800027

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

THE CHINESE STANDARD TELEGRAPH CODE DATED AUGUST 1955 IS USED IN LIEU OF CHARACTERS FOR CHINESE NAMES IN THIS REPORT

During the period from 8 August to 1 September 1960, a periodic check of messages dispatched and received by [redacted] aka [redacted] aka [redacted] aka [redacted] were made available by [redacted] and the following information was revealed:

a. On 12 August 1960, a message from [redacted] c/o Old English Inn, Okinawa to the Chinese Embassy, Manila, [redacted] stated as follows:

NOTES RECEIVED PRESENT FINANCE ALL TIED UP WILL STRAIGHTEN EVERYTHING UPON NEXT VISIT REGARDS CY

b. On 12 August 1960, a message from [redacted] c/o Old English Inn, Okinawa to Gogate, Hong Kong, stated as follows:

HARRY BILLS C-47 POSTPONED 24 HOURS C-54 NO CHANGE CY

c. On 18 August 1960, a message from [redacted] c/o Scotty's, Okinawa, to Gogate, Hong Kong, stated as follows:

HARRY 130 POSTPONE TILL 3 SEPTEMBER CY

(b)(7)(C) AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, 526th CIC Detachment, dated 25 May 1960, subject and file as above, which indicated [redacted] representative in Okinawa guaranteeing logistic support as being [redacted] Agent Report, 526th CIC Detachment, subject and file as above, dated 17 June 1960, which gives further information concerning [redacted] and Case File B2-020523, subject: [redacted] (U). Reference is made to Agent Report, 526th CIC Detachment, dated 29 July 1960, subject and file as above, pertaining to the arrival date of [redacted] into the Ryukyu Islands. The relationship between [redacted] of the Chinese Embassy in Manila are unknown. Gogate is the cable address of the Golden Gate Hotel, 136-138 Austin Road, Hong Kong. The individual "Bills" referred to in paragraph b supra is believed to be an aircraft pilot, further identity unknown.

5USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent	
[redacted]	526th CIC Det.

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DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

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16 12 '63 1191 [redacted] CRF

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands	15 July 1960
2/1 ZEI	3. Control Symbol or File Number HH-800027

4. Report of Findings

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

THE CHINESE STANDARD TELEGRAPHIC CODE DATED AUGUST 1955 IS USED IN LIEU OF CHARACTERS FOR CHINESE NAMES IN THIS REPORT

On 14 July 1960, the files of the 3rd Counter Intelligence Team, 3rd Marine Division, (Rein), FMF, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, were reviewed concerning [redacted] aka: [redacted] aka: [redacted] aka: [redacted] aka: [redacted] and the following information was revealed:

An Investigation Report, 3rd Counter Intelligence Team, subject: Suspected Communist Espionage Activity, file: 4-3-60, dated 14 July 1960, indicated that, during the period from 21 June 1960 to 28 June 1960, all locator files of the 3rd Marine Division, Okinawa and the locator files of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing located in Japan were examined to determine the identity of [redacted] who were mentioned in a message from [redacted] to Hong Kong on 13 June 1960. [redacted] could not be identified. During the same period, all flight manifests of the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing from Okinawa to Hong Kong, BCC and return, were examined and no record of the above names were listed.

During the course of the investigation, an undisclosed source provided information to the effect that the Clover mentioned in the cable is the Hotel Clover located at 380 Nathan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong, BCC, which is alleged to be owned and operated by the Chinese Communists. Further investigation is being taken to verify the status of the Hotel Clover.

AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, 526th CIC Detachment, subject and file as above, dated 17 June 1960 which predicated the above investigation.

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[redacted]

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent	6. Si
[redacted] JR, 526th CIC Det	[redacted]

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DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

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63 1191

CRF

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands 2/1 ZEI	14 July 1960
	3. Control Symbol or File Number HH-800027

4. Report of Findings

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) THE CHINESE STANDARD TELEGRAPHIC CODE DATED AUGUST 1955 IS USED IN LIEU OF CHARACTERS FOR CHINESE NAMES IN THIS REPORT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

On 12 July 1960, the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Section, Department, United States Civil Administration in the Ryukyus (USCAR), were examined concerning aka: aka: aka and the following information was revealed:

On 11 July 1960 submitted a letter to the Secretary, Naha Air Base Officer's Open Mess, APO 235, subject: Change of Status to Dependent, which states as follows:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

"1. As sponser for the person listed below, the Hotel Ryukyu having previously obtained approval for her to enter the Ryukyu Is. as a Technical Entrant, I now desire that her status be changed to dependent in order that she may remain in the Ryukyus as long as my contract with the Naha Air Base Officer's Open Mess subsists.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

a. Dependent's Name: , age 34, wife to sponser
b. Expiration date of Entry Permit: July 15, 1960

2. It is clearly understood that I am solely responsible for the logistical support of said person while in the Ryukyus and her repatriation to Japan upon termination of my contract with the Naha Air Base Officer's Open Mess, and further, at no expense to the US Government.

3. An approved private rental was obtained by the Hotel Ryukyu when application for entry was likewise submitted at that time as an enclosure to the application.

4. Date my dependent arrived in Okinawa: 15 Dec. 1959" (sic)

(b)(6)

Asst. Manager
Fighter Club
NAB Officer's Open Mess, APO 235"

The first indorsement was approved at the Naha Air Base Officer's Open Mess, APO 235, and was signed on 11 July 1960 by Bert Newmark, Captain, USAF, Secretary. The second indorsement was approved by the 6431st Air Base Group and was signed on 11 July 1960 by Homer R. Hunt, First Lieutenant for William E. Branz, Major, USAF,

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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5. [illegible]ganization of Special Agent JR, 526th CIC Det 6. Signature

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DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

Army-Admin Com-Japan

94

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7)(C)

20 JAN '61

82

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J27 @98

ACSI-SC

SEP 14 1960

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, New York, New York

1225935

1. (U) References:

a. Your letter, file AEAGB-PND (CI) 274/9 above subject, dated 30 July 1960.

b. Paragraph 2, ACSI-SC letter, above subject, dated 2 September 1960.

2. (S) Your request was transmitted [redacted] who furnished the following information:

(b)(1) per CIA

[redacted]

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Reed by MTR Aug 60 75

2 F 2 c Suspense 15 Aug 60

CRF/MESSAGE CENTER

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Counterintelligence Br

904-00928

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ACSI-SC
SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

(b)(1) per CIA

[redacted]

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For

MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

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2
099

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NUMBER 13

904-c4928

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Maj (rd, CIAS/car/72434

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: 12 Sep 60 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service (U)

CURRENT: Instant letter transmits to [redacted]

(b)(1) per CIA

BACKGROUND: On 28 Jun 60, OACSI forwarded [redacted] studies to G2, USAREUR re subject. USAREUR subsequently requested [redacted] the reports that served as a basis for these studies.

STATUS: Completed.

RATIONALE: Answer USAREUR request for information.

[redacted]

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 4½ hr
Typist Time: 1½ hr

Action Officer [redacted]
Ch, CIAS [redacted]
Chief, CI Br [redacted]
Ch, Sec Div [redacted]

100

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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY DIRECTOR, DIA
PER DIA 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

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PER CIA

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☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☑ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 101-102

IACPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

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BACKUP MATERIAL

Please forward to Record Section upon completion of action.

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APPLIES TO INCLOSURES ONLY

CIA MESSAGE CENTER
NUMBER 15

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Major Gifford/slc/72434/CIAS

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1 Sep 60

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, New York, New York

1. (U) Reference your letter, file AEAGB-PDN (CI) 274/9, above subject, dated 30 July 1960.

(b)(1) per CIA

2. ~~(U)~~ (S) In an effort to obtain information on which to base a reply to your request, [redacted] We have been informed that a written reply to our request will be forthcoming.

3. (U) Pertinent information will be forwarded to you upon receipt by this office.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY US USINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

per CIA

~~SECRET~~ 104
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RECORD SECTION
Counterintelligence

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Maj Ford/slc/72434/CIAS

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (1 Sep 60) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

CURRENT: Inst Interim reply advises G2, USAREUR of delay in obtaining information on which to base a reply to their request.

BACKGROUND: On 28 June 60, OACSI, forwarded [redacted] studies, subject above to G2, USAREUR. G2, USAREUR then [redacted] the reports that served as a basis for [redacted] they will submit to Sec Div a memo stating reasons for their position relative to this request.

(b)(1) per CIA

STATUS: Awaiting memo to Security Div [redacted]

RATIONALE: Interim letter report necessary to advise G2, USAREUR of circumstances relative to delay in obtaining requested information.

DELAY: Awaiting [redacted] reply to request for raw reports which served as basis for above subject studies.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None

COORDINATION: None

Action Officer Time: 5½ hr
Typist Time: 1 hr

Action Officer
Ch, CIAS
Chief, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div

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ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

for CIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9022

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ROUTINE

FROM: CINCUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HAWAII

TO : DA WASH DC

NR : RJ 93922 042312Z AUG 60

DA FOR ACSI, FROM GPPIN-SD

Ref: Your DA 980859. 2 Aug 60 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. (U) Info currently available this office reflect no record re [redacted] or [redacted] Further, no indications exist re organized ChiCom espionage net utilizing Chinese Nationals against US Army or NATO Forces targets in Europe. However, there are indications of probable involvement of Chinese tailors in espionage activity against US Forces in Japan. Details not readily available here, but being secured.

2. (U) Supplementary and/or final report will be submitted O/A 22 Aug 60.

ACTION COPY

5 Aug 60

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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ACTION: ACSI

DA IN 30228 (5 Aug 60) Jbm/4

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(27 Aug 60)

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1409) ACSI 910.1 China

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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OUR INTEL SEC	—	[illegible] & CI	
OUR INTL & SAS	—	[illegible] & SEC DIV	
TECH DIV		[illegible] INTEL/REV DIV	
[illegible] BR		[illegible] DIV	—
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AREA [illegible] BR		SR2 C.C	—
M E S BR		[illegible] BR	
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ACTION DOCUMENTATION

☒ No Reply Required
☐ Answered By Cable
☐ Answered By Letter
☐ Interim Reply Sent
☐ Distribution Reviewed Explain All Actions Other Than Final

Date 5 AUG '60

Action Officer's Signature D J Riley
Major AF(AC)

166A

CONFIDENTIAL

Counter Intell Br.
R-10568 (20)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
APO 403, New York, New York

ZA 016436

AEAGB-PDN(CI) 274/9 JUL 1960

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
Attn: Security Division
Counterintelligence Branch

1. (U) References: Find Secret

a. Letter, ACSI-SC, 28 June 1960, subject as above.

b. Letter, AEAGB-PDN(CI) 274/9, this Office, 14 June 1960, subject: Chinese Tailors in Europe (U).

2. (U) Various US intelligence elements, primarily OSI-USAFE and CNI-USNAVEUR, have recently indicated a concern with the possibility of Chinese Communist intelligence services (CCIS) activity in Europe. However, this concern appears to be based on the presence of Chinese nationals in the area and the espionage capability they represent rather than on actual evidence of such activity. As previously stated in reference 1b above, no evidence of significant CCIS activity in Europe is currently available to this Office; it would seem that if the CCIS is operating to any appreciable extent in this Command, some evidence would have come to the attention of USAREUR.

3. (U) The studies forwarded by reference 1a above represent new information to this Office. Although these studies generally imply the existence of concrete evidence of CCIS activity in Europe, no amplifying information is offered in support of these implications. In order that this Office may determine the extent and direction of CCIS activity in the USAREUR area, additional specific information is needed.

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2 p 1 c

1465) ACSI 910.1 China 30 July 60 (27 Apr 60)

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AEAGB-PDN(CI) 274/9
SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

(b)(1) per CIA

4. (C) It is requested that, if possible, this Office be furnished (S) information and reports which served as a basis for the Subject studies. In the meantime, information in the studies has been transmitted to USAREUR subordinate commands with a request for comments and any new evidence which might have a bearing on the Subject. Upon receipt of the requested information, this Office will attempt to fulfill the requirement contained in paragraph 2, reference 1a above.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

LLOYD E. WILLS
Lt Col GS
Chief, Production Branch

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ON 27 SEP 2000
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[redacted]

1

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS (U) Ryukyu Islands	14 July 1960
	3. Control Symbol or File Number
2/1 ZEI	HH-800027

4. Report of Findings

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Administrative Officer. The third indorsement was approved by Headquarters, 313th Air Division, APO 239 and was signed on 11 July 1960 by [redacted], Major, USAF, Directorate of Personnel.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, 526th CIC Detachment, subject and file as above, dated 15 June 1960, which indicated that [redacted] brought his Japanese concubine into Okinawa in March 1960. Oguni listed above is believed to be the unknown Japanese concubine for whom [redacted] has previously attempted to obtain Commissary and Post Exchange privileges.

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

[redacted]

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

[redacted] (b)(7)(C) (2) 110 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[redacted]	6. S[redacted]
[redacted]ion of Special Agent 526th CIC Det.	[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

Army-Admin Com-Japan

[redacted] SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

JUN 28 1960

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: Security Division
APO 958, San Francisco, California

1323445

1. (U) Reference conference with Mr Kino, CI Analyst, Security Division, Headquarters, USARPAC, during staff visit by Major Gifford, Security Division, OACSI, in February, 1960.

2. (C) Transmitted herewith for information and retention are two studies (b)(1) relating to intelligence services in Communist China.

3. (U) It is requested that any current information on this topic which would supplement subject studies be forwarded to OACSI, ATTN: Chief, Security Division (CI Branch/CIAS).

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO
Lt Colonel, GS

For STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DOD DIR 5200.10

REGRADED SECRET
ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

[redacted] SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

111

[redacted] HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT [redacted]
BY AUTHORITY OF [redacted]
DATE 28 June 60

APPLIES TO INCLOSURES ONLY

RECORD SECTION CONFIDENTIAL
Counterintelligence Br

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHED INCLOSURE

(b)(1) per CIA.

910.1 China

28 June 60 (21 Jun 60) File

124CGF P78S

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CONFIDENTIAL

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ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (23 Jun 60) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Studies on the Chinese Communist Intelligence Services (U)

CURRENT: Inst ltr fwds to USARPAC () studies for info and retention. Supplemental info is requested ()

BACKGROUND: Mr Kino, CI Analyst, Sec Div, USARPAC, during staff visit by Maj Gifford, Sec Div, OACSI requested completed studies of this type be fwd. Mr Kino was aware of a partial study re ChICom intel svcs which had been fwd to OSI, Hawaii at their request (). Maj Gifford, when coordinating () re this partial study was informed that completed study was in process of publication. CIAS disseminating copies of these studies to USAREUR, USARCARIB, USAINTS, Eastern Div, DFI, ODCSOPS (Spec Warfare Div). Copies retained by CIAS and Ops Br, Coll Div.

(b)(1) per CIA

STATUS: Dissemination action completed. Supplemental info to be fwd () upon receipt by CIAS.

RATIONALE: Dissemination made in relation to recipient's area of interest; ()

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 1/4
Typist Time: 3/4 hour.

Action Officer
Ch, CIAS
Ch, P&O Sec
Chief, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div

RECRADED SECRET
ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R
Per CIA

[redacted]

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OPCA-20 (12-3-96)

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FOIPA
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☑ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
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☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

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pg 113-114

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FBI/DOJ

Capt Swerdlin, CIAS/r 73949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC

APR 27 1960

SUBJECT: Chinese Tailers in Europe (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, New York, New York
ATTN: Production Branch

1220774

1. (C) As your office is aware, rumors and allegations are in circulation in your area regarding the alleged utilization of Chinese tailors in organized CHICOM espionage against the forces of the NATO allies in Europe.

2. (C) The Office of Naval Intelligence attaches considerable importance to this matter, but does not possess any information that would validate the rumors and allegations. It is believed that the ONI desires to have this matter raised before the NATO Security Committee with a view toward initiating a major combined operational and analytical counterintelligence effort under NATO/SHAPE auspices.

3. (C) This office is not in possession of any reports of Chinese individuals engaging in such activities in Europe, and possesses no indications of a widespread intelligence net composed of Chinese tailors.

4. (C) Since ONI has contacted OACSI with regard to subject matter, it is requested that you send any information your office now holds which would indicate the existence of an organized espionage net, composed of or utilizing Chinese nationals, which is targetted against the US Army in Europe or NATO forces in general. We should also appreciate your comments.

5. (C) Inclosed for your information is a copy of US Naval Forces, Europe Letter, file: FF1/NAVEUR/5510, subject: Release of specific counterintelligence

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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ON AUG 1997
BY OCR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

291.1 China 9 apr '60

ACSI-SC
SUBJECT: Chinese Tailers in Europe (U)

Information to the Federal Republic of Germany (C) with two inclosures: (1) Translation of German Note for the Record, file: 072 Ex 1/4, dated 7 December 1959 which initiated the action; and (2) Summary of information, subject: Chinese Activities in Europe, undated (C), proposed for release to the German authorities.

6. (U) ACofS, G2, USARPAC is also being queried for pertinent information.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE SIGNED

STANLEY E. WHITMORE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl
a/s (Ø)

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ON AUG 1 1 1997
BY OBR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACSI-SC
MEMO FOR RECORD: (~~18~~ 15 April 1960) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Chinese Tailors in Europe (U)

CURRENT: This letter furnishes command present Sec Div, OACSI view on the matter of Chinese tailors in Europe; at the same time asks whether USAREUR has any up-to-date info.

BACKGROUND: Chinese tailors in Europe have access to US Navy Installations. There apparently have been some suspicious activities on the part of individual Chinese tailors in Europe (CINC, NAVEUR Rpt, Ser: 0211, dtd 14 Mar 60, to Ch, Nav Ops (Dir, ONI)/. ONI is very much concerned and is pushing for major US and Allied investigative effort (Ltr from Ch, Nav Ops to CINC, NAVEUR, OP-921E/ri, Ser 0753P92, dtd 7 Apr 60). Based on available info, ONI's evaluation of potential security threat appears somewhat exaggerated and if there is a security threat, it is dwarfed by the immense and known SIS and Satellite collection effort against US Army, Europe.

RATIONALE: Since ONI intends to have talks with G2, USAREUR regarding a joint CI effort, OACSI position on this matter should be communicated to the command.

COORDINATION: None required.

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None.

Action Officer G.D. Swerdlin, Capt.
Ch, CIAS
Ch, P&O Sec
Chief, CI Br
Ch, Sec Div

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pg 118-119

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FBI/DOJ

16 12 '63 119

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

27 6 '58 1490

April 14, 1958
Seattle 4, Washington

~~SECRET~~ (b 1) Per FBI

(S)

In the letterhead memo dated and captioned as above the source referred to therein has furnished reliable information in the past.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

4/1/99
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☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
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FBI/DOJ

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, ~~EX~~ INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ACSI-S(RFCAP)

FEB 21 1956

SUBJECT: Request for Interviews (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Sixth Army
San Francisco, California

1. Pursuant to a query received by this office from another government agency, it is requested that the individuals (RFCAP-P) listed in the inclosure be interviewed concerning a group of special interrogators at Camp No. 5, Pyoktong, North Korea, who were distinctive because of their headgear. They were known as "black hats", and appeared to be busy among the leading "Progressives" shortly before their repatriation.

2. Specifically, the interviews should attempt to confirm the existence of this group, and to elicit any identifying data and the mission of these interrogators.

3. Upon completion of the investigation, it is requested that the results be forwarded to The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, ATTENTION: Chief, Security Division.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

W. A. QUINTO
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

1 Incl
Partial List of RFCAP-P
Interned at Camp No. 5
(in dup)

Under existing laws this correspondence cannot be downgraded

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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~~SECRET~~

G2FEB165

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(C) PARTIAL LIST OF PROAP-K INTRTD AT CAMP NO. 5

(b)(6)

NAME	RANK	UNIT	ORGANIZATION
[redacted]	Sgt		Co B, 23rd Inf Regt Ft Lewis, Wash.
	Maj		63rd Inf Regt Ft Ord, Calif.
	Capt		6516 SU Attachment 7 ROTC Instruction Group Washington State College Pullman, Wash.
	1st Lt		35th Inf Regt Ft Lewis, Wash.
	Cpl		620 SU, Y Co Oakland 14, Calif.
	T/Sgt		6513 SU Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(C)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

1(b)(1) AC 51) 383.6 Chinese 12 Feb 52 125 fr. 32)

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☑ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 124

IAGPA-CSP Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

SCI 7-6P

[redacted] AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10) : KH/chp

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS	25 March 1955
	3. Control Symbol or File Number: 441-270032 (2)

4. Report of Findings (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

443: On 10 March 1955, CI-IV-661 submitted the following information:

[redacted] alias [redacted] DOB: [redacted] female; Chinese; address: [redacted] approximately 5' 1" in height; plump; round face; uses heavy makeup; is believed to be an "influence peddler", for she apparently makes her living from commissions obtained from acting as an introduction broker in business transactions. (Attached to this Agent Report as EXHIBIT LXXXII is a photograph of [redacted], and her close associates, [redacted] who are mentioned below). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] arrived in Japan at Shimizu-shi, Shizuoka-ken, from Hong Kong, British Crown Colony (BCC), on 20 July 1953, under the provisions of the Ministry of Justice ordinance (4-1-16-1). [redacted] came to Japan as a secretary to [redacted] President, Koka Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha (興華產業株式會社)(Koka Industries Company), Room 419, Sanshin Building, 10-banchi, 1-chome, Yuraku-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to. At present [redacted] is not working at the Koka Industries Company, although she visits the office occasionally.

[redacted] returned to Hong Kong, BCC, on 31 January 1955. [redacted] still lives at the house which she occupied with [redacted]. In the past, she has maintained intimate relationships with [redacted], DOB [redacted] male; Chinese; former address: 2646-banchi, 5-chome, Kami Meguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo-to, who returned to Formosa on 21 January 1955. [redacted] is now in Taipeh, Formosa, although he is known as a Chinese Nationalist Intelligence agent in Japan.

[redacted] is also on intimate terms with [redacted] Information Broker; DOB [redacted] POB [redacted] male; Japanese; Present address: [redacted] is a graduate of Chung Yang (0022/1135) University, Nanking, China; an ex-member of the Tokumu Kikan in China; a fluent Chinese linguist, and is widely acquainted with Japanese officials stationed in China during World War II and with Chinese officials of the former Nanking Government. He is 5' 3" tall, slightly bald at the forehead and has thin hair, thick eyebrows, large eyes and a slender build. [redacted] met [redacted] through [redacted] and often stays overnight with her at [redacted] residence. [redacted] and [redacted] visit various trading companies and when contracts are made they receive large commissions for acting as intermediaries in the transactions.

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Copy Nos: 3 (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent: [redacted] Headquarters Reporting Officer, 441st CIC Detachment

6. Signature: [redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7)(C)

8 APR 1955

[redacted] AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10) /H/chp

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date Submitted
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS	25 March 1955
	3. Control Symbol or File Number: 441-220032 (2)

4. Report of Findings (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)

444. On 2 March 1955, CI-IV-661 submitted the following information concerning [redacted] alias [redacted] DOB [redacted] female; Chinese; address [redacted]

Close observation of [redacted] during the period 2-15 February 1955 revealed that she associated with the following persons during that period:

[redacted] Information Broker; DOB [redacted] POB [redacted] male; Japanese;

Unidentified male; Approx DOB 1915; probably Chinese; approximately 5'6" tall; dark complexion; broad forehead; slightly bald; slender; wears silver-rimmed glasses and brown overcoat.

Places frequented were:

Kingo Sakaya (錦江酒家)(Kingo Chinese Restaurant), 14-banchi, 1-chome, Yuraku-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to;

Koka Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha (興華産業株式会社)(Koka Industries Company), Room 419 Sanshin Building, 10-banchi, 1-chome, Yuraku-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to;

Sanyo Shokai (三陽商会), 5-chome, Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

Rivoli, 5-chome, Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

Nippon Gorufu Shokai (日本ゴルフ商会)(Japan Golf Trading Company), 5-chome, Higashi-ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

Central Post Office, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to;

Fuji Film Camera Shop, basement, Mikkatsu International Building, Hibiya, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to;

Charme, Nishi-Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

H Coffee Shop, 3-banchi, 6-chome, Higashi-Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) - 2 - (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent	6. Signature of Special Agent
[redacted] Headquarters Region IV, 441st CIC Detachment	[redacted]

52

[redacted] AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

KH/chp

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident	2. Date submitted 25 March 1955
CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS	3. Control Symbol or File Number 441-270032 (2)

4. Report of Findings

Tokyo Onsen, Higashi-Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

Rogosuki (ロゴスキ) Restaurant, 2nd Floor, Tokyo-Onsen;

Mitsuai, 4-chome, Ginza, Chuo-ku;

Kurosaka Hospital (Plastic Surgery), 5-banchi, 8-chome, Nishi-Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to;

Yama Beauty Shop, 8-banchi, Yanagi-machi, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo-to.
(B-3)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

121
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5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent	6. Signature
[redacted] Headquarters Region IV, 441st CIC Detachment	[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used.

416-433-Army-AG Admin Com-AFFE-60000

[redacted]

CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE AGENTS 25 March 1955

C O V E R S H E E T

Photographs of:
(Upper left) Kitaoka, Toyoji
(Upper right) Shih, Yen-p'ing (2457/3601/5493)
(Lower left) Wu, Wen-hua (0702/2429/5478)
(Lower right) Hsu, Fu-pao (1776/4395/0202)

Disclosure of the contents of this Exhibit WILL NOT compromise the source.

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One (1) Page EXHIBIT LXXIII

[redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

SECRET

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

CI FILE

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO FILE NO.

VIA LIAISON

Date: May 18, 1954

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: POTENTIALITIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

There is enclosed, as of possible interest, a monograph entitled "Potentialities of Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States."

This monograph primarily concerns the pattern and development of interrelationships between the United States and Chinese Communist elements in this country. These interrelationships are also considered in terms of their intelligence potentialities in the United States.

Copy No. 18 of this monograph is being made available for your confidential information and its contents should not be disseminated.

Enclosure

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ON 4/8/99
(RHD)

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SECRET

144) ACSI 000.2456

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POTENTIALITIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

FILE

4/8/99 3A06B ELW/DCM/JW (RHD)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director

131

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POTENTIALITIES

OF

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

IN THE UNITED STATES

May, 1954

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
John Edgar Hoover, Director

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ON 4/8/99 (CRHD)

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~~SECRET~~

INTRODUCTION

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its instrumentalities cannot be totally isolated from this study due to its conditioning and control of major forces involved. Soviet leadership took an early role in setting the formulas leading to Communist domination of China. This is exemplified by a pronouncement of Joseph Stalin, the former Soviet leader, while speaking before the Chinese Commission of the Executive Committee, Communist International[1] on November 30, 1926.

Stalin identified as a "peculiarity" of the revolution in China two phases of interest to this study:

(1) "...a bourgeois-democratic revolution..."; (2) and "...at the same time a revolution for national liberation with its edge directed against the rule of foreign imperialism in China...."

Stalin On China (People's Publishing House, Ltd., Bombay, February 1951), p. 2.

This "peculiarity" and subsequent formulas for the Communist domination of China supply a foundation for the interrelationships of forces which may mature into a Chinese Communist intelligence potential.

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I. PATTERN OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CHINESE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS

Stalin has described two general phases of the Chinese revolution into which the pattern of interrelationships involving the Chinese and United States' Communist movements may be included. The theoretical expression and practical application of these interrelationships may be set forth in the following pattern: (1) Chinese Communist action directed toward sympathetic or potentially sympathetic forces in the United States and similar U. S. elements in China; (2) U. S. Communist action directed against similar elements in the United States and China; and (3) the influence and direction supplied by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and international Communist organizations in connection with directing, modifying or controlling items (1) and (2). Other ramifications of influence are not considered within the scope of this study.

This pattern of past realities involving the interrelationships between Communist forces in the United States and China supplies us with a framework upon which to build current and some future considerations. The application of the means for consummating these interactions may vary in scope, emphasis and interpretation, but the framework of interrelationships remains for our consideration in connection with the potentialities of these interrelationship patterns.

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II. UNITED-FRONT PERIOD I

A. BACKGROUND

The formal establishment of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1921, did not mean the initiation of an organized revolutionary movement in China. Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang Party occupied the broad revolutionary role of this period. In a relatively brief span of time, the Communist International[1*] and the Soviet Union had enticed Sun Yat-sen and his party into collaboration with them and the Communist movement.

The Fourth World Congress of the Communist International[1] held November 5--December 5, 1922, called for a Kuomintang-Communist alliance. On January 26, 1923, Sun Yat-sen and Adolph A. Joffe, Soviet Far Eastern representative, issued a joint declaration in Shanghai which gave the basis for the period of Kuomintang-Communist collaboration during the period 1924-1927. In part this joint declaration held that the Communistic order or the Soviet system could not actually be introduced into China due to the existence of improper conditions. Other events in 1923 leading to the period of collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were the Chinese Communist Party's manifesto resolving to cooperate with the Kuomintang and the arrival in China of the Soviet advisor Michael Borodin.

*See identification of this and other organizations in the Appendix.

At the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1924, many Communists won positions in the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was able to carry on its activities within the framework of the Kuomintang. This boring from within tactic was now at work.

B. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Study material issued by the National Education Department, Communist Party, USA[2], indicated the year 1925 as the first significant date in the record of "progressive" support in the United States for the "Chinese people." It was during this period that the Workers Party of America[3] and its successor the Workers (Communist) Party of America[4] took a significant stand in the furtherance of the uneasy coalition involving Chinese Communist-Kuomintang forces.

The major effort in the United States was built around three organizations: (1) Workers Party of America[3] and its successor the Workers (Communist) Party of America[4], (2) All-American Anti-Imperialist League[5], and (3) Trade-Union Educational League[6]. A Workers Party of America[3] press release of July 2, 1925, illustrates the "united front" appeal to the "trade unions, the Socialist Party, and all other organizations sympathizing with the cause of the Chinese people and against 'oppression of the foreign imperialists.' "

The interrelation of the Party and the All-American Anti-Imperialist League[5] was indicated in various meetings of the Party secretariat. A meeting of the Workers (Communist) Party[4] political bureau in October 1925 considered the work of this League[5] and decided to continue Manuel Gomez as secretary of the League[5]. He was instructed to make immediate contact in the United States with various Chinese organizations. Later that month, the Party secretariat again considered the work of the League[5] in the presence of Gomez and he made the following recommendations:

> "Instructions should be sent out to local units of the Party to arrange for conferences with officials of the Kuomintang or other resident organizations of Chinese to take up the question of joint attitude...."
>
> "A national policy be adopted to not indiscriminately press the Chinese to become members of our Party at this time but instead work actively for the affiliation of whole organizations to the AAAIL (All-American Anti-Imperialist League)[5]."

This second recommendation was amended by Charles Ruthenberg, General Secretary of the Party as follows:

> "That our policy at the present time shall be to endeavor to have Chinese organizations affiliate as bodies with the AAAIL[5] and only draw in selective Chinese into the Party."

A third major political factor was included in the Communist orbit for the formation of a "United Front" to support the Communist movement in China. This factor was the Trade-Union Educational League[6]. William Z. Foster, current Chairman of the Communist Party, USA[2], former Chairman of the Workers Party of America[3] and one of the organizers and dominant factors in the Trade-Union Educational League[6], identified the Trade-Union Educational League[6] as the American section of the R. I. L. U. (Red International of Labor Unions). Foster also stated that the T. U. E. L.[6] identified itself too closely with the Communist Party. In this connection Foster said:

> 'It adopted practically the whole program of the Party and in many cases its groups consisted entirely of Communists. It also merged its official organ, The Labor Herald, into the Workers Monthly, which then became the joint journal of both the T. U. E. L. and the C. P."
>
> William Z. Foster, From Bryan To Stalin (International Publishers, 1937), pp. 166, 195.

William Z. Foster has more recently stated that the Party in the United States always fought against "American imperialist aggression in China," and did this for many years under the slogan, "Hands Off China." The political committee of the Party in the United States on

April 25, 1927, considered the matter of certain demonstrations in the names of "Hands Off China" committees and the All-American Anti-Imperialist League[5].

The Comintern (Third Communist International)[1] also sanctioned this phase of activity carried on by the international communist movement, but emphasized that the "Hands Off China" activities were not enough:

> "...The slogan, 'Hands Off China,' merely formulated a part of the duties that the Chinese revolution imposes upon the international proletariat. The other part is--joint revolutionary struggle against the common class enemy."
>
> "If the revolutionary movement of China were to become isolated from the international proletariat, and from the principal fortress of the proletarian revolution--the Soviet Union--this would disarm the revolution."
>
> The Communist International, Official organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International[1], February 28, 1927, p. 29.

C. ACTIVITY OF U. S. COMMUNISTS IN CHINA

An American Communist, Earl Browder, who professed to be representing the Trade-Union Educational League[6] in China in 1927 as a part of the International Workers delegation, was actively engaged in preventing the isolation of the Communist movement in China from

like forces in the United States. Browder's interests and objectives paralleled the Comintern[1] pronouncement of February 1927 and were well outlined in the following quotation from Browder's writings during the same year.

> "It is in the interests of all workers in America to help the Chinese masses in this most difficult struggle. This means first of all, to understand their problems, to establish close connection with them and their organizations, to exert all efforts to prevent the Government of the United States from using its power to crush the Chinese revolution, and to work in all ways for assisting the Chinese trade unions and peasant unions.
>
> "To the ruling classes of America we must say: 'Hands off the Chinese Revolution.'
>
> "To the American workers, the word is: 'Solidarity with the Chinese workers and peasants.' Solidarity with the Chinese revolution, as a most important step toward the world revolution."
>
> Earl Browder, Civil War in Nationalist China (Labor Unity Publishing Assoc., Chicago, Ill., 1927), pp. 60, 61.

Under the date of April 2, 1927, the International Workers' delegation at Hankow, China, issued a statement addressed "To the Soldiers and Sailors of Great Britain, France and America." This statement described the addressees as exploited people who should not fight against the Chinese people, but on the contrary, these soldiers were

urged to fight those who exploit them. Earl Browder as a representative of the Trade-Union Educational League[6] in China was a signer of this statement.

A parallel for this activity appeared in the United States. During the course of the June 9, 1927, Political Committee meeting of the Party, Manuel Gomez, secretary of the All-American Anti-Imperialist League[5], made a motion which was passed that the Party should issue a statement on the Chinese situation addressed to the American marines and naval forces in China. This statement was allegedly for the purpose of sowing disobedience among their ranks and to create a demand among them for the removal of American forces from China. It was intended to utilize the Kuomintang (possibly left-Kuomintang) to reproduce and distribute this statement among the American forces in China.

This coalition period between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists was full of dissension from the various tendencies within both parties. This year of 1927 featured several developments resulting in the termination of the united front and the development of a period of civil war. Among the important events were the anti-communist coup of Chiang Kai-shek on April 12, 1927; the raid of the USSR Embassy in Peking on April 28, 1927; and Joseph Stalin's announcement of the second

stage of the Chinese revolution.

This second stage of the revolution also was to affect the tactics of the Communist Party in the U. S. in its support of the Chinese Communist revolution.

III. CIVIL WAR PERIOD I

A. BACKGROUND

During the course of a speech delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) on August 1, 1927, Stalin was quoted as follows:

> "Let us now proceed to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.
>
> "While the first stage was distinguished by the fact that the edge of revolution was directed mainly against foreign imperialism, the distinguishing feature of the second stage is that the edge of revolution is now directed mainly against the internal enemies...."
>
> Stalin on China (People's Publishing House, Ltd., Bombay, February 1951).

This new formula for revolution in China concentrates the revolutionary blow in China. This may account for the actual presence

of American Communists in China to aid the Chinese Communist revolution. The operations of the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat and its General Secretary Earl Browder supply us with some insight into the network of operations concentrated in this new tactic.

B. PAN-PACIFIC TRADE-UNION SECRETARIAT

Perhaps it is more than coincidental that the American Party's political committee and the International Workers' delegation at Hankow, China, both were involved in addressing seditious statements to American military forces involved in the Chinese problem. An understanding of the organizational effort involved may throw some light on the seemingly parallel efforts stemming from American Communist forces in China and like forces in the United States.

Earl Browder professed to be in China as a representative of the Trade-Union Educational League[6] of the United States. During 1927 in China Browder became the General Secretary of the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat.

According to the November 1929 issue of The Pan-Pacific Monthly, official organ of the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat (P. P. T. U. S.), this was an autonomous organization, separate from all other international organizations. It had established relations of "friendly

cooperation" with other international bodies which "stand against imperialism." Among these international bodies identified were: (1) the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern), "to which many of our affiliated organizations belong, and which is in full support of our work in the Pacific," and (2) the Anti-Imperialist League*[5], "which is a world federation of all anti-imperialist organizations and individuals, and with which our Third Plenum associated the P. P. T. U. S., and to which many of our affiliated organizations are connected."

More specifically the program of action for the Trade-Union movement in China was described in late 1928 by the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat in these terms. The plans regarding the organization of workers should be worked out with the Executive Bureau of the Red International of Labor Unions by the All-China Federation. In turn the All-China Federation should keep in fraternal contact and collaborate with the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat. It was also indicated that contact should be established between the "revolutionary" trade-unions in China and other countries.

The need for a dependable channel of communication between Communist forces in China and other Pacific area countries was

* According to reliable informants, the All-American Anti-Imperialist League[5] was affiliated with the International Anti-Imperialist League.

recognized by the Second Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Conference at Vladivostok, August 15-21, 1929. This conference adopted a resolution which in part urged the extension and improvement in the exchange of information and the development of joint actions in all countries of the Pacific. It is noted that Earl Browder attended this conference as General Secretary of the P.P.T.U.S.

Civil war conditions necessitated a phase of clandestine activity in non-Communist China. In addition to complicating the work of the Communist forces, the security and counterintelligence functions of anti-Communist forces were made more complex. Those who were in China in connection with the political tactics of the Chinese revolution might have been mistakenly identified with Soviet espionage operations of that period.

It has been reliably reported that during 1930 a large number of "Third International" (Comintern)[1] agents came into China and some were associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat. During the late 1920's and early 1930's several prominent American Party representatives were associated with the clandestine operations of the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat or the Profintern in China. These included Charles Krumbein, Margaret Cowl, Earl Browder, Harrison George, James Dolsen and Morris Louis Appelman.

This activity has a significant parallel in the United States. In 1929 Harrison George, charter member of the Communist Party in the United States, was assigned to the west coast to work with the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat. George allegedly published the Pan-Pacific Monthly, official organ of the Secretariat in connection with this assignment. This date may be significant, inasmuch as in April 1929 the Pan-Pacific Monthly was published in San Francisco, California, for the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, Shanghai, China.*

Harrison George claims that he subsequently returned to New York, but in 1932 was instructed by Earl Browder to proceed again to San Francisco, California, for the purpose of maintaining connections with Communists in the Oriental countries. This included carrying on correspondence and supplying propaganda and in general maintaining contact with the Oriental countries so that the Party in the United States would be cognizant of their activities.

*According to information appearing in the Pan-Pacific Monthly, official organ of the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, this publication was the successor to the Far-Eastern Monthly and the Pan-Pacific Worker of Shanghai. The Pan-Pacific Worker was published in Hankow, China, from June 1927 until January 1928, and in Shanghai during February and March 1928. The name of this organ was then changed to Far Eastern Monthly "to protect its Chinese printers from danger of execution, and was published under its new name in Shanghai until March 1929." With the April 1929 issue it became the Pan-Pacific Monthly in San Francisco, California, for the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, Shanghai, China.

The assignment of Harrison George appeared similar to the program outlined by the Communist International (Comintern[1]) and considered at the Workers (Communist) Party[4] Political Committee meeting of November 23, 1928. This program provided for steps to be taken by a "Port Bureau" established in San Francisco, California. These steps included an organization for correspondence between Chinese revolutionists; matters regarding the sending of Amer can Communists for special work in China; and the problem of setting up in the United States a Chinese printing press for printing revolutionary Chinese propaganda.

At the approximate conclusion of this clandestine civil war period Harrison George was relieved of this assignment by Rudolf Blum, better known as Rudy Baker or Ralph Bowman, an important figure in clandestine Party activity.

C. INTERNATIONAL LABOR DEFENSE[7]

Another type of assistance was given the Chinese Communists during this period of civil war in China. This was known as the International Labor Defense[7] and received active support from American Communists, sympathizers and dupes.

The Labor Defender, organ of the International Labor Defense, the I. L. D.,[7] has reported that instant organization was established on

June 28, 1925, in Chicago, Illinois. What might be considered its counterpart in China, the First Congress of China Red Aid, was held in December 1926.

The International Labor Defense[7] had identified with it several prominent members of the National Committee of the Communist Party in the United States. This included William Z. Foster, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, C. E. Ruthenberg and Harrison George. Its publication Labor Defender carried articles or writings of such well-known Chinese Communist apologists as Anna Louise Strong, Earl Browder, Manuel Gomez, R. Doonping (identified as Chi Chao-ting), Agnes Smedley and Philip Jaffe.

Although the Second World Congress of the China Red Aid was held in Shanghai, China, under secret conditions, the I. L. D.[7] openly supported the Chinese Communist revolution from the United States. Subsequent to this Second Congress of China Red Aid, the Labor Defender carried an article, "From the Appeal of the Red Aid of China to the workers and farmers of the entire world to support the Chinese Revolution." This was the strange companion to the line also promulgated, "no intervention in China."

Although the International Labor Defense*[7] is not an example of an organization primarily engaged in Chinese Communist support, it assisted in some projects, such as the movement to free the "Rueggs" in China. Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested in China during 1931 for "subversive" activities. Ruegg was allegedly connected with the operations of the Third International (Comintern[1]) and the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat in China.

Harold Isaacs and Agnes Smedley were among those from the United States who were associated with the "Noulens Defense Committee" in China. This committee later became known as the "Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (International)."

D. CHINESE NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES

We have noted examples of U. S. Communist representatives in China and Communist operations in the United States with targets in China and the United States. We should also consider whether the Chinese Communist activities extended to the United States.

A pamphlet allegedly written by Chi Chao-ting under the alias R. Doonping and published by the Chinese Vanguard Publishing Company, New York City, in January 1930, supplies us with some insight into this phase of our study. A foreword in this pamphlet by Earl Browder, who

*The August 1930 issue of Labor Defender refers to M.O.P.R. (International Red Aid) as the I.L.D. (International Labor Defense) organization of the Soviet Union. The March 1932 issue refers to the International Red Aid and the International Labor Defense synonymously.

in June 1930 became General Secretary of the U. S. Party, authenticates the Party viewpoint of the pamphlet, parts of which were previously printed in the Daily Worker[8], an east coast Communist publication.

Doonping indicated a parallel between the political strategy of the Chinese Communists operating in China and the Chinese "workers" operating in the United States. He stated that, when Chiang Kai-shek "betrayed" the Chinese revolution in April 1927, the Chinese "workers" in America led the fight against Chiang in the Kuomintang organization in America and consolidated the "left-wing-movement." He further indicated that after the "betrayal of the revolution" by left-Kuomintang elements, the Chinese "workers" in America openly denounced them and realized that the Kuomintang banner had turned into an emblem of counterrevolution. The "workers" dissolved the Kuomintang organizations under their control in many cities and led the sympathetic petty bourgeois elements into an independent united front organization, "The Alliance for the Support of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolution in China."

Doonping also indicated organizational parallels between the so-called Chinese "workers" in America and the American Party. This in itself is not unexpected in view of the common leadership indicated by Doonping in his statement: "During all these fights, militant Chinese

workers in America were struggling under the guidance of their only party organization, the Communist Party of America." On the one hand he designated The Alliance for the Support of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolution in China, which he described as an organization similar to the Anti-Imperialist League[5]. On the other hand, Doonping spoke of the "militant Chinese workers" who joined the "American Revolutionary Unions" organized under the leadership of the T. U. U. L. (Trade-Union Unity League)[9] and militant organizations of Chinese "workers" in America such as the Chinese Workers' Alliance.

Coming within the category of Doonping's first grouping in subsequent years were the All-American Alliance of Chinese Anti-Imperialists and the Chinese Anti-Imperialist Alliance. China Today[10], publication of the American Friends of the Chinese People[11], took note of these organizations. The November 1935 issue included a manifesto of the Central Bureau, All-American Alliance of Chinese Anti-Imperialists. The December 1937 issue included information identifying the Chinese Anti-Imperialist Alliance and its publication Chinese Vanguard as representing the split of the most militant members of the Kuomintang in America from the Kuomintang.

E. AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE[11]

Still another vehicle for promulgating the aims of Communist China was the American Friends of the Chinese People[11] and its magazine, China Today[10]. According to an educational outline of the National Education Department, Communist Party, USA, starting in 1934 this organization and publication "educated and organized support for the Chinese democratic forces fighting against the vicious counter-revolutionary onslaught of Chiang Kai-shek."

A former official of the American Friends of the Chinese People[11] and its publication China Today[10] has stated that the original organizational meeting of the American Friends of the Chinese People[11] took place in the early 1930's.* Chi Chao-ting, a Chinese national, was identified as a guiding factor in the founding of this organization. Chi, who more recently has been identified as a prominent official in Communist China, allegedly first interested a relative, Philip Jaffe, in this organization. Hsu Yung-ying, another Chinese national who has also reportedly returned to Communist China, was named as being present at this organizational meeting.

* May 1935 issue of China Today[10] stated that the month of May 1935 marked the beginning of the third year of the organization, Friends of the Chinese People[12].

This organization was originally called "Friends of the Chinese People[12]." The March 1935 issue of the organizational organ, China Today[10], included an appeal from Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling) to the "American Friends of the Chinese People[11]," urging them to "start a vigorous campaign against American interference in China." Significantly the May 1935 issue of this publication carried an article regarding the growth of "Friends of the Chinese People[12]" and stated that the organization would henceforth be known as the "American Friends of the Chinese People[11]." The explanation for this change was based on a desire to dispel the misunderstanding that this was an organization of Chinese people living in the United States, as the Chinese had their own independent organizations. In addition this term "American" would distinguish this organization from fraternal organizations in other countries.

The staff of this organization and its publication China Today[10] has been well identified with the Communist cause in China. Not only through its program of lectures, conferences, demonstrations and writings, but also through the names identified with it. These include names such as Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Chi Chao-ting, Philip Jaffe, T. A. Bisson, Max Granich, Owen Lattimore, Anna Louise Strong, Grace Hutchins and others.

An indication of the "behind the scenes" manipulation by the Communist Party in the United States is given by Morris Louis Appelman. According to Appelman, in 1935, after returning from the Orient where he had been engaged in Communist activities possibly on behalf of the Profintern (Red International of Labor Unions), he resumed his membership in the American Party. He was then assigned by the Party to work with the American Friends of the Chinese People[11]. After serving with this organization for a brief period, Appelman claims that he was approached by Earl Browder and asked to go to China for the purpose of replacing Max Granich who was in Shanghai serving as editor of a Communist paper. Upon accepting this assignment, Appelman was told to destroy his Communist Party card and all Communist identification.

Max Granich and his wife Grace had allegedly arrived in Shanghai in January 1936 where they had established the Eastern Publishing Company for the purpose of publishing The Voice of China. A source in Shanghai contacted by Granich understood that Granich had been sent to China by the Communist Party of the United States to publish a Communist periodical. They returned to the United States and became actively associated with the publication China Today[10]. Since her return to the United States Grace Granich has been in intermittent communication with Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling).

IV. UNITED-FRONT PERIOD II

A. BACKGROUND

George Dimitroff, General Secretary of the Comintern[1], in October 1936 stated that efforts of the Chinese Communist Party were directed toward ending the civil war in China and establishing collaboration with the Kuomintang and all other political groupings and armed forces in China in a united front to resist the invading Japanese. In addition Dimitroff stated:

> "It is necessary that energetic measures be taken to influence public opinion and the governments, first and foremost in England, France and the U.S.A."
>
> George Dimitroff, The United Front, (International Publishers, N.Y., 1938), pp. 193-196.

In an address delivered by Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA[2], on September 2, 1937, he stated:

> "We must make the American people understand that the cause of the Chinese people is our cause, the defeat of the Japanese imperialism is our concern."
>
> Earl Browder, The People's Front, p. 318.

According to Browder, his stand was fortified with requests from Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Chu Teh on behalf of the Chinese

Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army for American Party assistance. Of particular interest is a portion of a letter to Browder from Chou En-lai in which Chou stated:

> "I fervently hope that you and the Party under your leadership will give us more support. I am also anxious to get your opinion on our united front work. I am confident that with our two parties on both sides of the Pacific working to overthrow the devil of aggression in the Pacific and later to overthrow all aggressors, we will surely succeed."
>
> Earl Browder, The People's Front, p. 317.

Browder's speech of September 2, 1937, was of particular interest, not only because of the indicated liaison of ideas between Communist leadership in China and the United States but because of the way this liaison was effected.

Mao indicated in his communication to Browder that he was obtaining information regarding matters in the United States through "several American friends, and from other sources...." Mr. and Mrs. Philip Jaffe, T. A. Bisson and Owen Lattimore were in Yenan in June 1937, and Jaffe, allegedly the only man immediately returning to the United States, brought these letters from the Chinese Communist leaders to Browder. These letters from the Chinese leaders to Browder were allegedly translated into English by Hsu Yung-ying. *

*Subsequently more fully identified with the Institute of Pacific Relations[13] and other "united-front" activity.

This incident may provide a pattern for operations of this period which will be more fully developed. This pattern appears in the terms of a "united front" bloc bridging and giving force to Communist Party efforts in China and the United States.

B. COMMUNIST PARTY, USA[2]

Earl Browder, who was General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA.[?] has described the "Party line" during the time approximating this united front period. According to Browder, the Party in the United States took the line of explaining as thoroughly as possible that the Chinese Communists were leading the military struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese invasion; that they represented the fighting section of the Chinese people; and he urged the unity of Nationalist and Communist forces in China to resist the invading Japanese. In addition, Browder stated that the Chinese (Communists) were representative of certain fundamental agrarian reforms in China.

The Party press openly represented the vanguard forces in support of the Chinese Communist aims. These ideas found support in early phases of this period in the Communist front and infiltrated or dominated organizations and publications. Many Americans were

made increasingly conscious of Japan as a threat, not only to China but also to the United States. This simplified the Party's task in the United States. Some forces that were anti-Communist or apathetic to Communism, due to the circumstance of a common external enemy, enlisted in Communist fostered and controlled projects. In turn the Communists were in a position to pursue Chinese Communist aims in the name of American patriotism. This situation gave a common base for a broad united front prescribed by the international Communist movement.

This overt Party activity did not represent the complete effort of the Party apparatus. In approximately 1936 Rudy Baker (Rudolf Blum) allegedly succeeded Harrison George in the west coast apparatus dealing with Asiatic matters. Baker was identified with clandestine communications and transfer of information or propaganda between this covert apparatus and points in the Asiatic area. Steve Nelson, who openly operated as a Communist Party organizer in Alameda County, California, and who was in clandestine contact with Soviet officials in the United States, was identified with the operations of Baker. Baker was operating as "Al." Nelson indicated in early 1943 that China had been cut off from the apparatus.

C. UNITED-FRONT ACTIVITY

During this new period of united front, the "American Friends of the Chinese People"[11] turned the sharp edge of its propaganda weapon China Today[10] against Japan. The previous attacks against Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang forces were diminished to the point of seeking Kuomintang cooperation in the united front against Japan. In view of its prominent position in the united-front offensive, the publication China Today[10] may be considered an indicator of the political climate of the time.

The February 1938 issue of China Today[10] reported a broad coalition of forces was sponsoring a drive for medical supplies on behalf of China. Significantly, this coalition included such organizations as the American Friends of the Chinese People[11], the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and the American League for Peace and Democracy[14]. Seemingly merciful and humane objectives might have blunted the political perception of some and duped others. United-front efforts in these terms appear to have reaped marked success. An outstanding example of this character was the China Aid Council[15].

1. China Aid Council[15]

The China Aid Council[15] was formed in December 1937 as a division of the American League for Peace and Democracy[14]. This organization was allegedly organized to raise funds for relief projects in China. Its officers and directors included a number of persons identified with other organizations and activities sympathetic to Communist China, i.e., Philip Jaffe and Chi Chao-ting of the Institute of Pacific Relations[13] and Amerasia[16]; Doctor Arthur Chung, Chairman of the Chinese Democratic League's chapter in the United States; and Mildred Price. Elizabeth Bentley, a professed Soviet agent in the United States, has stated that Mildred Price of the China Aid Council[15] gave her political information obtained through her knowledge of Chinese activities as well as information from her correspondence with Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling). It is noted that Madame Sun carried on a clandestine correspondence with Price and had relief dealings with her in view of Madame Sun's position with the China Defense League.

During the period of World War II, the work of the China Aid Council[15] was stimulated by its affiliation with United China Relief, subsequently known as United Service to China. With the end of the united-

front period and the beginning of the new civil war period in China, pressure was built up to disaffiliate China Aid Council[15] from United Service to China. Jaffe and Price allegedly opposed this step and were criticized by the Communist Party.

By the late 1930's it was increasingly difficult to separate pro-Chinese Communist organizations from those inspired by a feeling against an aggressive Japan and a humane feeling for its victims. The Communist press in the United States gave wide support to organizations participating in this united front against Japan. These organizations included names of a substantial number of prominent persons in the United States who were not identified with the Communist Party. A glance at the list of officers actually conducting the business of these organizations usually revealed an interlocking of official personnel who had been previously identified with Communist objectives.

Another aspect of aid to China was known as Indusco (American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives). This organization, founded in 1939 and under the leadership of Ida Pruitt, reportedly rendered valuable aid to the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives in their role of the "Anti-Japanese War of Resistance." Further

developments regarding this organization will be considered subsequently. It is being noted at this point as another counterpart in the United States to activity in China. This was promoted and developed by those sympathetic with Chinese Communist objectives in a climate of a united front against Japan.

2. Institute of Pacific Relations[13]

The life span of the Institute of Pacific Relations (I. P. R.)[13] would seemingly give it a place in all the periods considered in this study. Due to the broad scope of matters considered, the I. P. R.[13] is being viewed as a major factor only during this united-front period.

The Institute of Pacific Relations[13] was founded in 1925 in Hawaii as an organization engaged in research on the economic, political and social aspects of countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean. According to an official of this organization, the I. P. R.[13] developed into an association composed of national councils. Although each national council was described as autonomous, the organization scheme provided for international cooperation in programs of research, publications and conferences. This program of international cooperation was directed through a Pacific Council, in which

each national council had representation. In turn, this program was administered by an international secretariat located in New York.

This study is concerned primarily with the Soviet, Chinese and American Councils as well as the international organization, all of which provided the primary conditioning of relations between forces sympathetic to the Chinese Communist cause. These forces provided an international organizational base for personnel who interlocked the various Communist controlled, influenced or dominated organizations or publications in the United States, i.e., American Friends of the Chinese People[11], its publication China Today[10] and the broad coalition of forces surrounding its activity i. e., China Aid Council[15]; the publication Amerasia[16]; and other organizations more concerned with the Soviet Union itself.

This interlocking personnel included such I. P. R.[13] officials as Edward Clarke Carter, former Secretary General of the International Secretariat; Thomas A. Bisson, Associate Editor of Pacific Affairs, international quarterly of the I. P. R.[13]; Frederick V. Field, Secretary of the American Council, I. P. R.[13]; Michael Greenberg, Managing Editor

of Pacific Affairs, Owen Lattimore, Editor of Pacific Affairs; Kate Mitchell, former private secretary to Carter; Catherine Porter, an Editor of the Far Eastern Survey, published fortnightly by the American Council of the I. P. R. [13]; and Harriet Moore, member of the Executive Committee of the American Council.

The efforts of these persons were aided by staff members and writers such as James S. Allen, Evans F. Carlson, Israel Epstein, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Miriam Farley, Philip R. Jaffe, William Marx Mandel, Ida Pruitt, Andrew Roth, Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow, Nym Wales (Mrs. Edgar Snow), Guenther Stein, Maxwell Stewart, Anna Louise Strong, Ilona Ralf Sues, Mary Van Kleeck and Ella Winter. These persons, identified with the I. P. R. [13], were also identified with other organizations or publications promoting Chinese Communist and/or Soviet united front interests in the United States.

These writers and executives in an allegedly objective I. P. R. [13] organization were able to corroborate each other's prestige to such an extent as to be recognized in many sources as specialists and well-grounded authorities in Chinese matters. Not only did this present a

situation wherein broad scholastic opinion was subjected to ideas compatible with Chinese Communists' aims, but it presented a means of orienting the thinking of U. S. Government officials. This could be accomplished through conferences with these officials in the guise of an objective and authoritative discussion of China; supplying selected research material to officials which might serve as a basis for their thinking on China problems; and the implementation and support of Chinese Communist objectives by I. P. R.[13] members and supporters actually in the employ of the United States Government. Not only were these persons in a position to orient official thinking in line with the Communist view, but they were also in a position, if required, to obtain vital intelligence information.

In 1934 a Soviet Council, known as the Pacific Institute of the USSR, was formally affiliated with the I. P. R.[13] Mr. A. Kantorovich was appointed General Secretary of the Soviet Institute. His special field of study was alleged to be American policy in China. G. N. Voitinskii (Voitinsky), a Vice-President of the Soviet Institute, had allegedly spent the period 1913-1918 in the United States and Canada as a student and worker. After returning to Russia he allegedly joined the Communist

Party and became involved in underground work and worked for a number of years in the eastern secretariat of the Comintern[1]. There he participated in Communist organizational work in China.

An investigation of certain phases of I. P. R.[13] activities revealed collaboration and exchange of information between I. P. R.[13] officials and persons in various departments of the United States Government. Conversely, the Soviet Union through the Soviet I. P. R.[13] officials was interested in harnessing the intelligence developing facilities of the I. P. R.[13] A former Soviet official has testified that some of these requests for information emanated from a Soviet intelligence organization.

Voitinsky of the Soviet I. P. R.[13] was interested in 1934 in obtaining through the I. P. R.[13] information regarding countries other than the United States. In 1936, Motiliev (Motylev), President of the Soviet I. P. R.[13], was allegedly interested in receiving from the United States more material on the economic geography of the country; of publications of the U. S. Government and particularly statistical [illegible] There were subsequent Soviet I. P. R.[13] requests for information publications.

In accordance with the established pattern, Chinese nationals sympathetic to the Chinese Communist movement also had a role in the I. P. R.[13] Most prominently identified with the I. P. R.[13] in this role were Chi Chao-ting, Chen Han-seng and Hsu Yung-ying. These persons were also a part of the pattern of interlocking personnel connecting through personnel various organizations or publications sympathetic to the Chinese Communist cause.

Chi Chao-ting became active in the I. P. R.[13] in the United States during its early period of development; supplied writings for publication; and served on the International Secretariat. Chi's prominent part in the publications China Today[10] and Amerasia[16] gives some indication of the scope of his propaganda efforts. Chi's wife, Harriet Levine Chi, has testified that she was employed by the I. P. R.[13] as a secretary to Owen Lattimore in 1936.

In approximately 1941, Chi was replaced on the International Secretariat of the I. P. R.[13] by Hsu Yung-ying. A reliable informant has stated that Chi in 1937 recognized Hsu as the top Chinese Communist in the United States. Like Chi, Hsu worked closely with Frederick V. Field in connection with his writings and other propaganda work.

Hsu was very active in connection with the United Nations conference held during 1945 in San Francisco, California. Hsu discussed with Edward C. Carter the possibility of being sent to this conference as an I. P. R.[13] delegate. Hsu was reliably reported to have been instrumental in arranging a meeting between Earl Browder and the Chinese United Nations delegate, Tung Pi-wu, in early 1945 and was connected with the preparation of a propaganda pamphlet written by Tung Pi-wu for dissemination in the United States. Frederick Field allegedly indicated to Hsu his cooperation in calling attention to this pamphlet. Hsu allegedly returned to China the following year and assumed various leadership positions in the new Communist China.

Chen Han-seng, another Chinese national formerly in the United States and now in Communist China, supplied writings or information for the I. P. R.[13] during a long period of time. In the early 1930's Chen supplied articles for the Chinese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[13] In the later 1930's his writings appeared in Amerasia[16] and the I. P. R.[13] publications Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs. Chen was particularly noted for supplying Lattimore, Carter and the I. P. R.[13] with military information regarding the situation in China during the late 1930's. A recent New China News

Agency release described Chen Han-sheng as Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

These writers and staff members of the I. P. R.[13] were useful for other purposes. In January 1940, Frederick V. Field supported the scheduled visit of Agnes N. Jaffe to China. According to Field, the I. P. R.[13] had requested Agnes Jaffe to look into the development of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. Field indicated that the arrangments for this visit had been made through Chen Han-seng, a former staff member of the I. P. R.[13] and Chairman of the Hong Kong Committee for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. In this connection it may be significant to note that also during January 1940 Edward C. Clark communicated with Theodore H. White in Chungking, China, and asked White to serve as a mail drop for a letter addressed to Carter from a "trusted member" of the I. P. R.[13] staff. It is noted that a Theodore White was employed as a correspondent in China and later wrote for the I. P. R.[13] publication Far Eastern Survey.

Two key persons during the most effective period of the I. P. R.[13] in the United States were Edward C. Carter and Frederick V. Field. Carter, who became Secretary to the American Council

of the I. P. R.[13] in 1926, has supplied information regarding a pertinent complement of the I. P. R.[13]

In 1950, Carter advised that for several years he had been a member of the Board of Directors, American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union (ARI)[17]. Carter stated that, although the aims and purposes of the I. P. R.[13] and the ARI[17] differ, the interests of the two organizations were complementary. As far as the differences were concerned, Carter stated that the I. P. R.[13] was interested in the Soviet Union as a Pacific power, whereas the ARI[17] was interested in the Soviet Union as an Asiatic and European power. Carter stated that Harriet Moore of the I. P. R.[13] was allowed to go to the ARI[17] on a full-time basis as Carter and his associates in the I. P. R.[13] thought she would be more useful there. Harriet Moore was also identified with the editorial board of Amerasia[16]. She was only one of a large group of writers identified with the Chinese Communist cause who were prominent in both the I. P. R.[13] and Amerasia[16]. Frederick V. Field is perhaps the most prominent of this group.

3. Amerasia[16]

Among the other bases for the Chinese Communist sympathizers in the United States was the publication Amerasia[16]. Many of those prominent in the group of individuals involved in the organizations American Friends of the Chinese People[11] and the Institute of Pacific Relations[13], were identified with this enterprise. In addition there was a linking community of interest indicated by the publications involved. According to a notification dated in March 1942 on the letterhead of the American Friends of the Chinese People[11] addressed to the subscribers of its publication China Today[10], the publication Amerasia[16] would replace subscriptions to China Today[10]. The last issue of Amerasia[16], dated July 1947 included a notice to the effect that incomplete Amerasia[16] subscriptions would be filled by the I. P. R 's[13] fortnightly publication Far Eastern Survey.

Guiding hands of the American Friends of the Chinese People[11], the Institute of Pacific Relations[13], and their publications took an early decisive role in the publication of Amerasia[16]. Amerasia[16] commenced publication in March 1937 with the editorial board including Frederick V. Field, Chairman, Philip J Jaffe, Managing Editor, and editorial board members Owen Lattimore, Chi Chao-ting and Thomas Arthur Bisson.

Subsequent issues of Amerasia[16] carried such editorial board members as Harriet Levine, wife of Chi Chao-ting, Kate Mitchell who subsequently became coeditor of the publication with Jaffe, and Harriet L. Moore, identified as Editor of Bulletin on the Soviet Union and the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union[18] published by the American Russian Institute[17]. These persons were all prominently associated with the I. P. R.[13]

Amerasia[16] writers and staff members included many more I. P. R.[13] writers; prominent persons in the Foreign Policy Association,* such as William T. Stone, David H. Popper and T. A. Bisson; as well as United States Government employees. Obviously the broad base of potentialities for securing information and providing propaganda and influence is evident in Amerasia's[16] staff, writers and collaborators.

After recognizing the similar personalities of influence in the American Friends of the Chinese People[11], the Institute of Pacific Relations[13] and Amerasia[16] one must consider the intelligence potential. We are confronted with the proposition of organizations or personnel sympathetic to the Chinese Communist cause who, because of their collective positions, have many channels of receiving and disseminating information which might well be of interest to the Communist movement in China and their Soviet "Advisors."

* The articles of incorporation of the Foreign Policy Association have reflected the purpose of this organization as "to carry on research and educational activities to aid in the understanding and constructive development of American foreign policy."

The most obvious intelligence potential of Amerasia[16] would be the appearance of intelligence material in its widely distributed issues. In July 1939 Edward Carter alleged that V. E. Motiliev (Motylev) of the Soviet I. P. R. [13] wished that Pacific Affairs carried as essential information as that which appeared in Amerasia[16] under the heading, "Economic Notes." This section of Amerasia[16] was handled first by Chi Chao-ting and later by Jaffe. An important factor in the Amerasia[16] case was the similarity between an article appearing in the publication and a "Secret" report of O. S. S. (Office of Strategic Services). Subsequent investigation led to the arrests of Philip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell, editors of Amerasia[16], Lieutenant Andrew Roth of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Emmanuel Larsen and John Stewart Service of the Department of State and Mark J Gayn, a free-lance writer, charging them with conspiracy to violate Section 31-D, Title 50, U. S. Code. Jaffe subsequently admitted that he had printed in Amerasia[16] items from a number of classified documents.

4. Chinese Influence in the United States

Just as those in China, the Chinese nationals in the United States played a continuing part in the forces involved in the Chinese Communist revolution. An article appearing in the March 1936 issue of China Today[10] regresses a bit and reports the continuity of Chinese activity in the United States.

This article reported that after the Canton Commune was crushed, the most militant element of the Kuomintang in America split from that party and organized the Chinese Anti-Imperialist Alliance and published the Chinese Vanguard as its organ. In 1929 this Alliance sent a delegate to the World Anti-Imperialist Congress in Berlin. This Alliance fought against the policy of the Kuomintang and gave support to the "anti-imperialist" forces in China and endeavored to link up all Chinese issues closely with the struggles of the "American masses."

This article goes on to state that the attack of Japan on China led to the uniting of all Chinese to fight against Japanese imperialists For the first time in the history of the Chinese movement in the United States, people of different political opinions began to unite and discuss the issues of China. Even the Chinese students who allegedly were inactive had been aroused. It was stated that the New York Chinese Student Alliance had joined hands with its countrymen in anti-Japanese activity.

There were reportediy other efforts to stimulate the youth in this period. The American Youth Congress[19] had a Far Eastern Commission engaged in promoting Chinese matters. On December 15, 1935, the Peiping Students' Union addressed a letter to the American

Student Union[20], asking for a united front against "Japanese imperialism." On February 22, 1936, the National Salvation Association of Fuh Tan University in China appealed to the American Student Union[20] for unity and support "for the liberation of China."

The influence of some of the more prominent Chinese extended far beyond the Chinese organizations. From faraway China, Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling) and her China Defense League affected organizations in the United States that were sympathetic to her cause in China. Others in the United States who were particularly influential during this period were Chi Chao-ting, Hsu Yung-ying, Chen Han-seng and Chu Tong. These four Chinese gave a broad and significant representation to their ideas during this period in such organizations as the American Friends of the Chinese People[11], Institute of Pacific Relations[13], Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, American League for Peace and Democracy[14], American Student Union[20] and the publications China Daily News, Amerasia[16], and China Today[10].

The consistent pressing of the idea, united front against Japanese imperialism, allegedly had marked success in the Chinese communities in the United States. Perhaps as a fruit of this propaganda and organizational barrage, it was reported that in November 1937 traditionally antagonistic tongs and organizations formed a General Relief Fund Committee representing

every organization in New York City's Chinatown. Similar united fronts were reportedly formed in Chicago, Illinois, and San Francisco, California. Frederick V. Field gave this line support in the April 1941 issue of China Today[10]. He appealed for a united front by the Kuomintang, Communists and other political elements against Japan.

5. U. S. Government Infiltration

This period of the second United Front was marked with significant infiltration and influence of the United States Government. Persons sympathetic to the Communist aims in China were found in positions and organizations where they could carry out Georgi Dimitroff's stated aim of influencing the United States Government. Regardless of whether this infiltration was accomplished through a formal intelligence apparatus or the work of stumbling idealists, the United States Government was infiltrated with persons sympathetic to Communist aims in China who were in a position to provide the structure for an intelligence apparatus.

A successful intelligence apparatus must have qualified sources of intelligence information. Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, professed Soviet agents, have identified a number of such sources in the United States Government. These allegations included persons interested in Chinese matters, i.e., Lauchlin Currie, an administrative assistant to

the President of the United States, and Currie's assistant Michael Greenberg; Harry Dexter White, an Assistant Secretary of the U. S. Treasury; and Solomon Adler, representative of U. S. Treasury Department in Chungking, China. These persons have been reliably identified with persons or organizations specifically interested in promoting conditions favorable to a Communist China.

Another potentiality as an intelligence source was the Amerasia[16] group which had access to United States Government documents of a classified nature. This is made more real with the close relationship between Jaffe and Chi Chao-ting.

Chi, while acting as an official for Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Government during this period, had entrees with various high U. S. Government officials. Chi's potentialities were emphasized by his position with the monetary stabilization fund set up for China and his position on behalf of the Chinese Government at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944.

The potentiality for espionage through Government channels or sources close to these channels also existed in China. During this second United Front period, John Stewart Service and Solomon Adler

shared an apartment in Chungking, China. Service admittedly on various occasions discussed with the Soviet press attache in Chungking the situation in China. Another employee of the U. S. Embassy in Chungking during the early 1940's admitted supplying information from Embassy files to an official of the Soviet Embassy.

Other potentialities for intelligence from U. S. Government agencies in China are evidenced in Chinese nationals such as Liu Tsun-chi allegedly the Chief of the Sino-Division of the Office of War Information in Chungking during World War II. Liu subsequently became associated with propaganda activities of the Chinese Communist regime.

U. S. Government employees sympathetic to the Chinese Communist cause were in a position to carry messages to and from Chinese principals. An example is Frederick T. Douglas who in 1945 allegedly brought Grace Granich communications from Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch ing-ling) which were addressed in care of Mildred Price. Douglas was allegedly employed in 1944-45 by the U. S. Government in China.

V. CIVIL WAR PERIOD II ("LIBERATION") - CONSOLIDATION

A. BACKGROUND

On April 24, 1945, Mao Tse-tung delivered a report to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in which he spoke of eliminating the Japanese aggressor externally and the Kuomintang Government internally. To accomplish this Mao stated:

> "...we must join hands with any individual or social group who favors the defeating of the Japanese aggressors and the building up of a new China, irrespective of class or political affiliation."
>
> Mao Tse-tung, The Fight for a New China (New Century Publishers, New York, December, 1945), p. 80.

Mao also warned of the danger of another civil war with the Kuomintang after the Japanese were driven out of China.

During the last days of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Nationalist and Communist representatives negotiated for a means of achieving national unity in China. United States representatives took part in these negotiations. These efforts to unify China were unsuccessful and the civil war (or in Communist terminology, "liberation war") was resumed.

In an article written by Mao for the 28th anniversary of the Communist Party of China he describes it in this manner:

> "Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China the Chinese people, after driving out the Japanese imperialists, waged a people's liberation war for three years and achieved a smashing victory."
>
> Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Rule, p. 4.

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communists established a Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. This was done after the meeting of the "People's Political Consultation Conference."

B. COMMUNIST PARTY, USA[2]

The termination of the war against Japan did not end the continuous parallel of assistance rendered the Chinese Communists by the Communist Party, USA[2]. According to an educational outline of the Party it had to assume special responsibilities:

> "To fully grasp the magnitude and deep significance of the great victories of the Chinese people, to imbue the whole labor and progressive movement with this understanding, to arouse the people to render direct and determined support to the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of 'their own country,' is in the first place, the special responsibility of the vanguard party--the Communist Party of the United States."

"Whereas many progressive organizations take part in the analysis of current news developments in China, it is the special responsibility of the Communist Party to clarify the basic nature of the present Chinese revolution, its 'new democratic' character, its perspectives for socialism, and the effects of the great victories of the Chinese revolution on the world struggle between the camps of reaction and of the democratic forces of the world...."

("World Significance of the Events in China--Discussion Outline and Material for Classes," Issued by National Education Department, Communist Party, 35 East 12th Street, N.Y.C.)

In addition to direct action, the Party also supplied guidance or discipline to collateral efforts assisting the "liberation" of China. Prominent among these organizational vehicles was the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21].

C. COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY[21]

In August 1945 this organization was reliably reported as operating in New York City under the name Committee for a Democratic Policy Toward China. In December 1945 this organization registered a change in its name to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21]. This organization worked in close cooperation with the Communist Party, USA[2] and spread its influence on a broad front throughout

the United States. Its publication was successively known as the Information Bulletin, Spotlight on the Far East[22] and Far East Spotlight.

Maud Russell became the Executive Director of this organization and the indicated officials of the organization and publication included many persons prominently identified with other organizations or programs in support of the Chinese Communists. These included Frederick V. Field, T. A. Bisson, Talitha Gerlach, Mr. and Mrs. Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong, Chu Tong, Israel Epstein, Elsie Cholmeley, Gunther Stein and Philip Jaffe.

Through both written and oral propaganda this organization spread its program. In early 1949 at an Action Conference on China Policy sponsored by the Committee a program of objectives was formulated. In general terms this policy was to attack the forces sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek; to demand an end to American "intervention" and aid to the Kuomintang; to prepare the United States Government for the recognition of the forthcoming Chinese Communist regime; to urge genuine cooperation with this new regime including friendly trade relations; and to get information regarding the Government's China policy to the American people.

A form letter on the letterhead of the Communist Party of the State of New York dated March 1, 1949, enclosed a Program for Action on China Policy as adopted by this Action Conference on China. This communication also referred to a special outline issued by the National Education Committee on Communist Policy in China. This letter referred the addressee of the letter to make any further inquiry to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21].

On November 20, 1952, Maud Russell as Executive Director indicated "The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21] is no longer in existence, after completing seven full years of activity geared to informing and mobilizing American public opinion. . . ." "Its work has served to prepare the way for the current emphasis on Far Eastern policy which many organizations now make a major part of their action program." Russell stated that she would continue to make available "specialized Far Eastern material." In addition she stated that all paid-up subscriptions to Far East Spotlight will be honored as subscriptions to Far East Reporter. She indicated that she would be available for talks on the Far East.

D. CHINA WELFARE APPEAL, INC.[23]

The China Welfare Appeal[23] was incorporated in New York State in May 1949. This was allegedly formed to replace the China Aid Council[15] which had been born of the previous united front period. This Council[15] allegedly followed the policies of Earl Browder, deposed Communist Party official, instead of cooperating closely with Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling) in China. In December 1949 Gerald Tannenbaum, associated with the work of Madame Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai, China,authorized the transfer of funds of the China Aid Council[15]-China Welfare Fund in the United States to the China Welfare Appeal[23].

The parallel in China for these activities was the China Defense League founded in 1938. After "V-J Day" it became the China Welfare Fund. It is now known as the China Welfare Institute. This Institute became affiliated with the People's Relief Administration in new Communist China.

Madame Sun Yat-sen's official collaboration with the new Chinese Communist Government, on the one hand, and her long period of liaison in the United States with Communists and

those sympathetic to her work in China, on the other hand, present a continuing threat to our internal security.

E. INDUSCO (AMERICAN COMMITTEE IN AID OF CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES)

Another organization carrying on similar supporting functions with the China Aid Council[15] and the China Welfare Appeal[23] was Indusco. Indicative of new tactics and the relationships of Indusco was an item appearing in a report of the China Welfare Appeal[23] in late 1952 which stated that Indusco's work had been successfully completed. This organization founded in 1939 under the leadership of Ida Pruitt had rendered valuable aid to the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives in their vital role of the "Anti-Japanese War of Resistance." This announcement went on to state that Miss Pruitt was continuing her activity as Chairman of China Welfare Appeal[23]. At the June 1952 meeting of Indusco it was stated that Indusco's mailing list would be turned over to China Welfare Appeal[23]. An invitation was extended to Indusco board members to join the China Welfare Appeal[23] board, which was described as the only link with "People's China."

A New China News Agency Bulletin* of March 7, 1951, in an item with a date line at Peking, March 4, (1951), stated that the International Committee for Chinese Industrial Cooperatives has decided to wind up its work. Ida Pruitt was identified with this work. This organization, in announcing its dissolution, was quoted by this bulletin as follows:

> "We are proud to have been associated, even in a small way with the early development of what has now, under the People's Government, become a great people's movement."
>
> New China News Agency, Daily Bulletin No. 235, dated March 7, 1951.

F. UNITED NATIONS

Although the People's Republic of China has not gained membership in the United Nations organization, the potentialities of Chinese Communist membership in this organization should not be disregarded. These potentialities are not in terms of conjecture but are indicated by past brief experiences with Chinese Communist representatives in the United States under the "official cover" of the United Nations.

*New China News Agency is the Communist official news agency. (Political Handbook of the World 1953, p. 41)

Chinese Communist participation in the founding conference of the United Nations organization held April 25 to June 26, 1945, at San Francisco, California, supplied an early opportunity for a sampling of their activities in the United States under a United Nations cover. These representatives in the United States pertinent to this sampling were the Chinese Communist delegate Tung Pi-wu and his secretaries Chang Han-fu, editor of the Chinese Communist Party publication, New China Daily News in Chungking, China, and Chen Chia-kung, secretary to Chou En-lai, current Premier, Government Administration Council, People's Republic of China.

Tung and his two secretaries took full advantage of their visit to the United States. Both United States citizens and Chinese nationals in the United States assisted them in their efforts to make contacts and carry on propaganda activities. These contacts included contacts with the China Daily News, Jefferson School of Social Science[24], Southern Conference for Human Welfare[25], Institute of Pacific Relations[13], Indusco, Inc., Protestant Digest[26], China Aid Council[15], Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade[27], and top Communist Party[2] (and Communist Political Association[28]) officials in the United States.

Grace Granich, who represented the Daily People's World[29], a west coast Communist newspaper, at this conference of the United Nations worked in close collaboration with the Chinese Communist representatives. Grace Granich and her husband Max Granich have been identified with Chinese Communist activities for many years. They were identified with Chinese Communist publications in China and the United States and have been in communication with Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling) over a long period of years.

During the course of the United Nations conference it was reported that Tung Pi-wu was preparing a propaganda pamphlet on the "liberated" area of China. Grace Granich and Hsu Yung-ying allegedly helped with the publication of this pamphlet in the United States. Frederick V. Field allegedly stated that he would help by drawing attention to it after publication.

In April 1945, Hsu Yung-ying arranged a meeting with Earl Browder, General Secretary of the American Party, at the home of Philip Jaffe. In addition, the Chinese Communists were in contact with Agnes Smedley, identified with the Richard Sorge espionage apparatus; Maxim Lieber, identified with Whittaker Chambers'

intelligence activity; and John Abt, identified with Miss Elizabeth Bentley's intelligence activity.

Tung Pi-wu and Chen Chia-kang in the company of Max and Grace Granich during late 1945 visited at the apartment of Aube Tzerko. Tzerko was in clandestine contact with Sam Carr while Carr was a fugitive from Canadian authorities during 1946-1949. Carr was identified with Soviet intelligence operations in Canada and national organizer of the Labour-Progressive (Communist) Party of Canada.

In June 1945, Lawrence Lowe who has been identified with Communist activities in California allegedly held a meeting in his apartment in San Francisco, California. The Chinese Communist delegate to the conference allegedly addressed a select group of San Francisco Chinese at this meeting. Lowe acted as interpreter for the speaker.

A reliable informant advised that Tung Pi-wu also attended a meeting of New York area Communist leaders in August 1945. This meeting was reportedly held so that Tung could discuss with those present conditions and future plans of Communist China. At this meeting Tung also allegedly announced that the

Committee for a Democratic Policy Toward China was being organized in New York City to criticize conditions under the Nationalist Government of China.

Perhaps another avenue of Communist cooperation was indicated through the activities of Charlotte Honig, who was identified as a member of the Communist Party[2] for many years. These Chinese Communist representatives allegedly utilized an apartment for their living quarters which had been leased in the name of Charlotte Honig.

Another experience with Chinese Communists with official cover in connection with United Nations matters took place in 1950. The Chinese Communist Government sent a delegation of nine members to the United Nations on November 24, 1950. They departed December 19, 1950, but not without attempting to collect a marked amount of publications regarding scientific, political and national defense matters.

Prominent in the collection of this material was Mme. Kung Pu-sheng. She was identified as Deputy Director, International Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an alternate member representing the All-China Federation of Democratic

Women, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. She was also identified as the sister of Kung Peng, who headed the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Mrs. Kung Pu-sheng also had been previously employed at the United Nations, New York City, during the period 1946-48.

Others connected with collecting this material were Pu Shan, Chiao Kuan-hua and An Tung. Pu Shan received his higher education in the United States, specializing in economics. Chiao Kuan-hua, in addition to his governmental and party positions, was editor of People's China. An Tung was listed as Technical Counselor to the delegation.

The remaining vehicle for potential intelligence activities in the United Nations is employment by the United Nations or affiliated agencies on the one hand or by infiltration of the existing governmental delegation. There are indications that these avenues have been utilized by persons sympathetic to the Chinese Communist regime.

G. OVERSEAS CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee

An unsigned letter on the letterhead of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the Central Government dated February 1, 1950, told of the formation of this committee for the purpose of helping overseas Chinese. This help was described in terms of protecting their rights; helping them make arrangements to return to China; relief, etc. This letter also requested that papers and magazines make this known and that they send reports on their articles to the Committee office.

A letter dated February 3, 1950, from Szeto Mei-tong, indentified with the Chih Kung Tang in China, stated that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee had been set up to protect the interests of all loyal overseas Chinese. The letter indicated that overseas branches would be established. Those who had matters to take up with instant committee were urged to communicate with representatives designated for this purpose. This letter further stated that China needed the help of every Chinese, whether at home or abroad.

2. Overseas Chinese in San Francisco, California

a. Overseas Chinese Representatives in the United States

The new Communist regime in China brought about a new phase in the historic relationships of overseas Chinese with revolutionary forces in China. The professed benevolence of the new regime and apparent opportunity for material gain caused many "fence sitting" Chinese to cast their lot with the Communist forces. This situation is well exemplified by the enthusiastic reaction of certain Chinese in San Francisco, California. This program allegedly was to be given guidance by two members of the Committee for Overseas Chinese Affairs in San Francisco. These two members were reportedly Joe Yuey and Dear Kew Yuen. This committee was to become operative in the event the United States Government recognized Communist China.

Joe Yuey was identified as president of the On On Company, and a director of the Chung Wah Corporation, both in San Francisco, California. It is noted that both of these business ventures were initiated in 1949, the formulative year of the new Communist Chinese Government.

It has been reliably reported that certain other Chinese in San Francisco, California, have been in communication with Hong Kong firms identified as having Communist connections. These firms have

been identified as the Tai Tung Company, the Ching Fung Chong Company and Life Reader Sinzh Joint Publishing Company, Hong Kong.

Still other Chinese in the United States have been the addressees for material from the Life Reader Sinzh Joint Publishing Company. In addition, on one occasion a Chinese of the student-scientist category requested this firm to receive and retain for him certain material. This was done by the Chinese to avoid carrying this material in his luggage when he returned to China. Another Chinese identified with Communist activities in California unsuccessfully attempted to return to China with several hundred pounds of technical papers.

b. Chung Wah and the Chung Sai Yat Po

Chung Wah was incorporated for the alleged purpose of handling and improving property at 716 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, the address of the Chung Sai Yat Po newspaper. Directors of this corporation included other Chinese identified with the Chinese Communist program in San Francisco, such as Leong Thick Hing and Francis Leong. Chung Wah allegedly leased the newly purchased Chung Sai Yat Po newspaper to a group headed by Dear Kew Yuen. This newspaper was published under this management until early 1951.

Reliable informants stated that, while owned by the Chung Wah corporation, the Chung Sai Yat Po was a supporter of the People's Republic of China. Its managing editor, Dear Kew Yuen, has admitted that this publication was pro-Chinese Communist.

c. China Weekly

Another publication should be mentioned in connection with the support to the new Chinese Communist regime in San Francisco. This weekly Chinese language newspaper was organized under the name of the Golden Gate Publishing Company in May 1949. This publication was allegedly described as an all-Chinese Communist weekly newspaper by a Communist Party, USA, functionary in San Francisco, California. Dear Kew Yuen, managing editor of the Chung Sai Yat Po newspaper in San Francisco, identified the China Weekly as truly a Communist newspaper. It may be of interest to note that the editor of the China Weekly recommended the Chung Sai Yat Po as a daily newspaper in answer to a reader's request. The last issue of the China Weekly, also known as Chin Men Chiao Pao, appeared December 13, 1950.

d. General Activity

Francis Leong may be exemplary of some of the Chinese in San Francisco who, during the period of 1949-51, openly identified

themselves with the new Communist regime in China. In early 1949 they participated in celebrating the victories of the "Army of New China" and propagating the propaganda line of Communist China. Leong has stated that, with the advent of Communist China, a great many of the overseas Chinese felt that the Communists would be better for China than the Nationalist Government had been. According to Leong, since the Communists have become more entrenched, stories emanating from China concerning the harsh treatment of the people have turned the overseas Chinese against the Communist Government.

Another factor which might have influenced Leong was the Party's urging of trade with Communist China. Leong, proprietor of the Royal Cathay Trading Company in San Francisco, also admitted that he felt that certain of his political activities in support of the new regime would help his business.

The basically Chinese organizations in San Francisco did not represent the whole effort in the Chinese support of the new China. It was reliably reported that on June 5, 1950, a meeting was held in San Francisco under the auspices of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21] and the Chinese Workers' Mutual Aid Association. Speeches delivered at this meeting concerned the

resumption of trade with China, soliciting support of the new Chinese regime and calling for help in the development of China.

The Chinese Workers' Mutual Aid Association is reportedly known as an organization of a pro-Communist nature composed largely of Chinese seamen, cooks and restaurant workers in San Francisco. Informants have reported that, due to the opposition of Chinese anti-Communists in San Francisco, this association has not been able to extend its influence.

3. Overseas Chinese in New York Area

a. Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance

The Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance in New York City was chartered in 1933 as a membership organization founded to render legal and protective services to its members engaged in the laundry business in the New York area. In approximately 1934 a dispute arose between members of this organization, resulting in a split in the organization and the formation of the Chinese Hand Laundry Association. Subsequent to this split, the Alliance was alleged to be under Communist control.

This Alliance is of particular interest because of the reported interrelation of members of the Alliance with stockholders of the China Daily News. An officer of the China Daily News has

stated that there were a large number of stockholders of this publication who were also members of the Alliance. In addition it was reliably reported that the Committee to Support the China Daily News is usually composed of stockholders of the publication and members of the Alliance.

It was reliably reported that on October 9, 1949, at the headquarters of the Alliance in New York City, a celebration of the Chinese Communist "liberation" of China took place. Other support was reportedly shown the Chinese Communist regime at a Quon Shar banquet in January 1950. Elder members of the Quon Shar, allegedly a social club within the Alliance, were reported to have advocated the buying of "victory bonds" issued by the new Communist regime.

b. China Daily News

The China Daily News is a Chinese-language daily newspaper published by the China Daily News, Incorporated, New York City. It was incorporated under New York State laws on May 17, 1940. As indicated previously, members of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance had an active interest in this publication. An additional influence from this direction might be indicated through Chew Sick Hong, with alias Chu Tong. He served as secretary of the Chinese Hand Laundry

Alliance during 1937-39 and then became editor of the China Daily News.

A former official of the Communist Party, USA, has advised that the Party was cautious in its dealings with the China Daily News, but its former editor, Chu Tong, was considered to be one of the Party's experts on Far Eastern matters.

The China Daily News, its president Eugene Moy, and its former managing editor, Albert Wong, were indicted on April 28, 1952, in the Southern District of New York for violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This involved publishing advertisements for the following designated (blocked) nationals:

> Nanyang Commercial Bank, Ltd., Hong Kong, China;
> Bank of China, Overseas Chinese Service, Hong Kong, China; and
> People's Bank of China, Toishan, China.

In part this involved making available financial facilities to Chinese residing in the United States to make unlawful remittances to China. It has been reliably reported that since the boycott of this publication by the Chinese in New York City, newsstands generally in Chinatown refuse to handle the paper.

c. China Tribune

The New York area included another Chinese newspaper which, during the approximate period of 1946-1950, was reportedly

fostering Communist aims. This was allegedly due in some part to financial assistance from General Feng Yu-hsiang who came to the United States in 1947 and became an agent of the Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang of China. In 1950 this publication was allegedly taken over by pro-Kuomintang interests.

Yee Yen-shan, former editor and president of the China Tribune, stated that this publication was critical of the Nationalist Government of China. Yee stated that, in addition, he was a friend of General Feng and was sympathetic with his cause. According to Yee, Lai Hsing-chih, secretary to General Feng during his stay in New York City, wrote editorials for the China Tribune.

d. Kang Jai Association

This has been identified as a Chinese seamen's organization located in Brooklyn, New York. It was reliably reported that this organization was dominated by a small group of outspoken Communists. This domination was allegedly due to the illiteracy of the membership and the fear of retaliation to relatives in China by the membership. The control of the Communist element was allegedly given a serious blow by the arrest in the United States of a number of aliens identified with the Communist leadership.

e. Fay Chow Merchants Association

This is reportedly an ancestral tong which draws its membership from those Chinese who can trace their ancestry from the Fay Chow District in Kwantung Province. Most of the members were allegedly former seamen who are now engaged in business. Its headquarters has been located at New York City. A small group of members led by Yim Ching-wing, a former president of the organization, were allegedly in support of the Chinese Communist cause.

f. Chinese Youth Club

There have been in existence various Chinese Youth Clubs in the United States which claim not to be political. Probably the best known of these clubs is the Chinese Youth Club in New York. The constitution of this organization, however, has included political aims, "to support the movement for a united, democratic, independent and free China." In addition, this constitution calls for liaison with the youth movement in China as well as other youth organizations in the United States and throughout the world.

There have been allegations identifying some members of the New York club with Chinese Communist aims. In the late 1930s and early 1940s this club allegedly cooperated in public events sponsored by

the American Friends of the Chinese People[11] and the American League for Peace and Democracy[14]. There have been unsubstantiated reports identifying this club with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and the China Daily News. In this connection it is noted that the Chinese Youth Club has occupied headquarters space in the building occupied by the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance in New York City and reportedly had as an advisor, Chu Tong, who was editor of the China Daily News.

4. General Activity

a. China Democratic League

In China the China Democratic League is a collaborating party in the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. In 1946 Percy Chen, son of Eugene Chen*, helped build up the China Democratic League in Shanghai. In late 1946 Percy Chen came to the United States and allegedly canvassed support for this League.

The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21] announced through its publication that a chapter of the "Democratic League of China" had been founded in the United States and its initial statements were issued in January 1947. In a letter to the Editor of this publication dated February 25, 1947, signed by Arthur W. Chung,

*Eugene Chen was allegedly a collaborator of Michael Borodin during the 1920s in China and reportedly took refuge in the Soviet Union with his children and Borodin in 1927.

Chairman, U. S. Chapter, Chinese Democratic League, it was stated that Percy Chen was not an authorized Chinese Democratic League representative. Chen had allegedly held a press conference in January 1947 and claimed to be an authorized spokesman for the League. When requested to register this organization under the terms of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Chung stated on May 27, 1947, that the U. S. Chapter had been dissolved.

Chung served on the Board of Directors of the China Aid Council, Inc.[15], served also as a sponsor for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21] and was a Director for China Welfare Appeal[23].

The "China Welfare Appeal[23] Report" in the "Winter, 1950" issue stated that Dr. Chung, China Welfare Appeal[23] Board member, accompanied a cargo of medical and hospital supplies consigned to Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling), China Welfare Fund Chairman in China. It was also reported that Dr. Chung was writing to the China Welfare Appeal[23] from China.

b. Hung Mon Min Chih Tang (Masonic Order People's Rule Party)

The Hung Mon Min Chih Tang had its origin in the year 1674 and was a popular revolutionary organization. Sun Yat-sen allegedly stated that the overseas Chinese were the mother of the Chinese revolution (in 1911) but it was the members of the Hung Mon that were the leaders of the revolutionary movement among the overseas Chinese.

The overseas organizations of the Hung Mon have been popularly known as Chih Kung Tang. Conventions of the American constituents of the organization caused the name to be finally changed to Hung Mon Min Chih Tang of China or more popularly the Min Chih Tang.

Szeto Mei-tong, identified as a leader in the Min Chih Tang, allegedly attempted to influence the overseas Chinese in the United States to support the Chinese Communist united front in China. He reportedly had some success in approximately 1945 in getting the Min Chih Tang to support a popular-front statement including the Chinese Communists. Szeto Mei-tong was allegedly unsuccessful with subsequent efforts to align this organization with the program of the Chinese Communists and returned to China. There he was reported to have attended the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held by the Chinese Communists and their allies in China in September 1949.

In November 1952, the Chih Kung Tang in China reportedly held its fifth national conference. A central committee was elected with Chen Chi-yuan as chairman. Resolutions were adopted to further strengthen solidarity with Chinese residents abroad and returned overseas Chinese; to continue to take active part in the movement against "U. S. aggression"; to consolidate Sino-Soviet friendship; to support people of the world striving for lasting peace; and to make preparations for the coming economic construction of China.

The Chih Kung Tang has been reliably identified as a minor party in China which lends its support to the Central People's Government. Although informants state that the Chih Kung Tang of China wields no influence over the Min Chih Tang in the United States, this organization among others may again be the target for infiltration by elements sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

c. Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang China

General Feng Yu-hsiang, who has been previously mentioned, arrived in the United States in September 1946, allegedly to study water conservation for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government. After he arrived in this country, he openly broke with Chiang and made several public appearances on behalf of the Committee for a Democratic Far

Eastern Policy[21] and other front groups attacking Chiang. While in the United States in January 1948, Feng was elected chairman of the Political Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang of China. He registered as an agent of this committee in the United States under the terms of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. General Feng allegedly departed from the United States in July 1948 en route to China, but was killed in an "accident" on a Russian vessel on the Black Sea.

The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21] sponsored a memorial meeting on December 3, 1948, to honor Marshal Feng. Miss Agnes Smedley made an address at this meeting. Chu Tong, Editor of the China Daily News, also made some remarks. The sponsors of this affair included many identified with Communist objectives in China, i.e., Chen Han-seng, Dr. Arthur W. Chung, Israel Epstein, Philip J. Jaffe, Miss Mildred Price and Miss Maud Russell.

5. Chinese Student-Scientist Groups

a. Student Organizations Generally

A large number of Chinese student organizations have reportedly existed throughout the United States. Some of these organizations have been infiltrated, others dominated by the Communists. In still other

instances, a pro Communist wing of a student organization has broken away to form its own organization. These organizations vary from the more influential student organizations which will be mentioned subsequently to short-term organizations which have a limited membership, scope and objective.

One form of student organization was the Reading Club which met regularly to study Marxism in New York City. A member of this club edited the bulletin, News Agency of Chinese Students in America. This bulletin included material requesting Chinese students in the United States to return to China.

At Columbia University, a group from the Chinese organization called the Chinese Club reportedly formed the Chinese Students Association. This association allegedly solicited members by stating that, since the prospective member ultimately expected to return to China, it would definitely be to his advantage to affiliate himself with an organization which was sympathetic with the new regime in China.

Another example of a youth group allegedly identified with the Chinese Communist front in the United States is the San Francisco Chinese-American Democratic Youth League. Although some of the

members of this club have denied pro-Communist activity on the part of the organization, members of this organization have allegedly exhibited a sympathy for the current regime in China and like sentiments are allegedly reported in the organizational bulletin, Youth League Bulletin.

This pro-Communist activity among the Chinese students was given some impetus and direction by communications from China. These sometimes were printed in the Chinese student publications or brought forth at meetings. Some of these letters came from the Ministry of Education, Peking, China. They spoke of new China's need for personnel in the fields of medicine, physics, chemistry, engineering and mechanics.

In September 1950, a letter was received by a Chinese student in Madison, Wisconsin, from the Ministry of Education, Peking, China. This letter enclosed a questionnaire to be executed by the Chinese students in the United States in connection with an alleged survey to determine the identity of students wishing to return to China. According to this letter, the survey was being conducted by the "special section for overseas students" of the Ministry (Department) of Education and all students were requested to keep in regular contact with the source of the letter

in China. It is noted that a similar questionnaire was distributed at a meeting of the Chinese Students Club at the University of California, Berkeley, California.

Reliable informants advised in early 1952 that Chinese student organizations and their activities had decreased to a point of little activity. Most of the openly pro-Communist students who perhaps were giving the necessary leadership to these organizations had returned to China. Others, because of the circumstances of the Korean War and legislation regarding subversive matters, abandoned open Communist activity. Although these students may shrink from overt pro-Communist activity, their attitude toward covert activity is a matter to be considered.

b. Chinese Students Christian Association in North America

A reliable informant has advised that, when the Committee on Friendly Relations of the Young Men's Christian Association (Y. M. C. A.) was formed in 1909, a number of students' groups were in existence. One such group was the Chinese Students Christian Association which was continued under the Y. M. C. A. auspices.

It has been reliably reported that this organization has disseminated propaganda favorable to the Chinese Communist Government

and that members of the organization have been urged to return to China to work for the Communist Government there. Some conferences and retreats held by this organization during 1950 and 1951 emphasized the necessity for returning to China to serve the new regime and the necessity for taking scientific books to China. Although there was no information developed indicating persons responsible for getting information to China, a general discussion was held of ways to transmit books and scientific data to China.

The Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students of the Y.M.C.A. voted to cease support of the Chinese Students Christian Association by June 30, 1951. At a meeting of the C.S.C.A. executive committee on June 3, 1951, it was voted to dissolve the organization by June 30, 1951.

c. Chinese Learned Society of America

Chu Chi-hsien, former chairman of the Chinese Learned Society of America, identified this organization as a composition of students at Columbia and Harvard Universities. Chu stated that, although the membership was composed of students of various political beliefs, in his opinion a large percentage of the students were in favor of the Chinese Communist Government.

In early 1950 Chu and this society waged a campaign "One Dollar Every Person" for the relief of Chinese Communist soldiers. Approximately $1200 was collected and the names of the donors were allegedly sent to Cho Yet-chung, a professor at the University of Hong Kong.

Chu, his wife and certain other members of the Learned Society returned to Communist China in 1949 and 1950, resulting in the organization's becoming inactive. This organization or the personnel of this organization was reportedly taken over by the Chinese Association of Scientific Workers.

d. Association of Chinese Scientific Workers in U. S. A. (Chinese Association of Scientific Workers)

This association was originally called "Chinese in U S. Science Association" and was formed in Chicago, Illinois, in January 1949 The official handbook of the association dated March 1950 stated the following purposes:

1. To unite and cooperate with scientific workers in China in an effort to advance the work of scientific development (in China).
2. To encourage the best use of scientific skill.
3. To work for improvement in working and living conditions of scientific workers.

A resolution of this association during 1949-1950 stated that the heart of their work was concentrated in the study of scientific techniques in order to prepare for their return to China.

An organizational report of November 1949 stated that groups (affiliated) in China were making preparation to collaborate on material to be published and all other informational matters. Subsequently members who had returned to China were requested to keep members in the United States informed of developments there.

At a conference of the organization held in March 1950, it was noted that the Chinese Association of Scientific Workers in China on January 27, 1950, had sent a letter requesting U. S. branch members to return to China and aid in the reconstruction. This was endorsed by the U. S. branch. This letter indicated that the Chinese Government had set up a special committee to handle arrangements for their return to China and a reception center in Peking.

The branch association in the United States allegedly had an elaborate table of organization including liaison officers for geographical locations as well as for various work committees and science branch organizations.

The National Secretary of the Association at the time of its dissolution in September 1950 stated that there were approximately 500 members in the United States at that time.

It was reliably reported that Dr. Ts'ao Jih-ch'ang, associated with Hong Kong University, Hong Kong, in October 1949 sent an article entitled "A Joint Manifesto of the Chinese Cultural and Students Organizations in the U. S. A." to the Kuo Sin News Agency and which appeared in the Ta Kung Pao, a Chinese language newspaper published in Shanghai, China. This article stated that cultural and student organizations announced their rejoicing over the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the Central People's Government Council and that the majority of Chinese students in the United States wished to return to China at an early date to follow the leadership of the People's Government. This announcement was allegedly signed by twenty-one organizations in the United States. Subsequent inquiry indicated that a number of the endorsers of this statement were mere "paper organizations." It was noted, however, that the Association of Chinese Scientific Workers in America was a prominent endorser of this statement.

Ts'ao Jih-ch'ang was identified as secretary of the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese Association of Scientific Workers. Ts'ao was allegedly designated by the Chinese Communists to handle contacts with all Chinese students returning from overseas.

e. Chinese Students Service Committee

This organization was created in approximately March 1950 at the University of California, Berkeley, California. It was allegedly organized by representatives of the Chinese Students Christian Association, the Chinese Association of Scientific Workers, and the Chinese Students Association of the University of California. The purpose of this organization, as stated by persons associated with it, was to aid Chinese students who desired to return to China. It was felt that this organization would play a part in this program due to its geographic proximity to the port of San Francisco.

In addition to this alleged service to returning Chinese students, this committee published a bulletin urging the return to China of specialists and publicizing the good reception afforded returning Chinese students by the Communist regime. Lo Ying yung, identified as perhaps the most active leader of the committee and outspoken in his sympathy for the Chinese Communist Government, returned to China in November 1950. The last issue of the bulletin was distributed in February 1951. In June 1951 this organization was reportedly dissolved.

f. Chinese Student-Scientist Groups Generally

This category presents a dilemma insofar as security and counterintelligence functions are concerned. If the scientific workers and students are allowed to return to China, many may be conscripted to stabilize and develop a Communist China. Others may be suitable material to return to the United States on technical and scientific espionage assignments. On the other hand, among those remaining in the United States, some may be fertile espionage recruits for Communist China. They present excellent potentialities for espionage recruits and other subversive activity, because of their strategic location in centers of research and learning; their knowledge of conditions and customs in the United States; and their susceptibility to coercion and intimidation because of the presence of their families in China and their adherence to family traditions.

Another Government agency advised that as of September 1, 1953, there were 4,877 Chinese students in the United States. Of that number 1,043 have completed their educational objectives. Another census published by the Institute of International Education indicated that, during the period 1952-53, 2,352 students were registered from China and an additional 226 were registered from Hong Kong and Formosa.

Numerically half of the students registered from China were allegedly pursuing courses of study in engineering, or physical or medical science. This would provide them with scientific or technical training.

VI. UNITED FRONT FOR PEACE

A. BACKGROUND

Although the groundwork for the current international peace tactic of international Communist forces was laid at the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties)[30] meeting in September 1947, Communist China's role was not prominent until the advent of the Korean conflict. In its warlike role in the Korean conflict, China made the most of the tactic "peace."

Following the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea in June 1950, the National Committee, Communist Party, USA,[2] stated that the Party's peace plan remained its central task and focused its propaganda guns on the Korean conflict. The October 15, 1953, issue of Party Voice, issued by the New York State Communist Party, reiterated this tactic as the central task of the Party and identified some of the "transitional forms" leading to peace. Some of the "transitional forms" directly concerned relationships between the United States and Communist China. These were the advocation of trade with Communist China; bringing Communist China into the United Nations; and generally having a friendship with Communist China. Around these general themes we will detect in the pro-Communist press continuing support of these ideas and perhaps

collecting collaterally additional support from dupes and opportunists for the Chinese Communist designs against the United States.

B. PEACE CONFERENCE OF THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGIONS

Insofar as the scope of this study is concerned, the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Regions held during October 1952 in Peking, China, was a milestone in the peace tactic. After some preliminary preparations in China, a group of members or former members of the Communist Party, USA[2], Communist fronts, particularly newly formed peace fronts, and Communist propagandists formed a committee to assure United States participation in this conference. This has been known as the United States Sponsoring Committee for Participation in the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions. This committee included such representation as Ida Pruitt, formerly identified with Indusco, and Maud Russell, formerly identified with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21].

The delegates to the conference in China included Communist Party members, persons associated with peace fronts and others who had previously been influential in Chinese matters. Among those veterans of Chinese activities was Talitha A. Gerlach who allegedly

held official positions with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy[21], China Welfare Appeal[23], and the Institute of Pacific Relations[13]. Among those who had actually worked in China were Walter S Ilsley, John W. Powell and his wife Sylvia, and Gerald Tannenbaum. Ilsley and Sylvia Powell were formerly employed by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in China. Ilsley was later employed by the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. Until his return to the United States in August 1953, John W. Powell was editor and publisher of China Weekly Review, a magazine published in Shanghai, China, under the Communist regime. During World War II, he was allegedly employed by the Office of War Information (OWI) in Chungking, China

A significant member of this peace delegation was Gerald Tannenbaum. Tannenbaum did not return to the United States but continued his residence in China, aiding Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling) in her China Welfare Institute, Shanghai, China.

These delegates have provided a large contribution to the propagandizing of the peace tactic in the United States. In addition, the Chinese and U. S. Communist press have fully exploited the various experiences of these delegates to China, not only in behalf of peace and to glorify Communist China, but to attack the Government of the United States.

Mrs. Schnur and her son Paul Frederick Schnur, Jr., allegedly provided a communication medium for pro-Chinese Communist propaganda. Paul Schnur, Jr., the POW, allegedly circulated a petition to be sent to his mother, endorsing her peace activities. Mrs. Schnur's letters to her son were allegedly given publicity among the POWs. These letters expressed the peace views of Mrs. Schnur. The Schnurs' correspondence gave the basis for several articles in the Daily People's World[29], a west coast Communist newspaper. Mr. and Mrs. Schnur, the parents of the POW, were identified with Communist Party activities in California for several years.

The indoctrination of the POWs by the Chinese Communists and the future potentialities of this factor must not be disregarded. This indoctrination had varying degrees of success. Some of the indoctrinated POWs reportedly were convinced that they would return to the United States in a few years and become a part of the Communist revolution. Others gave consideration to espionage assignments in the United States.

D. CHINESE COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS

The ingenuity displayed by the Chinese Communists in connection with ways and means of getting their propaganda into the

United States deserves some consideration. This material has been mailed to the United States from a wide variety of addresses including Communist China proper, Hong Kong, Czechoslovakia, and England. Addressees in the United States have included Communists and anti-Communists, either of whom may or may not have requested the publication. (This propaganda material was also sent to commercial firms handling imported publications.) Investigation indicated that name lists and directories have been sought by the Chinese in connection with the mailing of these Chinese Communist publications.

Among the most prominent English language propaganda periodicals and publications received in the United States have been: China Pictorial, People's China, Chinese Workers' Pictorial*, Chinese Literature, and China Reconstructs**. The Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, has reportedly published or supervised the publishing of this propaganda material. The International News Service Bureau reportedly administers the Foreign Languages Press.

The Chinese Communists enlisted the sponsorship of numerous organizations whose names might influence particular groups. On the one hand they distributed propaganda under the auspices of the

* Published by Chinese Workers' Publishing Agency.
** Published by China Welfare Institute.

Red Cross Society of China which might have a respectable connotation to some. On the other extreme they distributed propaganda under a more obvious propaganda sponsorship, the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace and Against American Aggression.

This propaganda material was also forwarded to concerns handling the importation or retail sale of Communist literature from foreign countries, some of which were registered under the terms of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. A sampling of the bookstores receiving propaganda direct from China included the International Bookstore and Oasis Bookstore in San Francisco; Progressive Bookstore, Detroit; Modern Bookstore, Chicago; Universal News Agency and the Smith News Agency, Los Angeles; and Imported Publications and Products, Four Continent Book Corporation and the Jefferson Bookshop, in New York City. It is noted that some of the retail outlets were billed for the Chinese Communist propaganda material by Imported Publications and Products and Universal Distributors, New York City. Some exceptions to this procedure were carried out by the Oasis Bookstore which dealt directly with Hong Kong firms. As an example, People's China and China Pictorial were obtained from Life Reader Sinzh Joint Publishing Company, Hong Kong. The Jefferson Bookshop, in April 1952, paid for a shipment of China Reconstructs by

check to the International Cooperative Trading Society, Limited, Hong Kong.

The China Welfare Institute and its publication China Reconstructs should not be considered strictly a propaganda medium. It also presents a medium for the clandestine transfer of funds and clandestine communication as indicated by past events.

Theodore Herman and Evelyn Herman nee Chen of Logan, Utah, have been in communication with Tan Jih-ming, identified as treasurer of China Reconstructs. This communication resulted in funds directed to the International Cooperative Trading Society, Hong Kong, by the Jefferson Bookshop, New York City, coming into the possession of Herman in the United States for the personal purposes of Tan Jih ming.

Herman allegedly is well acquainted with other officials of China Reconstructs, as he worked under their supervision in connection with the Chinese Cooperatives.

The Life Reader Sinzh Joint Publishing Company, reportedly a Communist firm in Hong Kong, has also indicated interests beyond the scope of a conventional publishing house.

E. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE

1. Background

Mao Tse-tung as Chairman, Central Committee, Communist Party of China, wrote an article in connection with the Twenty-eight Anniversary of the Communist Party of China (July 1, 1949), in which he made comments pertinent to the trade and economic phases of this study. In connection with the subject of international aid generally, Mao stated:

> "In the epoch of imperialism a real people's revolution in any country cannot be victorious without different kinds of assistance from international revolutionary forces; it is also impossible to consolidate victory even if it has been won."
>
> Mao Tse-tung, On People s Democratic Rule (New Century Publishers, New York City, 1950), p. 6.

Mao goes on to state that China did not need the aid of the British and American Governments, as they were ruled by "imperialists" who were not prepared to lend China money on mutually advantageous conditions. He stated that the Communist Parties as well as the progressive parties and groups in these two countries were campaigning for the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations with China. Mao indicated that this activity should not be placed on a par with the actions of the "bourgeoisie" in these countries, as it was well intended and a "help to us."

Those groups advocating trade and diplomatic relations with Communist China received a setback shortly after the entrance of Communist China into the Korean conflict. On December 17, 1950, the United States Treasury Department put into effect against China a foreign assets control program. This provided for the regulation and control of financial transactions involving Communist China. On June 29, 1953, new regulations were issued relating to trade with Soviet bloc countries for the regulation and control of purchases and sales of strategic commodities designated for Communist China. The efforts of some elements in the United States to reap financial or political gain by commercial transactions with Communist China were thus subjected to regulation and control.

2. Trade

Parallel efforts for a common cause which continued for many years between Frederick V. Field and Chi Chao-ting in the United States continued even with the advent of the new Communist regime in China and Chi's presence in China. Both have been advocating the Communist political tactics of "peace" and "international trade." In late 1953 Chi Chao-ting was identified as the General Secretary of the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, Secretary General of the Chinese Delegation to the Moscow International Economic Conference,

delegate to the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions in Peking, 1952, and a member of the Board of Directors and Assistant General Manager of the Bank of China. Field has maintained his identification with the Communist movement in the United States, its "peace" offensive, and has been identified as President of the American-Chinese Export Corporation, New York City.

The American-Chinese Export Corporation was chartered under the laws of the State of New York in 1946 to engage in a general import and export business. After the new Communist regime in China was established, Field and this corporation soon became official representatives for various Chinese principals. On September 19, 1950, Field registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, as attorney-in-fact for the Bank of China, the China National Aviation Corporation, Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, and the Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Hong Kong. The American Chinese Export Corporation subsequently filed a registration as purchasing and sales agent for eleven foreign principals in China, including the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, Peking, China.

Others were also interested in trade with Communist China for perhaps different reasons. Investigation has indicated that some in the United States who in the past had been sympathetic with the work of the China Welfare Appeal[23] (Joe Tannenbaum and Victor Hicks) and the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives in China attempted to develop export and import business with Communist China, perhaps exploiting their political contacts in China for personal gain.

Obviously the prospect of trade with Communist China would entice some unethical opportunists in the United States to do business with China. This was given support by the Chinese who attempted to induce others to circumvent controls. This was attempted by suggested methods of transshipment of strategic cargo and the use of Soviet satellite shipping facilities. Shao Ti-hsu, President of the Pacific Trading Corporation, which was formerly located in Boston, was convicted of violating export laws. He reportedly wanted to transship steel to Communist China via Argentina.

3. Finance

In addition to international trade, Communist China indicated a need of funds from abroad to bolster its domestic economy and to provide a medium of financing its trade with the United States. The United States Treasury Department controls provided for the regulation of funds transactions between the United States and Communist China.

The Chinese Communist regime did not restrict to political fields their utilization or attempted utilization of overseas Chinese. United States Treasury Department controls did not at first deter Chinese attempts to secure remittances to Communist China by extortion or "legal" transactions. Perhaps the best known of these attempts were the attempts reportedly made to extort funds from overseas Chinese in the United States to "aid" their families in Communist China and to invest in the enterprises of Communist China.

Even prior to the implementation of United States Treasury Department controls against Communist China, efforts were allegedly made to collect funds for the Chinese forces by the sale of "People's Victory Bonds." In 1951 the previously identified China Daily News became involved in matters relating to these unlawful financial transactions with Chinese Communist banks.

Another more specific example of attempts to siphon funds from the overseas Chinese was the activity of Szeto Mei-tong allegedly representing the South China Industry and Enterprise Corporation, Canton, China. Szeto identified this firm as organized under the direction and guidance of the People's Government on February 24, 1951. Thirty per cent of the firm's capital was held by the Government and seventy per cent by the public. Szeto indicated that this firm was especially interested in the investments of overseas Chinese and, in addition to providing interest and an annual bonus for the shareholder, it would be helpful to the families of overseas Chinese that remained in China.

Szeto stated that these remittances could be sent to the Bank of China, Tang Man-tin or Tai Shing-hong, all of Hong Kong, China. According to a reliable source, the South China Industry and Enterprise Corporation was allegedly formed with the express purpose of attracting investment from overseas Chinese. The indicated branch of the Bank of China was reliably identified as having an overseas department through which the Chinese Communist Government collected foreign exchange and was a suspected cover for clandestine activities. Tang Man-tin was identified as the owner

of the Goodwill Import and Export Company, Hong Kong. He reportedly had been a Communist since 1946 and had a brother who was the Deputy Commissioner of Trade at Canton, China. Tai Shing-hong was identified by a reliable source as a Communist firm working in the interests of the Chinese Communist Government. This firm was allegedly interested in importing illegally to China scientific instruments, scientific apparatus and metal goods.

The "freezing" of Chinese funds in the United States and the general international transfer of funds for the establishment of credit has been another problem of the Chinese Communist Government. Of particular interest to us are the various methods utilized by the Chinese Communists to accomplish international fund transfers in an apparent attempt to evade regulation and control. These methods may be a means for financing intelligence activity against the United States.

Reliable informants familiar with Soviet bloc countries, including Communist China, have stated that these countries did not allow large funds to accumulate in United States accounts. Large banking deposits were almost invariably followed immediately by large transfers to the accounts of large Swiss banks. This activity

was verified by transactions of the various branches of a Chinese Communist bank in the six-week period immediately preceding the implementation of Treasury Department controls affecting China on December 17, 1950. Shortly after the implementation of these controls, the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, Ltd., Peking, China, instructed a bank in the United States to collect certain accounts and credit the proceeds to the Union Bank of Switzerland, Zurich. This was to be done without passing the entry through the Chinese account.

A reliable informant familiar with international transactions of this nature indicated the possibility of Switzerland and other "neutral" countries handling negotiations of letters of credit for Communist China in a parallel manner with the previously mentioned transshipment device of international trade.

Another device reportedly in use concerns the transfer of funds to the United States from one personal account of an individual in a non-Communist bloc country to another personal account of another individual in the United States. This was reportedly attempted by the wife of a Chinese Communist diplomat assigned to a non-Communist bloc European country.

VII. CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE CATEGORIES

A consideration of various reports, allegations and potentialities in terms of intelligence categories may serve to orient our thinking so that we will recognize Chinese Communist intelligence operations, although they may be visible to us only in a fragmentary form.

A. TRAINING

Several reports have been received about espionage training schools in Communist China. Some reportedly supply the more elementary training, others the more advanced. In late 1953, ten international espionage training centers were reportedly on the Chinese mainland, including training for overseas youths.

Other specialized intelligence training has been reported. Certain Chinkiang fishermen were reportedly trained in espionage techniques. Another class was reported trained in marine sabotage and naval intelligence. More recently a more informal but specialized training was allegedly given a POW of the Korean conflict prior to his return to the United States.

The identity of these schools may change; they may increase or decrease in number; but the existence of these schools

indicates an intelligence organization with trained personnel. This provides a foundation for a more formal Chinese Communist intelligence apparatus in the United States.

B. RECRUITMENT

The potentialities for ideological recruits by the Chinese Communists at first would seem almost boundless in view of the extensive influence of sympathetic elements in the United States evidenced over a period of many years. A large portion of these persons may not be indoctrinated to the point of consciously committing espionage against the United States, although they might be occupied with political activities. While we may recognize this limitation, ordinarily conclusive information regarding a person's willingness to cooperate in Chinese intelligence activities will not be known to a security or counterintelligence agency.

There are incidents of a more specific nature which do indicate more conclusive potentialities. On the one hand we may have persons who have previously cooperated with the Chinese Communists with no evidence of defection. Some of these may be in a position to supply a specialized assistance, such as Margaret Krumbein of Imported Publications and Products.

Others may have the apparent willingness but feel incapable of supplying a specialized service. Indicative of this type is Anna Louise Strong who in February 1949 communicated with a contact in China (Lu Tsui) and asked intercession with Mao Tse-tung. Strong indicated that she would be of no use to her Chinese "friends" for some time, but offered her continued services to the "great Chinese revolution."

There may be other special categories to consider. One includes those who have been previously involved in Soviet or Soviet satellite intelligence activities or clandestine Communist Party affairs. Another more recent category may be the Communist indoctrinated POWs who have been repatriated from the Korean conflict. Americans who have been recently repatriated from Communist China after having lived in a Communist China without evoking disfavor of the Chinese Communist regime would represent still another category for careful scrutiny (e.g., John W. Powell).

Another specialized category for inspection comprises the Chinese groupings in the United States. They must be considered carefully not only from the viewpoint of ideological indoctrination, but also from the viewpoint of opportunism or subjects of duress.

The opportunist may feel a necessity for seeking favor with the new regime in China in anticipation of returning to China or as a defensive measure to protect family or temporary economic interests in China.

Some Chinese in the United States may represent a highly desirable recruitment target for the Chinese Communists. Some of the most desirable may be identified with the Chinese student-scientist groups, publications and propaganda groups, the United States Government and the United Nations. These and similar categories which may represent a specialized service of potential interest to the Chinese Communists should be carefully regarded.

C. FUNDS

The exchange of funds between the United States and Communist China has been modified by the lack of official or diplomatic cover for these transactions. This is of particular importance in view of the regulations governing funds and transfers of funds involving Communist China. This creates circumstances which promote the evasion of regulation and detection.

The clandestine transfer of funds has been suggested or attempted by transfer of Chinese Communist banking funds to accounts in neutral countries without entering the transaction in the United States account of the Chinese principal; handling letters of credit through neutral countries; transferring personal funds through a neutral country; and the use of the mails via Hong Kong.

The more obvious methods for transferring funds are through the diplomatic and official cover of Soviet bloc countries, Chinese Communist agents employed by international organizations such as the United Nations, and the international Communist movement generally. Domestic Chinese organizations, individuals sympathetic to the new Chinese Communist regime and the forces of the Communist Party, USA,[2] represent an obvious potentiality for funds within the United States.

D. COMMUNICATION AND TRAVEL

Although interest has been indicated in radio communication between the Chinese Communists and points in the United States, the actual unofficial or nondiplomatic communications have centered in the use of the mails and personal couriers. Reportedly one instance of travel was to be accomplished by Soviet submarine. Travel for the

most part has been accomplished by those legally entitled to enter the United States or China. This would include employees of international organizations such as the United Nations,* students, correspondents and personnel of the United States Government, whether they be Government representatives abroad or the more recently repatriated POWs.

The Chinese student-scientist category in the United States deserves special consideration as a means of liaison with Communist China. In early 1950, it was reliably reported that the Chinese Association of Scientific Workers advocated a liaison with like elements in China by its specialized learning and talent "sub-departments." In addition, it was stated that a list should be compiled of whatever scientific publications were needed in China. The association would then collect and send books back by mail or returning members.

Unsubstantiated information which allegedly concerned more recent intelligence recruits involved more explicit instructions. One individual, who was allegedly given an intelligence assignment by the Chinese, was to develop his own mail drop in Hong Kong through which he could forward information to Peking. Another was allegedly instructed to set up a mail drop in the United States through which messages could be forwarded.

The international Communist movement has historically presented an organization for communication. Mildred Price, Grace Granich, Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley and other contacts of Madame Sun Yat-

*This potentiality would deserve increased vigilance in the event Communist China had a delegation accredited to the United Nations.

sen (Soong Ch'ing-ling) in the United States presented a medium for clandestine communication. More recently publishing houses distributing Chinese Communist propaganda out of Hong Kong have been used as a mailing address for communications to persons in Communist China proper. Prominent among the addressees in Hong Kong has been "J. M. Tan."*

Recently it was reliably reported that an organized communication system existed between Chinese in San Francisco, California, and the Communist firm, Life Reader Sinzh Joint Publishing Company, Hong Kong. These Chinese have also allegedly been in contact with two other Hong Kong firms known for their Communist connections. They were identified as the Tai Tung Company and the Ching Fung Chong Company. This organized communication system has reportedly utilized indirect mailing methods through other neutral countries.

Chinese returning to Communist China have attempted to take information with them. One Chinese attempted to take several hundred pounds of technical papers with him. Another planned to transmit certain material to a Communist publishing house in Hong Kong to avoid carrying this material in his luggage. Still another Chinese national, a professor of aerodynamics in the United States, attempted to forward to China what has been described as a well-organized collection of material relating to the atomic energy program in the United States.

*Tan Jih-ming, who has been identified with China Reconstructs and the International Cooperative Trading Society.

E. TARGETS

The Chinese Communists have had an opportunity to be apprised of the accessible intelligence material in the United States. The Chinese leaders have had access to the potentialities of this intelligence through sympathetic elements in the United States and returned Chinese who had received education and training in the United States. This potential perhaps has been activated by the interest of the United States and the United Nations in matters affecting Communist China, e. g., the Korean conflict, Chiang Kai-shek's Government of the Republic of China, and other Communist aggression in the Far East.

A reliable assessment of Chinese Communist intelligence targets in the United States may be more feasible with the development and subsequent identification of more formally organized Chinese Communist intelligence operations. In the coming months, the edge of the Chinese Communist intelligence operations may be directed toward fulfilling requirements of international military and political tactics or it may be directed toward stabilizing the Chinese Communist revolution and the development of a more satisfactory transitional domestic economy. In either event, the United States as a potent foe of world communism possessing highly developed technology will continue to be a tempting target for Chinese Communist intelligence activities.

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APPENDIX

1. Communist International (Comintern).

"The Third or Communist International was organized by Lenin at Moscow in March 1919 to carry out the revolutionary purposes of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.... (It) has ever since been the medium of instigating class warfare and social revolution in all countries, in order to establish a world Soviet Union, with the capital at Moscow.... The Communist International is dominated by the Russian Communist Party and Soviet officials."

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, January 3, 1939, p. 15)

2. Communist Party, USA (1930-44, 1945 to date).

Its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

3. Workers Party Of America (1921-24: Designation of the Communist Party of America at time indicated).

"In December 1921 the Workers Party of America was formed as a camouflage for the real Communist Party of America which maintained its existence underground. In 1925 the official name was changed to Workers (Communist) Party of America, and at a convention held in March 1928, the Communists finally threw off all camouflage and boldly came out into the open as the Communist Party of the United States of America."

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, January 3, 1939, p. 17.)

4. Workers (Communist) Party Of America (subsequent to 1925-29) (successor to Communist Party of America and preceding the formation of the Communist Party of the United States.)

Cited as a subversive and Communist organization which seeks "to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

(Attorney General Tom Clark, Letters to Loyalty Review Board, released December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948.)

5. All-American Anti-Imperialist League (AAAIL).

Cited as a Communist enterprise.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, March 29, 1944, p. 76.)

6. Trade-Union Educational League (TUEL).

"Zinoviev, Losowsky, and Lenin proceeded during the next 12 months to organize the Trade-Union Educational League. This project was put under the control of and made amenable, as far as its work was concerned, to the central executive committee of the Communist Party of America, and it remains so today. William Z. Foster was selected to lead this movement. In the spring of 1921 he went to Russia, and the understanding was that he went there to get his instructions for the organization of the Trade-Union Educational League, gather facts about the Communist work in Soviet Russia, the functioning of Communist ideas and theories, and learn how the officials of the Communist International wanted these ideas and theories applied in America through the Trade-Union Educational League."

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, January 3, 1939, pp. 47 and 48.)

7. International Labor Defense has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"The International Labor Defense...was part of an international network of organizations for the defense of Communist lawbreakers." At a conference held in Detroit, Mich., April 27-28, 1946, the International Labor Defense and the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties merged to form the new front, Civil Rights Congress.

(Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, Report No. 1115, September 2, 1947, pp. 1 and 2.)

8. Daily Worker.

"The chief journalistic mouthpiece of the Communist Party... founded in response to direct instructions from the Communist International in Moscow.... The first issue of the Daily Worker appeared on January 13, 1924.... No other paper or publication of any kind in all American history has ever been loaded with such a volume of subversive, seditious, and treasonable utterance as has this organ of the American Communists."

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, March 29, 1944, pp. 59 and 60; also cited in Reports, January 3, 1939, p. 30; January 3, 1940, p. 7; January 3, 1941, p. 14; and June 25, 1942, p. 4)

9. Trade-Union Unity League (TUUL).

Cited as a Communist front directly controlled by the Communist Party. It was headed by William Z. Foster, national chairman of the Communist Party, U. S. A. ; was composed of some 20 Communist unions and was affiliated with the Red International of Labor Unions of Moscow.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Reports, March 29, 1944, pp. 94 and 124; also cited in Reports January 3, 1939, p. 63, and January 3, 1940, pp. 8 and 9.)

10. China Today

Cited as a magazine "published by the Communist front, Friends of the Chinese People, at 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City."

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, p. 198.)

11. American Friends Of The Chinese People.

Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, March 29, 1944, pp. 40 and 147.)

12. Friends Of The Chinese People.

Cited as a Communist front to support the Chinese Communist thrust against the National Chinese Government.

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, pp. 142 and 143.)

13. Institute Of Pacific Relations (IPR).

"The Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1925 in Hawaii as an organization engaged in research on the economic, political, and social aspects of countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean. As a result of documentary evidence and testimony from witnesses who appeared during 1951 and 1952 before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, this Committee concluded in its report dated July 2, 1952, that while most members of the Institute of Pacific Relations (including the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, succeeded by the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.) and its Board of Trustees were inactive and without any influence over the policies of the organization, and while the names of eminent individuals were by design used as a responsible and impressive screen for the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations inner core, the activities, administration and policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations were controlled by a small core of Communists or pro-Communist personnel; that the Institute of Pacific Relations was considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials an an instrument of Soviet policy, propaganda and military intelligence; that the IPR was used as a channel for Communist and Soviet propaganda and its leadership used Institute of Pacific Relations prestige to promote the interests of the Soviet Union; that the Institute of Pacific Relations had for its chief function the influencing of United States public opinion and was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policies; and that persons associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations were instrumental in keeping United States policy on a course favorable to Communist objectives in China."

American Council, Institute Of Pacific Relations.

Cited as a Communist front which received funds from the American People's Fund, another front organized and directed by Frederick V. Field as a repository for funds

to be distributed to Communist enterprises.

(Summary of conclusion of July 2, 1952, reached by the Internal Security Subcommittee; Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.)

14. American League For Peace And Democracy has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

15. China Aid Council.

A "subsidiary" of the American League for Peace and Democracy.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, June 25, 1942, p. 16.)

16. Amerasia.

Among publications which "the committee has found... to be Communist initiated and controlled, or so strongly influenced as to be in the Stalin solar system."

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, p. 224.)

17. American Russian Institute For Cultural Relations With The Soviet Union has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"A direct agent of the Soviet Union, engaged in traitorous activities under the orders of Stalin's consular service in the United States... Founded in 1926... the semiofficial status of the American Russian Institute is established...."

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, pp. 169 and 327.)

18. American Quarterly On The Soviet Union

Cited as the name under which the American Review on the Soviet Union, official organ of the American Russian Institute, was previously published.

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, p. 169.)

19. American Youth Congress has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"It originated in 1934 and. . . has been controlled by Communists and manipulated by them to influence the thought of American youth."

(Attorney General Francis Biddle, Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7685; also cited in re Harry Bridges, May 28, 1942, p. 10.)

20. American Student Union

Cited as a Communist front which was "the result of a united front gathering of young Socialists and Communists" in 1937. The Young Communist League took credit for creation of the above, and the Union offered free trips to Russia. The above claims to have led as many as 500,000 students out in annual April 22 strikes in the United States.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, January 3, 1939, p. 80; also cited in Reports January 3, 1940, p. 9; June 25, 1942, p. 16; and March 29, 1944, p. 159.)

21. Committee For A Democratic Far Eastern Policy has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The Communist Party line shifted after VJ-day and Communist fronts started pressure on the administration in reference to its foreign policy in China in order to clear the way for Soviet expansion. A "new front" in this field is the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, p. 198.)

22. Spotlight On The Far East.

Official publication of Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which was cited as Communist by Attorney General Tom Clark.

(Attorney General Tom Clark, letter to Loyalty Review Board, released April 27, 1949.)

23. China Welfare Appeal, Inc., has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

24. Jefferson School Of Social Science, New York, N. Y., has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"At the beginning of the present year, the old Communist Party Workers School and the School for Democracy were merged into the Jefferson School of Social Science."

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, March 29, 1944, p. 150.)

25. Southern Conference For Human Welfare.

Cited as a Communist-front organization "which seeks to attract southern liberals on the basis of its seeming interest

in the problems of the South" although its "professed interest in southern welfare is simply an expedient for larger aims serving the Soviet Union and its subservient Communist Party in the United States."

(Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, Report No. 592, June 12, 1947.)

26. Protestant Digest.

"A magazine which has faithfully propagated the Communist Party line under the guise of being a religious journal."

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, March 29, 1944, p. 48.)

A "Communist publication" later known as The Protestant.

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, pp. 93, 225, and 320.)

27. Veterans Of The Abraham Lincoln Brigade has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"In 1937-38, the Communist Party threw itself wholeheartedly into the campaign for the support of the Spanish Loyalist cause, recruiting men and organizing multifarious so-called relief organizations." Among these was the above.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, March 29, 1944, p. 82.)

Cited as a Communist-front organization "serving the objectives of the Communist Parties in the United States and Spain. Earl Browder boasted that 'over 60 percent of the Lincoln Battalion members were members of the Communist Party.' "

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, pp. 94 and 382.)

28. Communist Political Association, 1944-45 (formerly the Communist Party of the United States), its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates, including Alabama People's Educational Association, Florida Press and Educational League, Oklahoma League for Political Education, People's Educational and Press Association of Texas and Virginia League for People's Education, have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"...after assuming the name of the Communist Political Association on May 20-23, 1944, for strategic reasons, the party resumed the name of the Communist Party of the United States on July 26-28, 1945."

(Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, Report No. 209, April 1, 1947, p. 29.)

29. Daily People's World.

"West Coast mouthpiece of the Communist Party...published by the Pacific Publishing Foundation, Inc., in San Francisco.... The San Francisco office is located at 590 Folsom Street and the Los Angeles office is at 206 (524 in 1954) South Spring Street."

(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, p. 342.)

30. Information Bureau Of The Communist And Workers' Parties (Cominform).

"Open above-ground activity by the Communist International was resumed in September 1947 as a result of a meeting of European Communist leaders in Poland. It comes as no surprise that this new version of the Comintern, which is called the Communist Information Bureau or Cominform, has openly enrolled the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary where the old Comintern officials are in command. Also avowed members of the Cominform are the Communist Parties of the Soviet satellite, Yugoslavia, and of

France and Italy. Master of the international alliance, however, is the Soviet Union...."

(Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, Report No. 1920, May 11, 1948, p. 83.)

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-12752

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date: November 19, 1953

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BY COURIER SERVICE

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To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: (b1) PerFBI

Reference is made to previous communications in this matter. There is attached a copy of a memorandum dated November 3, 1953, at New York, with attachment, the content of which may be of interest.

Attachs

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Attachment)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

(b1) PerFBI

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence (Attachment)
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

(5) PerFBI

(b1)

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

New York, New York

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

November 3, 1953

DESERTION OF CHINESE SEAMEN

In August, 1953, an informant, of known reliability, reported the following information:

The British tug M/V Golden Cape arrived in San Francisco, California, in the tow of the British tug Castle Peak on May 6, 1953 bearing a full crew of Chinese seamen, all natives of North China. All seamen aboard the Castle Peak were ordered detained on board by United States inspecting officers as none had valid passports in their possession, and the Castle Peak sailed from San Francisco May 10, 1953 with all her crew aboard.

None of the crew members of the Golden Cape were ordered detained as this crew was completely documented with Hong Kong Seamen's Discharge Books and Chinese Nationalist passports. Fifteen seamen of this crew of twenty-five men aboard the Golden Cape have deserted as of July 31, 1953. Twelve of the desertions occurred between May 8, 1953 and May 11, 1953, one desertion was noted as of June 8, 1953 at 8:00 A.M. and two desertions were recorded as of July 6, 1953.

L. Atkinson, Superintendent, Hong Kong Towing and Salvage Company, Queens Building, Hong Kong, (owners of the Golden Cape) advised that he was of the opinion that the mass desertions were probably planned in Hong Kong and may have been arranged or assisted by Hoi Cheong, Boarding Master, 430 Nathan Road, Second Floor, Hong Kong.

Atkinson and Captain A.L. Waites, Master of the Golden Cape, explained that their company requires each crew member signing on to make a $750.00 Hong Kong deposit with the company ostensibly as a guarantee against desertion. They said Hoi Cheong furnished the bonds in cases where he supplied the crew men and that the men in turn make an allotment to him from their wages. They said that none of the deserters had previously sailed aboard the Golden Cape.

Enrico Angelosante, Chief Engineer of the Golden Cape, advised that a Mr. Mc Kenzie, Mollers' Ltd. in Hong Kong, (shipping agents for the Golden Cape) had

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arranged for signing on, he believed, of all men on the Golden Cape who had deserted. Angelosante was of the opinion that the seamen who deserted were signed on in connection with a "deal" so they could jump ship in the United States. He supported that by saying that when the crew appeared to sign the ship's articles the names had already been printed on the articles and there were no last minute substitutions as is usually quite commonplace.

As a further substantiation that Hollers' Ltd. was involved, Angelosante said that he was approached and offered a $2,000 bribe to allow six stowaways on the ship and First Officer J.A. Russell was also approached and offered a bribe. He said Russell then requested Hollers' to arrange for the Hong Kong Police to search the vessel before departure. This request was not acted upon.

J.A. Russell, First Officer of the Golden Cape, stated that every man in the crew was selected by someone in Hollers' Ltd. He said that none of the officers were allowed any decision regarding who should constitute the crew, and this was quite contrary to the normal procedure, as always before the First Officer had been allowed to pick and sign on sailors. Russell claimed he protested to Hollers' Ltd. to no avail.

An examination of the records relating to the Golden Cape, her crew, and the seamen who have been selected as replacements for the deserters had noted certain highly suspicious facts. All of the original crew and replacements are Northern Chinese and all were engaged in Hong Kong where available seamen are predominently from South China. All of the proposed replacements are from near Shanghai. Of these replacements several held advanced seaman's ratings but were to be employed in capacities below their qualifications as shown by the fact that many holding higher ratings were signed on as seamen of lowest rank, e.g., #1 Bosun with twenty-nine years experience hired at about $30.00 per month as a sailor; Bosun and Quartermaster hired at $27.00 per month as ordinary sailors; Assistant Steward hired as Saloon Boy, etc.

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

It is considered unlikely that these men would accept such low-paying jobs on a 550 ton tug. Information sheets prepared by Mellers' Ltd. in behalf of the replacement applications for visa applications indicated in every instance that the families of the replacements are residing in Hong Kong. On questioning, however, it was found eight of them had their families in Shanghai or thereabouts.

Mellers' Ltd., on their own initiative and in spite of the fact that each seaman was in possession of the usual documents and a crew list visa had been issued, obtained a Chinese Nationalist passport for every Chinese member of the crew and forwarded these to Yokohama where the Golden Cape called enroute to San Francisco. This action was unprecedented and has yet to be satisfactorily explained by the Mellers' Ltd. representative. No passports have been obtained for crews of any other of their ships, not even the tug Castle Peak which towed the Golden Cape to San Francisco.

Mellers Ltd. has a case history of close collaboration with the Communists in shipping deals.

The fact that the seamen aboard the Golden Cape were granted shore leave by the Captain and were permitted to keep their passports is a violation of regulations, as they should have turned in their passports to the Captain prior to leaving the vessel.

It was ascertained, in June, 1953, that spare parts and repair parts for marine diesel engines were stowed aboard the Golden Cape without export license, a violation of Export Control Laws, and, therefore, the Golden Cape was not been cleared to load further or to leave San Francisco. The Golden Cape had planned to return to the Far East with a large quantity of spare parts for United States marine engines and generators for use of the Chinese Communists.

A Chinese student with the same name as one of these seamen who deserted from the Golden Cape, namely Chang Yu Chung, attended the University of Minnesota and majored in Chemistry prior to 1949. This student at the University of

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

Minnesota was a member of the Chinese Scientific Workers Association which was allegedly a Communist sponsored organization. This student returned to China in 1949.

A list of the fifteen Chinese deserters from the Golden Cape is attached.

The Nationalist passport numbers of six of these deserters were known to be as follows:

WANG Ching Fa	10104
CHANG Yu Tai	10109
CHANG Yu Chun	10112
WONG Wo Ping	10109
LEE Chan Choi	10110
CHOW Kam Yin	10025

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

Ex. D. of S.S. of Calif.

DESERTERS

		Age	Hong Kong Seaman's Registration Book No.	Name as on Ships' Articles
YANG Ching Fa	Steward-Interpreter	42	23652 楊忠發	YUNG SHIU FAN YANG Ching Fa
CHANG Yu Tai Shantung	Sailor C	33	23590 張玉泰	
CHANG Yu Chung "	Sailor C	33	23589 張玉鴻	
WONG Wu King "	Sailor	40	23511 王富興	
XX LEE Chan Choi Kwai	Sailor b	33	23592 李贊(古)財 (LEE CHAN CHAI)	
XX PAN Yi Ching S'S"	No. 1 Greaser C	32	8692 潘賢臣	PAN Ye Ching
CHEN Ah Sen	Greaser	54	23707 張阿仙	
X LEE Shew Long	Greaser b	35	14616 李小龍	
SUM Ah Hong	Greaser	32	12629 宋阿旺	
CHANG Ah Kian	Greaser	28	20855 張阿根	
CHEUNG Kam Yin	Greasers' Cook	38	12031 張順賢	
NG Tong Yeng	2nd Cook	48	23561 伍全恩	
WONG Chan Nan	Saloon Boy	33	23716 黃忠南 - good English - spoke	
LIU Yiu Dong	Saloon Boy	31	23566 - 劉耀棠	
WONG Chien Lung -	Saloon Boy	34	23565 黃謙倫	

All fingerprints on articles illegible and not suitable for identification.

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL

OPCA-20 (12-3-96)

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☑ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☑ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☑ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

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☑ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
Army referral pages 261, 262

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X Deleted Page(s) X
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X for this page X
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FBI/DOJ

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DOSSIER NO. ZF40 0090

As of 15MAY79 (Date) all material

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DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E. Ward 15MAY79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOIS E. WARD 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER ... DATE ...

REVIEWED BY ...
DATE OCT 8 5 1986

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REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER K DARGAN DATE OCT 28

263

IC Form 315
1 Sep 72

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☑ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Page(s) 264-270

IACPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted] DISSEM
(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

1. COUNTRY: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA/JAPAN/HONG KONG/CAMBODIA/INDONESIA
2. SUBJECT: (S-NFD) [redacted]
3. IRC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Jul 68 - Aug 72
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TOKYO, JA, 30 Apr 73
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: 22220403
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 255 0093 73
9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 JUN 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 6
11. REFERENCES: ICR U-GPA-G1290, para IA, IIIA, B, C
DIRM 6A2, 6B6a, 6B7a, 6C
12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp
13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] (83773), GS-13
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: DOUGLAS C. DILLARD, Colonel, MI, Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (Leave Blank)

(S-NFD) [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(Report is marked SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM to preclude compromise of a sensitive source.)

1. (S-NFD) [redacted]

2. (S-NFD) [redacted]

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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500th MI Gp (N-1)	4

500TH MI GP
73 - 3535
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PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2), 15 Feb 67, Dir of DIA
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 3
DECLASSIFY ON: Cannot be determined

271

[redacted]

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

Field Distribution:

J2-USFJ	16 May 73
DO 46, OSI, FUCHU	"
USNAVINVSERVOJ	"
LEGATT, AMEMB	"
DI USARBCO	"
USARJ, GB-I	"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 255 0093 73
PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

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Aliases: [redacted]

(b)(7)(D)

Date of Birth:

Permanent Address:

Home Address:

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

Occupation: [redacted]

6 USC 552a (b)(7)

(b)(1)(b)

3. (S~~NFD~~) [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(b)(1)(b)

4. (S~~NFD~~)

a. [redacted]

272

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted] DISSEM

(Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 255 0093 73
PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES
ORIGINATOR

500th MI Gp

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(1)(C)

b. [redacted]

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(1)(C)

c.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(1)(C)

d. [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(1)(C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (1) (D)

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 255 0093 73
PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

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5. (S-NFD)

a. [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)

b. [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Field Comments: (S-NFDU)

(b)(7)(D)

[redacted]

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[redacted] DISSEM

REPORT NO. 2 255 0093 73
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10th MI Gp

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(b)(3)

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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[redacted]
NO [redacted] IGN DISSEM

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5 USC 552a (b) (7)

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 226

IACPA-CSF Form 6-R

TED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JU CE
MMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

TITLE	FILE NUMBER

REPORT MADE AT	DATE	BY
San Francisco	May 7, 1973	James H. Montgomery, Investigator

SYNOPSIS

Source S-1 advised an instructor at Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California, had made statements during classroom instruction which indicated he had personal knowledge of a [redacted] having obtained fraudulent documents to enter the United States and also knowledge of other persons from Mainland China including Communist agents who had entered the United States with visas secured using fraudulent documents obtained in Hong Kong. (U)

Central Office index advised they had a [redacted] who might relate to the person identified in the report of Source S-1. (U)

The instructor mentioned in the report of Source S-1 was interviewed. He alleged during that interview that he had no personal knowledge of any person who had illegally entered the United States. He advised the only person he knew with a similar name to the person mentioned in the report of Source S-1 was [redacted] who had come to the United States in December 1971 as a nonimmigrant student from Taipei, Taiwan.(U)

Nonimmigrant Index, Central Office, located a copy of Form I-94, Record of Arrival-Departure, relating to [redacted] showing he was admitted to the United States at Honolulu, Hawaii on December 29, 1971 as a nonimmigrant student. Nonimmigrant Index also advised they had a copy of Form I-538A report of action nonimmigrant showing [redacted] had received an extension of stay valid until December 29, 1973 [redacted] further alleged that he had known this person since his birth and had known his mother and father prior to his birth and that he knew this individual to be of very sterling character and said that he would guarantee him 100%. He also advised that he had numerous occasions heard rumors of persons having entered the United States through Hong Kong after first obtaining fraudulent documents in Hong Kong but that he had no personal knowledge of any such incident. (U)

Investigation disclosed no information to substantiate a continuing investigation.(U)

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY [redacted]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON [redacted]

Copy for United States Army Intelligence Command
Fort Holabird, Maryland
Re: Report dated January 8, 1973
entitled, "Illegal Immigration [redacted]
from Communist China"

FORM G-166 (REV. 7-1-64) A-8-6 FPI-LFC-10-70-10[illegible]

DETAILS

In a report dated January 8, 1973, Source S-1 advised a source who had provided them with reliable information in the past had supplied the following information. [redacted] United States citizen (naturalized June 11, 1963), who is an instructor in the Chinese Mandarin Language Department, Defense Language Institute West Coast, Presidio of Monterey, California, did on or about December 18, 1972, during classroom instruction made comments regarding a [redacted] It was alleged [redacted] stated [redacted] had entered the United States from Hong Kong during 1972 after securing false Hong Kong residency papers. It was further alleged [redacted] claimed [redacted] was a pro-Communist and a strong supporter of MAO and that there were many illegal Chinese Mainland immigrants to include Communist agents who had entered the United States illegally and were residing in California. (U)

(b)(6)

Central Office index located an index card relating to [redacted] Service File [redacted] who had entered the United States on March 30, 1972 at San Francisco, California. His date of birth was given as [redacted] place of birth, [redacted]. His destination at time of entry was listed as [redacted] (U)

(b)(6)

In a memorandum dated April 6, 1973, the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, advised the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, a review of Service File [redacted] relating to [redacted] had been accomplished. A review of that file determined [redacted] had been born on [redacted] in [redacted] and had resided in Taiwan from September 14, 1949 until December 15, 1971. The file contained a letter from the Taipei Municipal Police Headquarters, Taipei, Taiwan dated December 15, 1971 and a copy of [redacted] discharge from the Army of Nationalist China in Taiwan. He served in that Army from September 5, 1963 until September 4, 1965. He entered the United States on March 30, 1972 and was at that time admitted as a lawful permanent resident utilizing a visa issued by the American Embassy in Taipei, Taiwan on March 17, 1972. The District Director, Chicago, further advised the only conclusion that could be drawn from information contained in Service File [redacted] was that the subject of the report of Source S-1 and the subject of that Service file were not the same and therefore an investigation appeared not warranted. (U)

(b)(6)

On April 25, 1973 [redacted] a United States citizen (naturalized June 11, 1963), was interviewed at his

(b)(7)(C)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 80 Oct 97
This letter dtd 80 Oct 97
[illegible]-R.

residence. He advised that he was an instructor at the Chinese Mandarin Language Department, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California. When questioned as to his knowledge of a person by the name of he advised the only person by this name he knew was a young man named He said he had known family since before birth and had known since his birth. He advised that was born in Nanking, China during the late 1940's. He said had been residing in Taiwan with his mother and father since about 1949. He said had come to the United States on December 29, 1971 and that he had met at the airport in San Francisco upon his arrival. He said was destined for Georgia Tech in Atlanta, Georgia where he was seeking his master's degree in engineering. He further advised that this young man was a person of sterling character who had come from a family with an unquestionable background and that he would guarantee the young man's presence in the United States 100%. He advised could be contacted through P. O. Box 31606, Georgia Tech University, Atlanta, Georgia and presented a letter with that return address postmarked April 19, 1972, which he claimed he had received from (U)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C) [illegible]

He identified further saying that he was single, his father's name was and his mother's name was He said they could be contacted at He said father was a professor in the National Political University in the Economics Department, that he had been the Minister of Finance for the Chinese Nationalist Government and that he had also been the head of the Overseas Bank of China in Taipei. said that mother was a government worker, working in the Foreign Trade Section of the Economics Department. (U)

produced a letter in the Chinese language which he said was from mother prior to his arrival in the United States. translated the letter to say would arrive in San Francisco on Northwestern Airline Flight 010 on December 29, 1971 at 6:10 P.M. and that he would leave San Francisco on National Airline Flight No. 200 at 11:15 P.M. en route to Atlanta, Georgia. advised that he met and visited with him for a period of time before his plane departed to Atlanta. (U)

Attached as Exhibit "A" is a photostatic copy of Form I-94, Record of Arrival and Departure, relating to That document indicates he entered the United States on December 29, 1971 at Honolulu, Hawaii. He was at that time admitted as a nonimmigrant student and granted permission to remain in the United States until December 29, 1972. The Form I-94 shows him to be a citizen of the Republic of China and to have had in his possession a passport, No. (60) KFA 245671, and to have

Ex "A"

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SF, Cal 5/7/73
A20 300 844

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ON 8 Oct 97
BY INS letter dtd 8 Oct 97
AUTH PARA 4-103 DOD 5200.1-R

been destined to Georgia Tech University. Form I-94 indicates he arrived on Northwestern Flight 010 from Tokyo and that his permanent residence was listed as () date of birth () place of birth, () Nonimmigrant visa was issued on December 7, 1971 at Taipei, Taiwan. Included on the same photostat is Form I-538A report of action nonimmigrant showing () address P. O. Box 31606, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, Georgia 30332, to have received an extension of stay valid until December 29, 1973. That extension was granted by the DistrictDirector, Atlanta, Georgia on February 5, 1973. (U)

During the interview with () he advised that he had heard numerous rumors of persons who had come to Hong Kong from Mainland China within the past few years who had obtained falsified documents to indicate they had resided in Hong Kong for several years. He further advised these persons were rumored to have utilized these false documents to secure United States visas; however, he stated that he did not have personal knowledge of any individuals who had done this and stated that he could not remember who had told him about this. He said that in the future if any of this information came to his attention he would make note of it and promptly report it to the appropriate authorities. (U)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) per INS

RELEASED
ON 8 Oct 97
BY INS letter dtd 8 Oct 97
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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SF, Cal 5/7/73
A20 300 844

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[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (KS)/CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (CH)/REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TW)/UNITED STATES (US)

2. SUBJECT: (U) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1972-February 1973

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: SEOUL, KS 23 February 1973

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

7. SOURCE: A medium level official of a KS intelligence agency

9. REPORT NUMBER: 2 221 0206 73

8. DATE OF REPORT: 16 MAR 1973

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP DIRM 6B7a,c,d

12. ORIGINATOR: 502d MI Bn tcn/B-0161/95110

13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] MAJ, MIC

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: WILLIAM G. BENEDICT COL, MI Commanding

(U)

(C-NFD) This report contains additional information pertaining to recent activities of the Unification Struggle Department (T'UNG-CHAN-PU (4827/2069 6752)), allegedly a cover name of a CH overseas intelligence agency.

(U) Due to the sensitivity of the Source, the information contained in this report is not releasable to foreign nationals.

RECEIVED DS-4C2 MAR 27 11 03 AM '73

(U)

1. (C-NFD) In accordance with instructions, from the Unification Struggle Department, approximately ten Chinese students and young residents residing in NEW YORK, US, have started to organize a cover organization named the "National Unification Promotional Association" (Chinese Name: KUO-CHA-T'UNG-I-T'SU-CHIN-HSIEH-HUI, (0948/1367/4827/0001/0191/6651/0588/2565)). These Chinese Nationals have been engaged in peaceful propaganda activities toward Chinese residents in US, calling for peaceful unification of China by means of peace negotiations between CH and TW. They have been publishing weekly pamphlets entitled the "Weekly Union" (LEIN-HO-CHI-K'AN, (5114/0678/1323/0436)) distributing them among Chinese residents throughout the US.

(Leave Blank)

24 7200 / 10 32 40 / TW

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1 DIA
2 CINCPAC
5 USARPAC DCSINT
5 G2 EUSA
1 314th AIR DIV
1 548th RTGp
1 7th PSYOPS GP
2 24th PSYOPS Det
1 J2, UNC/USFK
1 J3, UNC/USFK PSYOP
1 EMB POL
1 AAD
1 EMB RI
8 502d MI Bn

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
CLASSIFIED BY DIA EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 DECLASSIFY ON UNDETERMINED

1 HQDA (DAMI-DOA-S)
2 COMNAVFORK
1 G2, I US CORPS
1 G2, 2d US INF DIV
1 EMBASSY, TOKYO, LA

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
NONE

1 500th MIG; ATTN: DMIG-OH
2 OSI DO 45
1 USARJ
3 J2, USMACV
1 1st SFGP (A)
1 COG

281

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1 SEP 62 1396

REPLACES DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62.

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 June 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

Chinese Communist Int/Ave

(b)(1) & (b)(7)(C) 5USC552

(Leave Blank)

2. (U) The pamphlets make the following points:

a. "Now is the era of negotiation. Why can't we Chinese people solve our own internal problems through peaceful negotiation?"

b. "Our fatherland has suffered serious damage of a long war. Today, it is not important whether we rule our country under Communism or under the Threehold National Principle (Alias: Sunwenism). What's more important today is to unify our fatherland by means of peaceful negotiation between CH and TW".

c. "It would be very difficult to eliminate the current hostile relation as long as the T'aip'ei government does not recognize the CH government and defames it. We, Chinese residents in the US, hope that the T'aip'ei Government will soon initiate peace negotiations with the CH government."

d. "We, the Chinese people, had once a deep and friendly relations with Americans. The US government began changing its policy toward the CH government from confrontation to negotiation. How can we Chinese people oppose negotiations to our own benefit?"

e. "It is true that the T'aip'ei government raised the living standard in Formosa and it has promised further economic growth, but economic development is not everything. These days, every country has to unite and speak with one voice in international politics, otherwise it won't be able to influence world opinion and developments. Therefore, the T'aip'ei government should start direct negotiations with the CH government."

f. "The T'aip'ei government has strong anti-communist feelings. It would be very difficult for any one to change it. Despite this it should renounce its present anti-communist policies which endanger its future existence."

Comment: (U) Source had access to this information by virtue of his official position. Source has been reporting since January 1972.

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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Chinese Communist Activities

1. COUNTRY: CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (CH), UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US), JAPAN (JA),
2. SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (KS) (U) ACTIVITY OF CH OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 8 February 1973
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: SEOUL, KS August 1972 - February 1973
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: A medium level official of a KS Intelligence agency
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 221 0153 73
9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 FEB 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP DIRM 6Ba,b,c,d
12. ORIGINATOR: 502d MI Bn tck/B-0108/95033
13. PREPARED BY: William J Donnelly
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: WILLIAM G. BENEDICT COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U)

(C-NFD) This report describes activities of the T'UNG-CHAN-PU (4827/2069/6752) (pronounced in Chinese), allegedly a CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (CH) overseas intelligence agency which has its headquarters in PEIP'ING, CH and its main operative base in KUANGTUNG (1684/2639), CH.

(U) Due to the sensitivity of the Source, the information contained in this report is not releasable to foreign nationals.

(Leave Blank)

2410-CH-A44, TW
2410-CH-A44, TW
2410-CH-A44, TW

(U)

1. (C-NFD) Between August and December 1972, approximately 500 well trained CH agents, under the control of the T'UNG-CHAN-PU, were dispatched to target nations, mostly to US and JA, via HONG KONG on espionage missions. Their missions included the recruitment of Chinese residents residing abroad.

(U)

2. (C-NFD) In an effect to obtain results in its recruitment operations, the T'UNG-CHAN-PU has established cover organizations in the US and JA. One of them is named the "CHINESE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION PROMOTIONAL ASSOCIATION" (0022/0948/0735/1627/4827/0001/0191/6651/2585). The CHINESE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION PROMOTIONAL ASSOCIATION and other organizations have been established by agents who have been successfully penetrated target

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE

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(b)(1),(b)(6) & (b)(7)(C) 6USC552

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nations under various covers.

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3. (C-NFD) The CHINESE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION PROMOTIONAL ASSOCIATION in the US and JA has been periodically printing and distributing pamphlets entitled "PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF CHINA" (0022/0948/0735/1627/4827/0001) and the "COMPROMISE BETWEEN NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST CHINA" (0948/0364/0588/0794) among Chinese residents in these countries. The CHINESE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION PROMOTIONAL ASSOCIATION in the US had been paying $500.00 (US currency) to those Chinese residents who assisted in the printing and distributing of the above pamphlets. The money is given in the name of a business assistance fund. The pamphlets contained the following propaganda slogans, designed to turn the Chinese residents abroad from the Nationalist Chinese (TW) Government and support the CH government.

4. (C-NFD) Texts of pamphlets are outlined below:

a. Anti-communist commitment works against the fatherland. The fatherland has become a great nation in the world and it will bring glorious and satisfactory life to the entire Chinese population.

b. The fatherland welcomes the return of Chinese residents residing abroad and their participation in constructive projects at home.

c. The fatherland is already a strong nation, but it would become a much stronger nation if TW would join the mainland.

d. Chinese residents residing abroad must [redacted] peaceful unification of the fatherland by participating in [redacted] (6126/0681) (pronounced in Chinese) ("[redacted]")

e. The age of compromise is here. Even KS, which has been regarded as a strong anti-communist nation, has started talks with KN. Therefor, there is no reason why we Chinese people cannot get together also.

f. CH virtually represents all of CH, and TW will soon be brought under CH control by peaceful means.

COMMENTS: (C-NFD) Source had access to this information by virtue of his official position. Source has been reporting since January 1972

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[redacted] Mr. Corey

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
For use of this form, see AR 381-130 & FM 30-17; the proponent agency is Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

DATE: 8 January 197[illegible]

PREPARING OFFICE: U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

SUBJECT: Illegal Immigration from Communist China (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLE TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(U)

1. (C) On 18 December 1972, a source who has provided reliable information in the past reported the following statements by Dr. Ting SU, an instructor in the Chinese Mandarin Language Department, Defense Language Institute West Coast, Presidio of Monterey, California, made during classroom instruction during the period immediately prior to the above date: (B-6)

a. On an unspecified date during 1972, Ting Su met an individual identified as Cheng Li, approximately 30-40 years old, in San Francisco, California. According to Su, Cheng Li departed Shanghai, China in 1970 for Hong Kong, resided in Hong Kong from 1970 to 1972, then obtained falsified residency papers from a British travel agency in Hong Kong which listed him as a resident of Hong Kong since 1949. Li then obtained a visa from the US Consulate in Hong Kong, and arrived in San Francisco at an unspecified date in 1972. Ting Su stated that Cheng Li is procommunist and a strong supporter of Mao. It was not determined how Su obtained the above information concerning Li.

b. Ting Su related that there are many illegal Chinese Mainland immigrants residing in California who came to the US through Hong Kong by obtaining falsified Hong Kong residency papers from one of two British travel agencies in Hong Kong. Prior to their application for a US visa, coordination is made with Chinese businessmen in San Francisco, California, for job guarantees in San Francisco as linguists. Application for visas are then made utilizing the falsified Hong Kong residency papers and US job guarantees. Su stated that many Chinese Communist intelligence agents are infiltrated into the US in the above manner. Su also added that a Chinese organization in San Francisco (not further identified) is responsible for security of the above procedures by threatening anyone who has knowledge of the above with violence or death if they relate their knowledge to US government agencies.

2. (U) SU, whose SSAN is [redacted] was born on [redacted] in [redacted]. He has been employed in the above capacity since 8 August 1951. (B-2)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOA-A

12 OCT 1972

SUBJECT: Peoples Republic of China Threat to CONUS (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Intelligence Command
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

TO: Commanding Officer
902d MI Group
P.O. Box 113
Falls Church, Virginia 22046

1. (S/NFD) During a meeting at CIAD on 2 Oct 72, representatives of the 902d MI Group requested CIAD analysis concerning the Peoples Republic of China intelligence threat to the US Army in CONUS.

2. (U) The attached inclosure is forwarded in response to this request.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

Kenneth F. Jackson

KENNETH F. JACKSON
Colonel, Inf
Commanding

1 Incl
as (S/NFD)

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7000540-1

(U) (S/NFD) Peoples Republic of China (PRC) Threat to CONUS

1. (U) (S/NFD) There is no information on any PRC intelligence operations in CONUS directed against the Army. However, there are potential resources for successful PRC exploitation. Of the more than 300,000 ethnic Chinese in the United States, some could be used in clandestine Chinese Communist intelligence operations. PRC intelligence agents could capitalize on a hostage-type situation where there are close ties between individual Chinese residing in the United States and their relatives on the Chinese mainland. Such US residents would be vulnerable to pressure and their cooperation could be elicited for espionage purposes. An estimated 5,000 Chinese Communist sailors have jumped ship at various US ports during the last few years. These sailors also present a potential target for Chinese Communist intelligence recruiters.

2. (U) (S/NFD) In late October 1970, the Canadian Government recognized the PRC. This provided the Chinese with their first permanent base for prospective intelligence operations in North America. A potential threat to the US Army may consequently emerge from Chinese Communist infiltration into the United States via Canada. Increasingly liberal Canadian immigration policies (in conjunction with diplomatic recognition) are expected to result in more Chinese students coming to Canada from Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the PRC itself. The likelihood that students may be co-opted for intelligence missions is strong, especially in view of the ease with which they could be directed by the PRC Embassy officials in Ottawa. Lenient border regulations between the United States and Canada make it relatively easy for these students to enter the United States as tourists. The re-establishment of the New China News Agency in Ottawa could also provide a base for PRC intelligence collection and subversive planning.

3. (U) (S/NFD) Admission to the United Nations has finally provided the PRC with a base of operation within CONUS. At least one member of the Chinese advance party had intelligence connections. The PRC Mission to the United Nations became operational on 11 November 1971. Approximately five PRC staff members of that Mission in New York are known or suspected intelligence officers. With the increasing legal presence of the PRC in the United States, the strong possibility exists that the potential resources within Chinese communities in the United States will be tapped for use in intelligence operations directed against the US Army.

4. (U) (S/NFD) Upon its admission to the United Nations, the PRC Mission initially attempted to gain control over U.N. Secretariat personnel being utilized by and for the PRC in various lower and mid-level positions, primarily as interpreters and translators. Contrary to U.N. policy, the

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employees were instructed that they were not to consider themselves "international civil servants" but rather individuals owing allegiance to China; they were told they must learn Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology. The U.N. has subsequently allowed the PRC Mission to recommend people for additional positions, and it is now in the process of recruiting "ideologically safe" individuals from the PRC and the rest of the world. Since approximately five staff members of the PRC Mission to the U.N. are known or suspected intelligence officers, it is likely that, as the Mission is expanded, more staff members will be intelligence operatives. This will increase the PRC's capability for covert collection in CONUS during the short-range and mid-range periods.

5. (U) (S) To date, no PRC intelligence agent has been surfaced in CONUS. It should be kept in mind that the resources mentioned above are only potential assets, not actual agents. The PRC intelligence services have always preferred long-term operations so it is unlikely that any current activity would be uncovered in the immediate future.

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1. COUNTRY: COMMUNIST CHINA/BURMA/THAILAND

2. SUBJECT: (U) Chinese Communist Intelligence Agents Identified in Thailand and Burma

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1970 - present

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: CHING MAI, Thailand, 19 Jun 72

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C,F,F INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: 22220178 from casual sources

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 730 0113 72 (0527-01-K)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 31 AUG 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP (DIRM 6B7a)

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] (30/72) COL, MI

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Alfred W. Bagot
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commanding

(b)(7)(C)

(U)

15. SUMMARY:

(U) Report provides information on three alleged Chinese Communist intelligence agents operating in the KENG TUNG (2117N/9936E) and THA CHALEAK (2027N/9953E) areas of BM, and the CHIANG MAI (1847N/9859E) area of TH. The agents are established in the Burmese communities and operate collection nets in BM and TH.

MAP REFERENCES: AMS Series 1501, 1:250,000, Sheets NF 47-7, NF 47-15, NF 47-6;
AMS Series U542, 1:250,000, Sheet NF 47-11.

(Leave Blank)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

(U)

(U) Since 1970, the Chinese Communists have been establishing intelligence agents in KENG TUNG (LP 5576)(2117N/9936E), BM, and TACHILEK (aka THA CHALEAK)(NC 9865) (2027N/9953E), BM. Couriers and collection agents have been connected through/at Mong YANG (LK 6544)(2152N/9940E), BM, KENG TUNG, TACHILEK, and CHIANG MAI (MA 9877) (1847N/9859E), TH. Three identified agents are:

(b)(7)(C)

a. [redacted] Yunnanese, currently a merchant at Ban PA KAENG, KENG TUNG; about 38 years of age; has about three-inch scar on right cheek; frequent travel between KENG TUNG - Mong YANG; KENG TUNG - TACHILEK; about every three months he makes one trip to CHIANG MAI.

(U) b. [redacted] half Yunnanese and half Tai Leu, born in [redacted]

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
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CONTINUATION SHEET	[redacted]IDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)	REPORT NO. 2 730 0113 72 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

(Leave Blank)

() Wife's name: [redacted] works from KENG TUNG as a Kha Kwe Yei (KKY) (Burmese Self Defense Force) troop in Lao SI's unit. [redacted] travels between KENG TUNG and TACHILEK; has two subagents placed in CHIANG MAI who always meet LEE in TACHILEK.

c. [redacted] about 42 years of age, [redacted] with office located in [redacted]; often travels between TACHILEK and Mong YANG, and TACHILEK and CHIANG MAI; has subagents in TH and BM.

Field Comments:

1. (U) The above information was obtained by a trained source who is considered fairly reliable, from a minor Burmese official in the TACHILEK area who obtained from a Chinese merchant from the KENG TUNG area.

2. (U) Informants' Comment: Chinese refugees attempt to steer clear of above-reported Chinese Communist agents because of fear of detection and abduction/return to CH.

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1. COUNTRY: COMMUNIST CHINA

2. SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Organization, YUNNAN Province

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Jun 72

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TAIPEI, Taiwan, 9 Aug 72

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B, F INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: Foreign intelligence agency from a confidential source

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 727 0354 72 (0710-06-3)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 AUG 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP (DIRM 6B6, 6B7)

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] (426/72) COL, MI

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Alfred W. Bagot
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

COMPLETE TEXT

(U)

(C) It was reported on 11 Jun 72 that the 121 Unit, an intelligence organization in YUNNAN Province, has six sections, in addition to an administrative section and a garrison unit which consists of one Ta-tui (STC 1129/7130), one Chung-tui (STC 0022/7130), and one Fen-tui (STC 0433/7130). Most members of this organization are natives of northeastern China. The mission of this organization is to train and send agents to Southeast Asia. The mission of its administrative section is to maintain files, issue supplies, approve temporary duties, interrogate criminals, and maintain security of the organization. The key personnel of this organization are: Chief--CHAO (STC 6392)(fnu); Deputy chief--AN (STC 1344)(fnu); Political officer--CHIANG (STC 3068)(fnu); and chief of the Administrative Section--LIN Ch'i-t'ang(STC 2651/6386/1016). LIN, age 47, native of HAN-TAN (3635N/11429E), HOPEH Province, is an ordinary worker with a junior middle school education. He joined the Army in 1943, and in 1950 was assigned to KALGAN (4050N/11456E). In 1952, he became section chief of the administrative section of an unidentified unit in K'UN-MING (2504N/10241E). He became section chief of the administrative section of this intelligence organization after the Cultural Revolution.

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Comment of Preparing Officer: [redacted]

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DECLASSIFY ON: N/A

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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15 JULY 1972

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INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES

OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA (U)

15 July 1972

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication has been reviewed in consultation with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency and the assistance of these agencies is gratefully acknowledged by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

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PREFACE

1. (C) "Our knowledge of the nation is very little and that little, too obscure to be trusted," wrote an American political analyst about 170 years ago. The nation was China which was then embroiled in a civil war. Today his statement remains equally applicable. The Cultural Revolution plus current political uncertainties make a definitive study of The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) intelligence and security agencies impossible. The study is instead an attempt to piece together what is known as well as to provide some insight into what is probable. [redacted]

(b)(1) per DIA [redacted]

2. (U) [redacted]

3. (U) To assist the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, in evaluating the utility of this publication in meeting consumer requirements, addressees are requested to provide information as set forth in the Reader Response Form.

4. (U) The date of information for this publication is 1 March 1972.

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APPENDIX 1. Glossary of Terms

APPENDIX 2. List of Key Personalities

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APPENDIX 4. Tables of Organization & Equipment for Tactical Units

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A. (S/NFD) (u) INTRODUCTION

1. (S/NFD) (u) The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has a dual hierarchy of government and party to exercise control over intelligence and security matters. Government leadership positions, however, are staffed by party members. This theoretically insures party control.

2. (S/NFD) (u) The party structure which supervises individual intelligence and security components is obscure. The Cultural Revolution wrecked the old Party organization and a new structure has not been finalized. It is possible, however, to generate the probable apparatus controlling individual agencies (see Figure 1). The top Party supervisory organizations are the Central Committee and the Political Bureau (Politburo). A *de facto* Secretariat handles the daily operational supervision of the Party's three intelligence and security departments: the Investigation, Political Security, and International Liaison departments. The Military Affairs Committee reports directly to the Politburo; this committee formulates military policy and insures the Party's control of the Peoples Liberation Army through the General Political Department.

3. (S/NFD) (u) The governmental apparatus controlling intelligence and security agencies is much clearer. The State Council, staffed with Central Committee members, oversees the Ministry of Public Security, which has primary responsibility for control of the general populace and supervises the Ministry of National Defense. The Ministry of National Defense controls the intelligence and security elements of the People's Liberation Army. These elements are shown in Figure 1.

B. (S/NFD) COMMUNIST PARTY

1. (S/NFD) *Investigation Department -- ID (Tiado Ch'a Pu, STC 6148/2686/6752)*

a. General: The ID was established by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to collect intelligence information

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
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(U)

(S/NFD) PRC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (U)



▬ ▬ The State Council is composed of members of Central Committee.

▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪ De facto organization.

▬ ▬ ▬ Although technically subordinate to the Army General Staff, the GPD actually reports to the military Affairs Committee.

SOURCE: OACSI, DA
DOI: March, 1972

Figure 1

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b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

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
* Subdivision titles were coined by OACSI, DA, and do not represent actual Chinese nomenclature.

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Figure 2

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INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT, CANTON STATION (S)

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


Figure 3

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


Figure 4.

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* All Figures represent monthly income in 1958.

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
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
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f. [redacted]

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2. (S/NFD) (a) *Political Security Department -- PSD*

a. General: The PSD is one of the most enigmatic organizations in the PRC intelligence and security system. The ranks of the PSD were

* When this quotation was written the term "Communist China" was used to refer to the PRC.

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decimated by the purges of the Cultural Revolution, and recent sources suggest the PSD may have been functionally reconstituted, perhaps under a new name.

b. Mission: Before the Cultural Revolution, the PSD had the prime responsibility for enforcing discipline and insuring loyalty of Party members in the armed forces, government and Party organs.

c. Functions: The PSD functioned as a counterintelligence investigative unit to monitor the activities of members of the Communist Party. In pre-Cultural Revolution days, the PSD operated through the political offices and party organizations. During the Cultural Revolution, individual PSD agents probably reported directly to Mao or his security specialist, Kiang Shen. Information on the current functions is not available. The PSD may have combined the two previous methods in carrying out party security work.

3. (S/NFD) *International Liaison Department -- ILD*

a. General: Until recently, PRC officials had never publicly admitted the existence of the ILD. Over the years, the ILD has been referred to by many names: "Central Liaison Department," "Foreign Liaison Department," International Liaison Department," and "The Department Responsible for Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties." The official silence was broken initially by Hanoi radio on 8 March 1971 when it announced Keng Piao as Director of the ILD, had accompanied the Chou En-lai delegation visiting North Vietnam. Peking subsequently confirmed the Hanoi radio broadcast.

b. Mission: The ILD handles relations with foreign Communist Parties.

c. Functions: The ILD is tasked by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to develop and maintain relations with friendly communist parties. ILD personnel study the policies, personalities, doctrines, and activities of all foreign communist parties and friendly revolutionary parties to identify and encourage pro-Chinese adherents. [redacted]

(b)(1) per DIA

d. Organization, Method of Operations: For detailed information on ILD organizations and *modus operandi*, reference is made to the OACSI

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publication, The International Liaison Department -- Chinese Communist Party, dated 15 July 1972; dissemination of this publication is restricted to the States of the United States and the District of Columbia.

e. Capabilities and Limitations: Lower echelon ILD research cadres are probably quite skilled in the mechanics of the job. The Cultural Revolution, however, led to a high turnover in senior staff members, thus limiting overall efficiency. The current power struggles within the Communist Party Politburo also hamper ILD efforts to evaluate the ideological correctness of other Communist Parties.

4. (S/NFD) Military Affairs Committee -- MAC (Chun Shih Wei Yuan Hui, STC 6511/0057/1201/0765/2585)

a. General: The MAC is the highest Party element dealing with military affairs.

b. Mission: The mission of the MAC is to formulate military policy and to supervise the Party's control over the PLA.

c. Functions: The MAC promulgates general policy directives to the armed forces; the more sensitive issues are handled by the Politburo. The MAC also supervises political work and the Party's control of the PLA through the General Political Department.

d. Organization: The MAC is a component of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. The actual membership of the MAC is composed of powerful Party figures and important military mem. It appears that the MAC is divided into subcommittees which have responsibility for specific functions. One such committee is an administrative unit handling daily implementation of directives -- this is the functional equivalent of the Party Secretariat. As of 1968, this administrative unit was composed of the Chief of Staff and six others.

(b)(1) per DIA

([redacted])

e. Method of Operation: Information about the actual decision-making process within the MAC is not available. Once decisions are reached, however, the MAC administrative unit supervises their implementation. In the past, one of the chief tools of the MAC has been the General Political Department, discussed on page 20.

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f. Capabilities and Limitations: Given the powerful institutional position of the MAC and the prominence of its members, it is extremely capable of carrying out its assigned tasks.

C. (U) (S/NFD) JOINT ARMED SERVICES

1. (U) (S/NFD) General Political Department -- GPD (Tsung Cheng Chin Pu, STC 4920/2398/3112/6752) (GPD)

a. General: The political commissar-political officer system goes back to the 1920's. Under this system, a hierarchy of political officers exists parallel to the military chain of command. The Soviets introduced this concept into the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek when the KMT established the Whampoa Military Academy under the directorship of General Chiang Kai-shek; the chief political commissar was Chou En-lai. The present Chinese Communist GPD traces its origin to this early KMT experience and functioned as an important part of the Chinese Communist military apparatus until 1967. For the next two years, the GPD ceased to serve as the Communist Party's watchdog over the military due to the purge of its top leadership in the Cultural Revolution. In early 1969, however, references to the GPD reappeared and on 7 September 1970 LI Te-sheng was appointed the new director. The appointment of a new chief probably means the GPD will resume its old duties and functions. Its position as a political security agency for the Communist Party probably will be completely restored once the Party's leadership disputes subside in Peking.

b. Mission: The GPD is responsible for conducting Party work and political security operations throughout the military and for general counterintelligence activities in the armed services.

c. Functions: The GPD performs a variety of tasks, some of which would not be considered counterintelligence functions by Western standards. GPD personnel are charged with counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion duties; they also handle psychological warfare operations. Other responsibilities include interrogation, exploitation, indoctrination, and detention of prisoners of war. The most important function of the GPD in the past, however, was to insure the political reliability of the military to the Communist Party, a function that eroded during the Cultural Revolution with the dismissal of top GPD leadership. Current standards of "political correctness" are probably rather loose, and it is unlikely that anything more than gross deviations from political norms -- such as membership in the "May 16 Corps" or direct association with Liu Shao-ch'i -- are prosecuted by the GPD. This slackness

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is due to the unsettled conditions in the Politburo itself. Since the GPD is only the arm of the Politburo, it cannot function properly until the Politburo sets forth policy. Closely linked to the GPD's political security duty is its role in carrying out Party work. The political officers explain Party policy directives to the troops and local civilians. GPD personnel also are active in the organization and administration of Party committees which are attached to every military echelon; the political officer often is the secretary of the Party committee.

d. Organization

(1) Although technically subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense through the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, the GPD actually is responsible to the Military Affairs Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo and is at the same administrative level as the Army Staff Department (see Figure 1). Information on the GPD at the national level is limited, but it can be hypothesized from pre-Cultural Revolution information on the lower echelons. Due to its relative organizational stability from the 1930's to the Cultural Revolution, the GPD probably will have much the same form once it assumes its old functions.

(2) The following national-level GPD sections may be attached to different echelons of military commands:

(a) An Organization Section probably handles general administration for the GPD including records and personnel assignments. This section may also oversee the task of "party-building" in the military.

(b) [redacted]

(b)(1) per DIA

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(c) A Propaganda Section disseminates and explains new Communist Party policies and directives and seeks to instill a proper ideological outlook among soldiers. This section also publishes military newspapers and disseminates overt military propaganda for foreign audiences.

(d) A Cultural Section supervises cultural work throughout the military esatblishment. It promotes the Party's policies in art and literature and directs mass entertainment and sports activities. This is an important section since the Chinese Communists equate the pen with the sword.

[redacted]

(b)(1) per DIA

(f) A Youth Section indoctrinates young civilians and military men; it supervised the activities of Communist Youth League members in the military before it was disbanded.

(g) [redacted]

(h) A Cadre Section, like the Organization Section, handles personnel administration. It administers the Party's cadre policies and examines the political attitudes of cadre personnel, especially high-ranking ones. It also has army-wide responsibility for fostering cadres and reviewing cadre performance and for appointments, promotions, and dismissals. The Cadre Section also supervises the employment and placement of cadre personnel after retirement.

(3) Each military region has Secretary, Organization, Security, Propaganda, Cultural, Cadre, Youth, and Mass Work sections.

(4) Each military district has Organization, Security, Propaganda, Cadre, Cultural, Youth, and Mass Work sections.

(5) Subdistrict levels have Organization, Security, Propaganda, Cadre, and Mass Work sections.

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(6) Tactical field units have GPD sections only at divisional and regimental levels. Divisional political departments have Organization, Youth, Propaganda, Enemy Affairs, Cadre, Civil Affairs, Cultural, and Security sections. Regimental political offices have Organization, Propaganda, Cultural, and Security subsections.

(7) Political officers attached to regimental and higher tactical units are called Political Commissars; at the Battalion level they are Political Directors and at the Company level, they are Political Instructors.

e. Method of Operation

(1) Selection of Personnel: To be a political officer of the GPD, a candidate is required to be a Communist Party member in good standing. After joining the GPD, the political officer is subject to continuing scrutiny for ideological correctness.

(b)(1) per DIA

[redacted]

(2) Training: Little information on the instruction given to GPD personnel is available, but they probably receive political education as well as security work training.

(3) Assignment: Little information about assignment policies is available. The Cadre Section or Organization Section probably handles personnel assignment procedures.

(4) Significant Operations: There are no examples of specific operations available.

(b)(1) per DIA

[redacted]

f. Capabilities and Limitations: In the past, the GPD was a highly effective arm of the Communist Party. Its stature since the Cultural Revolution is not clear.

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2. (S/NFD) *Intelligence Department (Ch'ing Pao Pu, STC 1906/1032/6752)*

a. General: The Intelligence Department is responsible for the collection of strategic and tactical military intelligence. It is directly controlled by the General Staff Department (operations) of the Peoples Liberation Army. The Intelligence Department was created in 1949 from personnel formerly assigned to the intelligence components of various military regions; the initial organizational structure lasted until 1953.

(b)(1) per DIA

b. Mission: The Intelligence Department is tasked with collection of military-related information outside the PRC.

c. Functions: The Intelligence Department engages in espionage operations abroad to collect information on foreign forces, to direct the tactical intelligence efforts of regular army combat units and military regions, to place and supervise attaches abroad; and to process and disseminate intelligence within the Peoples Liberation Army.

d. Organization

(1)

(b)(1) per DIA

(2) Mission: The Intelligence Department has a Political Division which may be synonymous with the Second Division. Through this

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division, the Communist Party exercises its control over military intelligence personnel. The division is known to be tasked with political education functions and probably has countersubversion, countersabotage, and general counterintelligence responsibilities. Elements of the Political Division are attached to all operational intelligence units, but report directly to the division headquarters in Peking and not necessarily to the local unit military commanders. Also, the head of the Political Division probably reports directly to the General Political Department which in turn can report directly to the Chinese Communist Party. The personnel assignments for the Political Division probably come from the General Political Department (see page 20, General Political Department).

(3) [redacted]

(a) [redacted]

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(b) [redacted]

(c) [redacted]

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(b)(1) per DIA

[redacted]

(4) The Fifth Division processes and disseminates intelligence. Information on evaluation techniques and dissemination methods is not available.

e. Method of Operation

(1) Selection of Personnel: Most military intelligence personnel are required to be members of the Communist Party and have a good class backgroun (worker or peasant ancestry). Once appointed, these officers are subject to continuing ideological evaluation by security officials from the General Political Department.

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[redacted]

(3) Targets and Essential Elements of Information (EEI): The Intelligence Department is interested in all information on the

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military intentions and capabilities of hostile nations.

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(4) Significant Operations (Tactical):

(a) In the combat situation, the Intelligence Department's primary means of tactical intelligence collection is through direct reconnaissance. Other methods include exploitation of captured equipment and documents and prisoner interrogations.

(b)(1) per DIA

(b) The Intelligence sections of tactical combat units direct the efforts of specialized elements, such as armored reconnaissance units. These reconnaissance units cover an area of 100 to 200 kilometers in advance of Chinese combat forces and approximately 50 kilometers wide; cavalry reconnaissance troops operate over a wider front. Both search out major concentrations of enemy forces and report on their strengths and compositions.

(c) Other ground reconnaissance is directed by intelligence sections attached to the infantry. These reconnaissance troops operate as small units to infiltrate enemy lines. Reconnaissance personnel are specially trained for these operations and sometimes infiltrate in civilian clothing.

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f. Capabilities and Limitations

(1) Intelligence sections attached to tactical combat units probably are effective. These sections have many experienced staff officers

* At publication of the quotation, the PRC was referred to as Communist China.

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and a long tradition from which to construct doctrine. The intelligence sections effectively gathered data in the conflicts with the Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, and the United Nations forces in Korea. In this type of operation, primitive reporting techniques and poorly educated agents could produce good results; PRC intelligence officers could be well trained with a minimum of instruction in sophisticated tradescraft or foreign language skills. These units should be considered very effective.

(b)(1) per DIA

(2) [redacted]

3. (S/~~NFD~~) Technical Department (Chi-Shu Pu STC 2111/5890/6752)

a. General: The Technical Department of the PLA dates back to the early 1940's when it was established by the Communists in Yenan as the Meteorology Bureau to provide weather observations for military operations. Its main task, however, was to monitor the Chinese Nationalists' radio messages. Its name was changed to the Technical Department about 1951, and the department became augmented.

b. Mission: The Technical Department is responsible for communciations intelligence.

c. [redacted]

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(1) [redacted]

[redacted]

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(b)(1) per DIA

[redacted]

(2) [redacted]

d. [redacted]

4. (U) (S/NFD) *Border Defense and Military Internal Security Units -- BDMIS*

a. General: The BDMIS dates back to the 1955 reorganization of the public security system when the BDMIS assumed responsibility for internal security along the borders and in minority regions.

b. Mission: BDMIS troops are responsible for protection of the frontier, suppression of civil disorders, and apprehension of persons attempting to infiltrate or exfiltrate the country. BDMIS units also have counterespionage and countersubversion duties and collect low-level intelligence in border areas.


c. Functions: The BDMIS surveils travelers entering and leaving China to detect enemy agents. These troops also maintain civil order and control over minority groups. They provide border patrols and are the first line of defense should the country be invaded. BDMIS units also send agents outside the PRC to collect intelligence.

d. Organization: BDMIS troops are organized into 22 divisions and 63 independent regiments under the control of the appropriate military regional headquarters. (Division organization is shown in Figure 7.) Collection operations are handled by the reconnaissance company which is staffed in part by intelligence officers.

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BORDER DEFENSE AND MILITARY INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION



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Figure 7

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e. Method of Operation

(1) Targets and Essential Elements of Information: The collection teams of one BDMIS unit once sought information on anti-Communist armed units across the border, non-Chinese intelligence operations, economic conditions, and information regarding PRC refugees.

(2)

(b)(1) per DIA

f. Capabilities and Limitations: The BDMIS is capable of carrying out its limited low-level intelligence functions. BDMIS units are probably better able, however, to perform security duties.

5. (U) (S/NFD) Air Force

a. General: Two elements of the Air Force General Staff, the Reconnaissance Section and the Intelligence Section, have intelligence interests.

b. Mission: The Air Force probably is tasked with providing aerial reconnaissance and photographic intelligence to aid the PLA General Staff Department and ground commanders (the Air Force is not an independent service, but a subordinate element of the PLA).

c. Functions: The Air Force intelligence elements probably provide strategic aerial reconnaissance support and analysis to the PLA General Staff Department and to ground commanders concerning enemy strategic and tactical intentions and capabilities.

d. Organization

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(1) Reconnaissance Section: The responsibilities of this section are not known. This element probably plans and directs aerial reconnaissance missions.

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(2) [redacted]

e. Method of Operation

(1) Targets & EEI: Air Force intelligence sections collect strategic information to include enemy defense industry installations, military supply centers, air installations, harbors, forces at sea, and air defense systems. Tactical EEI include enemy troop disposition, equipment, troop movements, command posts, lines of communication, and general defensive field works.

(2) Equipment: The primary reconnaissance plane used by the Chinese Air Force is the IL-28. In tactical operations, MIG jet fighters and single-engine prop planes also may be employed. The planes are of Soviet design and were acquired during the era of Sino-Soviet cooperation.

(U)

D. (S/NFD) GOVERNMENT: *Ministry of Public Security -- MPS*

1. (S/NFD) (U) *General*: Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the MPS had paramount responsibility for police and internal secuirty. The MPS originally controlled the municipal security forces and the Public Security Bureaus. During the Cultural Revolution, some of the control was shifted to the army and local Revolutionary Committees. The MPS now seems to be reasserting its control over the local Public Security Bureaus. The information presented here is based on pre-Cultural Revolution MPS characteristics and organizations in anticipation of the MPS regaining full responsibility for internal security.

2. (S/NFD) (U) *Mission*: The MPS is responsible for maintaining the security of the government and the Communist Party.

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3. (S/NFD) Functions:

[redacted] the MPS maintains border patrols, conducts investigations and interrogations, censors mail, monitors telecommunicaltions, directs civil defense activity, conducts surveillances, maintains an extensive network of informants, protects foreigners (including diplomats) residing in or visiting the mainland, and provides security escorts for PRC officials traveling abroad. It is also probably responsible for the security of PRC official installations abroad. The MPS makes arrests and controls those services performing other police functions. It is also responsible for fire protection.

(U)

4. (S/NFD) Organization

a. MPS headquarters in Peking is subdivided in the following components:

(1) The Political Department formerly was responsible for Communist Party security in the MPS and probably handled all matters concerning MPS personnel who were members of the party or the Youth League. The Political Department also maintained the political records of party members. The MPS suffered during the Cultural Revolution and the Department's existence cannot be confirmed. The Political Department probably suspended its operations until the current party rebuilding program is completed.

(2) The General Affairs Bureau functions as a secretariat for the MPS. It has sections for research, internal security, finance, courier and communications services, archives and files, property acquisition and management, handling correspondence and reports to and from lower MPS elements, liaison, printing and distributing MPS publications, and other general administrative matters.

(3) The Personnel Bureau handles the recruitment and placement of rank-and-file Ministry personnel at the central level. This bureau probably is responsible for selection, promotion, and assignment of all personnel in key positions in the Ministry.

(4) The Public Order Bureau, sometimes referred to as the "Public Safety Bureau," directs routine, overt police, fire, traffic, and

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population control work. It also establishes policy and levels of personnel strengths. Population controls include census, birth and death registrations, residence certificates, moving permits, household and hotel registrations, and administration of labor camps and farms where criminals and political prisoners are sent for indoctrination and punishment.

(5) The Political Security Bureau probably is charged with the political screening of the citizenry, other than government and party members.

(6) The Border Security Bureau protects China's borders and polices her ports of entry, seacoasts, rivers, airports, and shipping. It also issues travel permits and conducts surveillance on travelers to and from the mainland. It works closely with the Economic Security Bureau of the Ministry to prevent smuggling.

(7) The Economic Security Bureau is concerned with security of industrial plants, mines, and other installations against sabotage and the prevention of smuggling and blackmarketing. It is also concerned with misappropriation of governments funds, property, and equipment, counterfeiting, and economic subversion.

(8) The Alien Affairs Bureau watches foreigners in China, including their business and personal activities. Alien Affairs Offices of the bureau are found in all regions, provinces, and the large municipalities ostensibly as a part of the civil government, but they actually are manned by public security personnel. They control the hotels where foreigners are billeted; they assign the guides, interpreters, and chauffeurs to foreigners during their stay in China, and engage in surveillance, surreptitious baggage search, censorship, telephone tapping, and the installation of audio-surveillance devices.

(9) [redacted]

(b)(1) per DIA

(10) [redacted]

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(11) In approximately 1951, the Central Public Security Institute was established in Peking. It provides specialized training for MPS personnel in public security, intelligence, counterintelligence, and political indoctrination.

b. Provincial Public Security Departments, subordinate to the Ministry, have secretariats, administrative sections, and Alien Affairs Offices, plus sections for countersubversion, counterespionage, personnel security, overseas Chinese, guard, criminal investigations, interrogations, residence controls, labor reform, Peoples Armed Police, and travel controls. The Peoples Armed Police are rural forces whose duties include safeguarding industrial installations (see Figure 8).

c. Large cities have Public Security Bureaus (PSB) subordinate to the province departments, except for Peking, Harbin, Shanghai, and Canton, which because of their size and prominence have bureaus administratively equivalent to the provincial departments. The bureaus have sections for criminal investigations, counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, and fire and police services. These bureaus also have secretariats, alien affairs sections, and pretrial sections.

d. Each municipal bureau has subordinate sub-bureaus or branches. These sub-bureaus seem to be functionally divided into secretary, supply, administration, family registration or census, political, and judicial subsections. Each sub-bureau controls several police posts or stations.

e. Provincial departments have administrative elements called Special District Public Security Units. Each unit is responsible for criminal investigations, counterespionage, countersubversion, counter-sabotage and for maintaining the peace.

(b)(1) per DIA

[redacted]

f. The lowest subordinate units of the MPS are called police posts, police stations, police precincts, or wards (usually found only in *hsiens*). During the Cultural Revolution the functions of these basic public security elements sometimes were usurped by *ad hoc* groups like the Workers Provost Corps. These basic police units probably will resume their old duties as the MPS recovers from the Cultural Revolution. A police post usually was composed of a chief and his deputy, a security specialist, a household registry or census office, a records section, and a public order section comprised of individual policemenn.


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(S/NFD) (U) ORGANIZATION OF MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY



SOURCE: OACSI, DA
DOI: March 1972

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Figure 8

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5. (S/NFD) Method of Operation

a. Selection of Personnel: MPS personnel generally are required to have good class backgrounds (worker or peasant ancestry) and good political records. The Cultural Revolution probably caused a political re-evaluation of all MPS personnel before they were allowed to keep their current posts. Some physical standards such as height and weight are used to select members of such MPS elements as the local traffic police.

b. Training: Little current information on MPS training is available.

(b)(1) per DIA

c. Assignment: MPS staffing and assignment policies are not known.

d. Targets and Essential Elements of Information: The MPS is the principal counterintelligence and security arm for the state and party. Its primary interests are internal subversion and foreign intelligence; ordinary crime is lower priority mission for the MPS.

e. Significant Operations

(b)(1) per DIA

(1)

(a)

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(b)(1) per DIA

(b) [redacted]

(c) [redacted]

(d) [redacted]

(2) Internal Security

(a) The MPS uses a documentation system to control the mainland populace. Each household must have a family registration document containing the names of all family members, changes of address, and other personal data. Citizens also carry at least one type of identity document. Another form of control is the ration booklet needed for purchases at approved outlets.

(b) Travel documents, required for both Chinese citizens and foreign visitors, are controlled by the MPS. Mainland residents carry a permit from local authorities listing destination, dates of travel, and occasionally the persons to be visited. Foreigners usually obtain permits from local MPS Alien Affairs sections.

(b)(1) per DIA

(c) [redacted]

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(b)(1) per DIA

(d) [redacted]

(U)
6. (S/NFD) *Capabilities and Limitations*: The results of the turmoil created during the Cultural Revolution are still not clear. This limits any discussion of MPS capabilities. One apparent deficiency, however, is low cadre morale resulting from the purges of the Cultural Revolution. This sagging morale probably will persist even after MPS duties are normalized. In spite of low morale, as soon as the MPS resumes normal functioning, it can be expected to perform well.

(U)
E. (S/NFD) *PARAMILITARY*

(U)
1. (S/NFD) *Peoples Militia*

a. General: The Peoples Militia is a reserve force much like the old Chinese Communist irregular army which existed during the civil war.

b. Mission: During peacetime, the militia is an additional centrally regulated force for control of the masses. It also has intelligence and security responsibilities. The militia also serves as a tool to assist in the Party's political indoctrination.

c. Functions: Militia units are used primarily to check households, act as guards, search for fugitives, patrol coasts, and take other security measures. During a war they function as guerrilla units and collect order of battle information. Specifically, militia duties include:

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(1) Providing replacements for regular forces;

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(2) Relieving regular forces of security duty along seashores, borders, and important communications lines;

(3) Disseminating intelligence, transporting supplies, and constructing fortifications;

(4) Conducting guerrilla operations in coordination with regular forces;

(5) Enforcing thought control and ideological indoctrination of youth (the Chinese view this as a counterintelligence task);

(6) Guarding against enemy agents, controlling civilians' movements, preventing uprisings, and maintaining order;

(7) Insuring that people comply with all government orders and regulations;

(8) Unifying thoughts and opinions of the masses through propaganda; and

(9) Participating in construction and production tasks.

d. Organization

(1) Control of the militia is divided among the PLA, local Communist Party committees, and local government elements. It varies according to the political climate, with the PLA currently having the most control.

(2) The ordinary militia is one of three militia categories; it consists of politically reliable men and women between 18 and 45 years of age. This militia receives infrequent training and has few arms. Its only peacetime duty is night patrols. In a war, it would be deployed as guerrilla forces.

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(3) The armed militia has full-time, salaried personnel who train the other militia elements. They are usually ages 18 to 25. Some armed militia personnel serve as staff members of the Peoples Armed Departments at either the county or commune level.

(4) All militia units are subordinate to the PLA on the national and provincial (or military district) levels. At lower echelons, the militia generally parallels the local government and economic structure. One report indicates that divisions, rather than regiments, are the highest echelon militia units. These divisions are organized at commune level with the operations and training under subdistrict control.

e. Method of Operation

(1) Selection of Personnel: Men and women between ages 18 and 45 are eligible to join provided they have a good class background.

(2) Training: The broad militia mission requires a wide variety of training subjects including marching, formations and basic movements, marksmanship and grenade throwing, cover and concealment techniques, patrol and sentry methods, capturing enemy agents, escorting prisoners, care of weapons and ammunition, weapons familiarization, and political courses. Militia cadre get additional leadership and security training and attend advanced political classes.

(3) Targets and EEI: The militia seeks general, low-level order of battle information and attempts to ferret out enemy agents and subversive elements.

(4) Equipment: The militia is poorly equipped with outmoded small arms; types and quantities of weapons vary.

(b)(1) per DIA

(5)

(a)

[redacted]

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(b)(1) per DIA

(b) [redacted]

(c) [redacted]

(d) [redacted]

(e) [redacted]

f. Capabilities and Limitations: The lack of weapons and the limited training received by most militia units probably weaken their effectiveness. If given sufficient arms and training, the armed militia elements probably could be field-ready in one-to-three months; the ordinary militia would require intensive training for about four months before they could become effective guerrilla units. It is improbable, however, that the PRC government could provide the necessary arms.

(u)

F. (~~S/NFD~~) EVALUATION

(u)

1. (~~S/NFD~~) PRC intelligence and security personnel generally are dedicated, loyal, and efficient. Few officials dare engage in malfeasance because of ever-present Party scrutiny; the opportunity for corruption is minimized by strict accounting procedures for intelligence funds.

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2. (S/NFD) (u) Since 1949, the intelligence and security forces have efficiently maintained the Communist Party in power. They have shown a good grasp of counterintelligence methods and demonstrated technical ability. Foreign operations, however, have been hampered by shortages of personnel with knowledge of foreign languages and customs. All the security services seem to maintain a smooth working relationship, although they sometimes compete for prospective agents.

3. (S/NFD) (u) Morale of intelligence and security personnel may be low at present because of the purges during the Cultural Revolution. The Ministry of Public Security, which had numerous functions eroded from its mission, particularly was affected. Also, the Red Guard singled out individual security personnel and subjected them to public abuse. Most cadre personnel are veterans of past purges, however, and low morale should be only a temporary problem. The disrespect engendered in the general populace by Red Guard activities may be a more persistant problem for security authorities. As the political climate normalizes, security forces probably will regain their high-level capabilities.

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APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS (U)

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(S/NFD) APPENDIX 1. GLOSSARY OF TERMS (U)

BDMIS	Border Defense-Military Internal Security units
GPD	General Political Department
ID	Investigation Department
ILD	International Liaison Department
MAC	Military Affairs Committee
MPS	Ministry of Public Security
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
Politburo	Political Bureau of the Communist Party
PSB	Public Security Bureau
PSD	Political Security Department

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APPENDIX 2

LIST OF KEY PERSONALITIES (U)

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(S/NFD) APPENDIX 2. LIST OF KEY PERSONALITIES (U)

NAME	POSITION
CH'IU Hui-tso	Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA; member of Military Affairs Committee (MAC)
UNKNOWN	Minister of Public Security
K'ANG Sheng	Internal Security Specialist, member of Politburo
KENG Piao	Head of International Liaison Department
LI Ts-sheng	Director of General Political Department of PLA, member of MAC
LIU Shao-wen	Chief of Intelligence Department
MAO Tse-tung	Chairman of Communist Party
TSOU Ta-pieng	Chief of Investigation Department
YEH Chien-ying	Vice Chairman of MAC
WANG Tung-hsing	Vice Minister of Public Security

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APPENDIX 3

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GAPS

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(b)(1) per DIA

1. [redacted]
 a. [redacted]
 b. [redacted]
 c. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
 a. [redacted]
 b. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted]
5. [redacted]
 a. [redacted]
 b. [redacted]
 c. [redacted]
6. [redacted]
7. [redacted]
8. [redacted]

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(b)(1) per DIA

9. [redacted]

10. [redacted]

11. [redacted]

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

14. [redacted]

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APPENDIX 4.

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION & EQUIPMENT FOR TACTICAL UNITS

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KEY TO APPENDIX 4

	Infantry
	Signal
	Cavalry
XX	Division HQ
III	Regiment
II	Battalion
I	Division
• • •	Platoon
• •	Section
•	Squad
———	Elements with intelligence functions

Upper numbers indicate officers

Lower numbers indicate enlisted men


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ARMY HEADQUARTERS



NOTE

1/ STAFFED BY PERSONNEL FROM ARMY UNITS.

ELEMENTS WITH INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS.

SOURCE: DIA
DOI: Apr 72

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
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27 SEP 2000

HEADQUARTERS INFANTRY DIVISION



NOTE

1/ STAFFED BY PERSONNEL FROM DIVISIONAL UNITS.

SOURCE: DIA
DOI: Apr 72

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SOURCE: DIA
DOI: Apr 72

NOTES

1/JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS.
2/STAFFED BY PERSONNEL FROM REGIMENTAL UNITS.


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
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
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ARMY RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION




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RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY, INFANTRY DIVISION



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DOI: Apr 72

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☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

b2-DIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 369

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

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Page(s) 374-376

IACPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: COMMUNIST CHINA

2. SUBJECT: (U) Operations of Smuggling Rings at China-Macao Border Area

3. ISC NUMBER: 333.730, 159.700

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 28 Mar 71

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TOKYO, Japan, 3 Aug 71

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B,F,F INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: 22220177 from an overseas Chinese traveler from a relative in CH

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 727 0432 71 (0710-06-G)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 9 SEP 1971

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 2E1, 6B7a

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] COL, MI (1-11/771)(PS 10/70)

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Alfred W. Bagot
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commanding

(b)(7)(a) & (b)(1) 2200177

15. SUMMARY:

(C) Report provides information on methods employed to smuggle Chinese across the China-Macao border in MACAO (2212N/11333E), including those used by CH government agencies. Information was furnished by an overseas Chinese traveler from Japan who visited the CH'IEN-SHAN (2215N/11330E) area, KWANGTUNG Province, 25-28 Mar 71. The traveler in turn elicited the information from his 60-year-old brother-in-law who runs [redacted]

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(Evaluation Reports, DD Forms 1480, prepared on this IR will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.)

1. (C) Background Information on Basic Informant: Basic informant, [redacted]

(b)(7)(D)

2. (C) (U) Smuggling of People From CH to MACAO:

a. "Overt" smuggling by "contacts": The person to be smuggled is "sneaked" into MACAO after his "in-border contact" establishes connection with an "out-border contact" in MACAO (EN: No further details). The fee for this service is high, but the results are guaranteed.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA	1
ACSI, DA	1
CINCPAC	1
USARPAC	7
PACAF	2
PACFLT	1
USMACV	4
DOD/PRO	1
COMUSTDC	1
USAINTC	1
USAIRR	1
USASAPAC	1
1st SFG (A)	1
USDLO, Hong Kong	1
1021st USAF	1
J2, MACTHAI	1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Item #16 continued:

CAS, Taipei (C)	1
500th MI Gp	10

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
None

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 8 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1 SEP 62 1396

REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

b. "Covert" smuggling by "contact": Those who cannot afford the high cost of "overt" smuggling may be smuggled into MACAO "covertly" for a smaller fee by an "in-border contact." Most of those who use this method travel to the YIN-K'ENG (approx 2210N/11331E) coast from PEI-SHAN (2213N/11330E) via WAN-TZU (2212N/11332E) (see accompanying sketch). At YIN-K'ENG, they sneak over the PLA sentry line and swim toward MACAO at night as directed by their "in-border contact." They are given no guarantee of success in their venture.

c. "Blind" escape: Many who are dissatisfied with the regime in CH try to flee the country without using a "contact." They usually follow an east-to-west route along CHIANG-CHUN-SHAN (STC 1412/6511/1472), sneak across the PLA sentry line when they reach the coast, and swim toward MACAO (see accompanying sketch). A great number drown before they reach MACAO.

3. (U) (C) Travel to HONG KONG From MACAO: On can travel freely between HONG KONG and MACAO if he has a Hong Kong-Macao residency certificate. If he does not have such a certificate, a "contact" will take care of the matter for a fee.

4. (U) (C) State-Run Smuggling Ring: The Kwangtung Provincial Public Security Department and the Canton City Public Security Bureau smuggle people into MACAO where Communist cadre provide them with documents needed to enter HONG KONG. Young girls who speak fluent English are smuggled into HONG KONG via MACAO in the holds of ferryboats (EN: Presumably, by the above government agencies). In HONG KONG, these girls are met by someone who finds jobs for them, usually in dance halls, restaurants, or bars.

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ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT


CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 727 0432 71
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

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ESCAPE ROUTES FROM
COMMUNIST CHINA TO MACAO
(Not to scale)



379
379

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

DD FORM 1 SEP 62 1396c
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 C—655193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60 AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

J1203 2064

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]
(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: JAPAN/COMMUNIST CHINA

2. SUBJECT: (U) Chinese Communist Intelligence Collection Activities

3. ISC NUMBER: 159.300, 159.700, 159.710, 159.100

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 20-23 May 71

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TOKYO, Japan, 1 Jul 71

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

7. SOURCE: [redacted]

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 255 0153 71

9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 0 AUG 1971

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: SICR U-GPA-G1290, paras IIIA1. IIIC1
DIRM 6B6a, 6B7a, 6C, 7A6

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] COL, MI (CJ 199/71)

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commanding

(b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

15. SUMMARY: RELEASABLE EVALUATION BY SICR ORIGINATOR IS REQUESTED (Leave Blank)

(C) Report concerns the activities [redacted]

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROJECT

SPECIAL STUDY
CHINESE COMMUNIST SCHOOLS FOR ESPIONAGE, SUBVERSION, AND GUERRILLA WARFARE (U)
4 MAY 1970

27 SEP 2000

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SPECIAL STUDY

CHINESE COMMUNIST SCHOOLS FOR ESPIONAGE, SUBVERSION, AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication has been reviewed in consultation with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency and the assistance of these agencies is gratefully acknowledged by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

Reader attention is invited to the Counterintelligence Gaps identified in Appendix 3. Comments, suggestions, or queries pertaining to this publication may be directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310: ATTN: CIA.

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
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APPENDIX 3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GAPS

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PREFACE

During the last decade, the US Army has become more directly involved in counterinsurgent warfare and in advising friendly governments on anti-guerrilla operations. To better fulfill the Army's mission, military personnel must be aware of Chinese Communist aims, methods, and techniques in training insurgents at schools especially constructed for this purpose. The Chinese training schools deserve special consideration due to the openly avowed Chinese policy of spreading revolution throughout the world.

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I. (S/NFD) OVERVIEW

A. (S/NFD) GENERAL POLITICAL

"The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principal of revolution holds good universally for China and for all other countries."

MAO Tse-tung, *Problems of War and Strategy* (6 November 1938).

"We, the Chinese nation, have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood, the determination to recover our lost territory by our own efforts, and the ability to stand on our own feet in the family of nations."

MAO Tse-tung, *On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism* (27 December 1935).

"In the fight for complete liberation, the oppressed people rely first of all on their own struggle and then, and only then, on international assistance. The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our international duty."

MAO Tse-tung, *Talk With African Friends* (8 August 1963).

"The people of the world invariably support each other in their struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. Those countries which have won victory are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet done so. Nevertheless . . . it is imperative to adhere to the principles of self-reliance, to rely upon the strength of the masses in one's own country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from the outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts . . . no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won."

LIN Piao, *Long Live the Victory of the People's War* (September 1965).

1. These quotations, from the writings of the People's Republic of China's (PRC)* leader and his heir apparent, have been responsible for shaping portions of China's foreign policy. The writings (*Thoughts of MAO Tse-tung*) have helped shape a nation and sought to alter the course of world history. The Chinese leaders view "Thoughts" as a sort of universal "Bill of Rights" which legitimizes armed rebellion or insurrection as the most practical means of correcting social injustices.

2. With this ideological armament, China seeks to extend its influence in the underdeveloped areas of the world (primarily in Southeast Asia). It seeks to encourage insurrections, rebellions, and subversion; to undermine non-communist powers; and to gain its "rightful"

*hereafter referred to as China

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position as a world power with hegemony over Southeast Asia. The primary sources of policy by which China seeks to extend its influence and assume this position are tradition, nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM).

a. In certain aspects, the current Chinese leaders, like Chinese emperors of old, think of their problem as how to effectively deal with "barbarians." They see the world as divided into those who accept Chinese culture (now meaning ideology) and those who do not. The former are "civilized" or "progressive" people; the latter are "barbarians," be they "revisionists," "imperialists," or "neutralists." Barbarians, the Chinese leaders feel, must be dealt with by a combination of persuasion and coercion. Visits to Peking (the imperial capital), exchanges of gifts (aid programs), and many other devices are used to awe and impress. Strong words and strong actions, however, may also be used to cajole and coerce.

b. Nationalism/culturism occupies a high position in determining Chinese actions or reactions. Chinese leaders have sought to define and defend China's borders as they interpret them. They have also wanted to create a buffer state system and win respect for Chinese hegemony in its traditional political-cultural sphere of influence in Asia. In effect, the country has tried to revive some of the old meaning of "China" -- *chung kuo*, or central realm/central country.

c. The Maoists see themselves as the only orthodox Marxist-Leninists (thus the only legitimate leaders of the world Marxist movement). The Maoist revolutionary formula begins with the creation of a Communist Party. Directed that it must never lose control of the revolutionary movement, the party freely uses instruments of coercion and persuasion. China regards this formula as broadly applicable to the entire world. Because of their generally self-imposed isolation, the Chinese view the world through their own ideological-revolutionary image and history.

3. Since assuming control of mainland China, the communist regime has fallen short of what it considers its rightful position of leadership and dominance in Asia. Nor has it become the leader of world revolution. This lack of progress, however, does not mean China will be a negligible factor in Asia or in the international arena. Its aspirations have deep historical roots. China will remain a threat to other Asian countries and to the interests of any outside power seeking to continue, or to assume, an important role in Asian affairs.

4. A principal threat and challenge to peace over the next decade may arise from China's promotion and support of wars of liberation, insurrections, and subversion in Asia. Secondary emphasis will be placed on Africa and Latin America. China's main thrust in promoting "People's War" and subversion will be directed against Southeast Asia. This area represents a power vacuum relative to other areas of traditional interest to China. It relates directly to China's security interests in denying or neutralizing the US or other unfriendly powers

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from any position close to its borders. The location is near ideal, in relation to other areas of interest, for application of Mao's modern revolutionary doctrines. It holds the potential of greater gains with a lower level of effort and risk than would be involved in other areas of interest. The location also serves to satisfy the general goal of China in establishing its predominance in the area and the world revolutionary movement.

5. In its national policy, China has shown a willingness to challenge both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Southeast Asia. It has avoided any all-out military confrontation with either, however. China has chosen to work through indigenous communist groups and insurgent elements to exploit conditions that are conducive to weakening foreign influence and undermining non-aligned governments. Revolutionary wars, in the Chinese view, are not only the most effective means of tying down and eliminating US influence in the emerging countries; they are also the best way to ensure consolidation of power after a communist takeover.

6. China is actively exporting its version of Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary doctrine, which it views as a model for revolutionaries in underdeveloped areas of the world. As Mao declared in a talk, "Strategic Disposition," in September 1967: "Communist China is not only a political center of world revolution, but also an arsenal of world revolution." China has the capability to train revolutionary cadre, propagandists, guerrilla specialists, saboteurs, subversion specialists, and intelligence agents. China also is providing limited material and weapons support on a selective basis. These actions are in consonance with China's ideology and policies. The Chinese activities are relatively inexpensive, frustrating to her enemies, and much less risky than open involvement in war. China can thus fight by proxy beyond her borders. The full extent of Chinese involvement in some dissident groupings is unclear at times. It appears China is trying to generate wars of liberation that have the best chance of success with little resource expenditure and in a manner concealing its part in the operation. By supporting a number of non-communist as well as communist movements (even though the groups may be antagonistic), China is better able to conceal its subversive role. Its chances of toppling a government are also increased.

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a. "Eagles of the Sea" (color) -- In this film one unidentified US warship, aided by 12 Taiwanese vessels, attacks a handful of Chinese PT boats in the Yellow Sea. The Chinese force the US warship to withdraw after sinking all 12 Taiwanese ships. The Chinese lose only one boat which capsizes. Those viewing the film were told that the battle actually took place in 1963.

b. "Guerrillas in the Plain" (black and white) -- This movie depicted the struggles of the Chinese guerrillas against the Japanese invasion in 1938. The film also showed how base areas were built.

c. "Tunnel Warfare" (black and white) -- Guerrillas attack a regular Japanese army unit commanded by a Captain (1937/38). The communist militiamen strike from underground tunnels until the Japanese soldiers have been completely wiped out. The captain is taken prisoner.

d. "Chinese con, US in Korea" (*sic*) (black and white) -- A Chinese volunteer unit is caught off guard on high ground and attacked by US Forces using napalm. The Chinese unit is almost completely destroyed, but one messenger heroically breaks through the US barrage. The messenger then finds a friendly unit, which drives off the US attackers and saves its comrades.

e. "Lenin 1917" (color) — This is a Soviet movie dealing with the toppling of the Czarist regime in the Russian Revolution.

f. "Class Struggle" (black and white) -- This film is the tale of two brothers; one a lieutenant, the other a commune leader. After retiring from the army, the lieutenant returns home and denounces his brother as self-centered and egotistical. The people of the commune then follow the true Maoist (the ex-officer), and redeem their fallen comrade by getting h:

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D. ~~(U)~~ PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

1. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

a. As might be expected, the greatest amount of time was devoted to political training. This political indoctrination focused on the experiences of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the thoughts of Mao. In the area of insurgency theory, two subjects especially emphasized were anti-imperialism and analysis of classes in society. Also in this area, a combination of political and military tactics was blended into the lectures. Naturally, all of the dogma was based on the thoughts of Mao. In fact, each student was given a four-volume set of the "Works of Mao Tse-tung" and the "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

b. Classes in ideology consisted of lectures by various instructors. Occasionally, these instructors would enrich a "dull" program with their own revolutionary experiences. The experiences of the instructors were always kept well within the bounds of orthodox ideology, however.

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2. GUERRILLA WARFARE: STRATEGY: Under the rubric of strategy, the Chinese tried to give the students an understanding of the long-range planning necessary for a successful revolutionary war. The training in this area covered base areas, people's war, self-reliance, and mass warfare.

a. BUILDING AND EXPANDING BASE AREAS: ("*Encircle the cities from the countryside*"): This technique is based on the concept of building ring upon ring of controlled territory in the countryside until the whole nation is "liberated." The operation begins with isolated fighting against the enemy. The next step is mobilization of the local citizenry. Once the local populace has been mobilized, enemy fortifications, storage depots, and supply lines will be destroyed or put out of action. At this point, the insurgent forces divided into a "hold-down force" to keep control of the secure area and another group to infiltrate the surrounding regions. These infiltrators were responsible for combing the zone for spies and others sympathetic to the enemy cause. This process of infiltration continues until the area is "seasoned" and ready to be annexed into the original base area.

b. PEOPLES WAR: ("*Fighting with only one Part of the Force is like fighting with singlehanded Warriors*"): This lecture was based on a book, *Peoples War*, by Lin Piao, Vice Chairman and Secretary for Defense. The main theme of this training was the idea that only a mobilization of all the citizenry can assure victory. There must also be an integrated effort by guerrillas, militia, and regular Army forces for maximum impact on the enemy.

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c. SELF-RELIANCE: ("*If a people successfully fought for independence, it must help those still struggling*"): [redacted]

Keeping with the theme of self-reliance, the Chinese said the guerrilla fighter should manufacture his own hand grenades, mines, and explosives. Also the students were advised that they must take an active part in the production of food and clothing when not engaged in actual fighting.

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d. *MASS WARFARE:* Under this topic, the Chinese instructors discussed how to mobilize the masses and also the conduct expected of a guerrilla fighter. Mobilization was best accomplished by spreading hatred and distrust of the landowners and the hope for communist takeover. Such a hope should be fostered by emphasizing the benefits of land reform and later collectivization. Also, the insurgents' personal conduct could be a way of rallying the masses to the revolutionary cause. As the instructor explained, the insurgent must always display immaculate behavior; any serious breach of such good behavior, like rape, should be punished by death.

3. *GUERRILLA WARFARE: TACTICS:* In this bloc of instruction, the material was presented in essentially three categories: war of attrition, mobile warfare, and war of annihilation. The aim of the training was essentially tactical instruction in the art of waging a successful revolutionary war.

a. *WAR OF ATTRITION:* The staff used make-shift maps to show how insurgents would react to a concentrated enemy attack. The recommended response was for the insurgents to disperse immediately, and change their positions constantly to prevent further attacks. The instructors stressed the use of tactics in relation to terrain and climate, and suggested the use of hit-and-run attacks by revolutionaries. The watchword for this section of training was "Fight rapidly, and with success."

b. *MOBILE WARFARE:* The Chinese emphasized that insurgents should not engage motorized or armored enemy units without a sufficient supply of mortars, mines, and plastic explosives. As with war of attrition training, the instructors relied on maps and drawings to present practical examples.

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c. *WAR OF ANNIHILATION:* [redacted] The idea was for the revolutionary soldiers to completely annihilate small units, thus magnifying the psychological effect of the insurgents' successes.

4. *WEAPONS TRAINING:* Besides training the students in methods of conducting revolutionary wars and politics, the Chinese also provided practical guidance in the use of various weapons. This part of the course primarily consisted of the students being taken out to target ranges for actual firing. Since this was a field exercise, it was conducted outside the grounds of the Nanking Military Academy.

a. *SMALL ARMS:* The small arms instruction was conducted at a primitive rifle range located about 5 kilometers northeast of Nanking. The facility, about 100x100 meters, was situated in a flat, wooded area. The range itself was located on flat, stony ground and had few security precautions (no guards, lights, or fences). When it came time to shoot, the students lined up along a single line and fired at three rows of targets. The targets were paper silhouettes on a wooden picket that could be moved either sideways or popped up by hand. The targets were located in three lines of trenches, 100, 200, and 300 meters from the students.

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b. *RIFLE:* Before the actual firing exercise, each student received two hours of classroom time on aiming, maintenance, and rifle mechanics. The students were then issued one 7.62 mm AKM and taken to the range. When they arrived at the range, the students were introduced to a Chinese




7.62 mm Assault Rifle Kalashnikov (AK)

Figure 3

dressed in a regular army uniform who introduced himself as the military advisor in charge of the exercise. The advisor gave each student ten rounds of ammunition and told them to pace off 100 meters from the targets. After stepping off the 100 meters, trainees were told to construct shallow revetments from earth and stones as rifle supports. The students, two abreast, fired five rounds at the 100-meter target and another five rounds at the 200-meter target. These targets consisted of paper affixed to wooden frames (about 1x1 meter) which were attached to stakes held by four other trainees squatting in a trench below.

c. *LIGHT MACHINEGUN:* The group was then trained in the operation and use of the 7.62 mm Degtyarev light machinegun. This instruction was



7.62 mm Light Machinegun Degtyarev (RFD)

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conducted at the same range as the earlier rifle practice. Upon arrival, the group of 24 students was broken down into six equal subgroups by the military advisor. Each trainee was permitted to fire the machinegun once in single shot and once in rapid fire from the prone supported (bipod) and unsupported positions.

d. *HANDGRENADE*

(1) Another day was spent learning about the use and construction of handgrenades. The students were taken to an unidentified location about 5 to 6 kilometers east of Nanking for actual practice in throwing grenades. A harvested bean field served as a target area, and each student was permitted to hurl one handgrenade in competition. First, however, the students were shown how to pull the pin and throw the grenade. All the grenades used in the exercise appeared to be make-shift affairs consisting of a cardboard cylinder containing an unidentified type of explosive and primer which was attached to a wooden handle. In fact, one report described them as looking like "someone had made them by hand in his backyard."

(2) Another source made a contradictory report on both the quality and quantity of handgrenades used in the exercise. The second source stated that each student was issued four grenades which, although homemade in appearance, were constructed of better material. These grenades, described as being 20 cm. long, consisted of a dark gray metal head about 10 cm. in diameter. A raw wooden handle was attached to the head. The head was filled with an unidentified explosive which was mounted on a handle with a cotter pin inside. (See Figure 5.) To operate it, a wooden safety plug was removed from the butt of the handle. A ring pin, which then came out of the handle bore, was pulled before the grenade was thrown.

(3) Another subject by the Chinese instructors covered how the guerrilla fighter could produce his own handgrenade. The students were shown how to produce the explosive. (See the section concerning demolition.) After the explosive was made and allowed to cool, it was funneled into serrated cast iron casks about the size of an egg-type handgrenade. (See Figure 6.) Next a primer cord, called "fuse lighter," was inserted into the cask crown and then plugged with asphalt or sealing wax. To detonate, the user would have to light the primer cord and then throw the grenade.

e. *MORTARS:* The students were also taken to a site about 30 km. east of Nanking to undergo mortar training. Upon arrival, the group was greeted by about 110 men chanting Mao songs and waving "Mao bibles."

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[redacted] After learning the mechanics of the equipment, each team fired four shells at a nearby low hill.

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


Figure 5

--- Chinese grenade used in training ---




Figure 6

--- Cask type grenade ---

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f. DEMOLITION AND EXPLOSIVES: (

During the first portion of the training, all the students were seated around a conference table to listen to a lecture on the manufacture of demolition devices by hand. The advisor took two ammonium nitrate preparations of approximately one cubic centimeter each and exploded them as a demonstration. Next, the advisor filled a pot with three liters of an unidentified liquid which was heated. Then, 10-15 cups of a charcoal gray powder were mixed into the liquid. After removal from the fire, the liquid was allowed to steep for a few minutes. It finally cooled into a dark mass which was repulverized and funneled into cask type grenades. At this point, primer cords were added to the cask grenades. Then they were detonated. The students were also taught how to construct anti-helicopter mines and rolling mines. (See Figures 7 and 8.)

5. FIRST AID: This instruction dealt with elementary treatment of wounds and injuries. At the beginning, trainees were given a lecture on first-aid techniques and then issued a first aid kit for practice. They received no instruction on resuscitation methods or chemical, biological, and radiation survival.

E. (C) TOUR OF INFORMATION AND ORIENTATION: (

They again received guided tours designed to impress them with the significant advances achieved by the Chinese under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. One week was spent sightseeing in and around Nanking. During the last two weeks, the students toured Peking. The places visited varied from model communal farms to Mao University and Norman Bethune Museum.

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After two weeks in Peking, the group returned to their homeland by the same route used in getting to China.

F. (C) CONCLUSIONS: (


The first generalization is that the Chinese use the training schools for more than merely as a tool to advance "wars of liberation." It is evident from the time spent on tours, sightseeing, and political indoctrination that the Chinese are attempting to win converts to their secular faith (Maoism) from among the visiting trainees. The Chinese also seek to convince the visitors that China is an ideal example of modernization and is worthy of emulation. A second generalization that can be made is that the students are relatively uninterested in abstract ideology; instead, they primarily seek military training. Given the contradictory nature of the interests of the students and Chinese in the training schools, it can be inferred that the schools may not actually be effective vehicles of Chinese policy.

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
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Figure 7

Grenades placed above explosive
in small excavation on top of knoll.



7A --- Emplaced Anti-Helicopter Mine ---



7B --- Activated Anti-Helicopter Mine ---

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
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
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Figure 8



8A --- Emplaced Rolling Mine ---



8B --- Activated Rolling Mine ---

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III. (S/NFD) OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

A. [redacted]

(b)(1) per DIA

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

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(b)(1) per DIA

B. (S) China now seems more concerned with the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet dissension and its struggles with the USSR in the international communist movement than with actively "exporting revolution." The fact remains, however, that China has trained countless dissidents in the past and still retains the capability to do so in the future.

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APPENDIX 1

REPORTED TRAINING SITES

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10. (U) Sabotage Training Camp	Sibsongpanna (2504N/10214E), Yunnan	Sabotage	Unknown	
11. (C/NFD) Military Training Camp	Che-li (2159N/10049E), Yunnan	Jungle Warfare	Unknown	Young men and women of Tai Leu tribe trained.
12. (S/NFD) Guerrilla Training Center	Pao-shan, Yunnan	Guerrilla tactics	Unknown	Kokang minority personnel have trained here.
13. (S/NFD) Military Training Camp	Vicinity of Ban Kwong (QD 9335), Laos	Guerrilla tactics/ logistics	Unknown	
14. (S/NFD) Military Training Camp	150 km north of Canton, Kwangtung	Paramilitary warfare	Unknown	Only Africans are trained.
15. (C) Kunming Infantry School	Kunming, Yunnan	Military tactics/ languages	Up to 3 years	Thai Burman, Lao, Vietnamese, and Indic languages taught.
16. (C) Military Training Camp	Saipboung (1915N/10145E), Laos	Military	Unknown	CC and VC military cadre are instructors.
17. (C) Guerrilla Training Camp	Vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan	Guerrilla warfare	3 months	Ethnic groups in Yunnan selected for training prior to dispatch to Laos and Thailand.
18. (C) Terrorist Training Camp	Vicinity of Muong Sing (2111N/10109E), Laos	Jungle warfare/ communications/ weapons use	3 months	Trainees are Thai youths who are returned to Thailand and are to "remain inactive until further notice."
19. (C) Military Training Camp	Mang-shih (2427N/9836E), Lung-ling (2435N/9841E), Yunnan	Military	Unknown	Training site for Kachin, Shan, and and other ethnic groups from West Yunnan and Sino/Burma border areas. Selected individuals receive intensive political indoctrination.
20. (C/NFD) Military Training Camps	Lung-ch'uan (2412N/9748E), Pao-shan and Kun-ming, Yunnan	Military/intelligence courses	Unknown	Selected Kachins from Burma given specialized military, intelligence, and communications training.

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APPENDIX 1. (S/NFD) REPORTED TRAINING SITES (U)*

DESIGNATION	LOCATION	CURRICULUM	DURATION	REMARKS
1. (S) Guerrilla Warfare Training Organization (U)	Ching-hsi (2310N/10625E), Kwangsi	Guerrilla Tactics	Unknown	
2. (S/NFD) Nanking Military Academy (U)	Nanking (3203N/11847E), Kiangsu	Military/guerrilla warfare	2 to 3 months	Guerrilla tactics and basic military courses taught.
3. (C/NFD) Basic Training School (U)	Che-li (2159N/10049E), Yunnan	Political/sabotage/ guerrilla warfare	18 months	School has a capacity of 600 to 800 students.
4. (C/NFD) Advanced Training School (U)	Ssu-mao (2246N/10105E), Yunnan	Political/sabotage/ guerrilla warfare	Unknown	Graduates of basic school at Che-li trained.
5. (C/NFD) Military Training Center (U)	K'o-chieh (4439/5894), Ch'ang-neng (2450N/9936E) Yunnan	Military	Unknown	Thai, Shan-tou, and other minority tribal youths trained.
6. (C/NFD) Military Training Centers (U)	Pao-shan (2507N/9909E), Mang-shih (2427N/9836E), Yunnan	Military	6 months	Minority training sites to include Pai-I, Lo-Hei, Shan-tou, and Li-so minorities.
7. (C) Military Training Camp (U)	Vicinity of Miao-Po (1680/ 0980) and La-Hsin-Chieh (CTC 5248/2450/5894), Yunnan	Military	Unknown	Kachin tribesmen trained here since September 1967. (Unlocated on map)
8. (C/NFD) Military Training Camp (U)	Wen-fu-szu (CTC 5502/0154/ 1408), T'eng-ch'ung (2502N/ 9828E), Yunnan	Militar,	Unknown	Training of Indian Communists commenced in September 1966.
9. (S) Youth Training Centers (U)	Sino/Burma border, vicinity, Pu-Tao (2730N/9715E) to Kya Hkok (2404N/9840E), Burma	Military/political/ physical training	1 month	Training for pre-teen and teenage Kachins.

*See Appendix 3, Counterintelligence Gaps

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31. (S/NFD) Training Center (U)	Sze-mao (2247N/10104E), Yunnan	Espionage/sabotage	Unknown	Only Thai and Burmese communists are trained.
32. (C) Intelligence Section (U)	Kunming (2504N/10241E), Yunnan	Intelligence	Unknown	Provides short intelligence training course for CPR secret service and secret police personnel.
33. (C) Intelligence Training School (U)	#6, Lane 14, Section 2, Li-P'ing (2746N/1627E), Road, Han T'ien (3352N/3944E), Wuhan (3034N/11414E), Hupei	Espionage; liaison; communications; health and medical courses	1 to 9 months	Trainees are reportedly all ethnic Chinese; various levels of training received.
34. (C) Agent Training School (U)	Hainan Island, Kuangtung	Unknown	Unknown	Trainees are primarily Overseas Chinese from Hong Kong/Macu. After training, graduates are sent to Southeast Asian countries.
35. (C) Vocation School for Overseas Chinese (U)	Fu Chou(2605N/11918E), Fukien	Ideological training; language dialects of of SEA; political revolutionary tactics for SEA countries.	3 years	Students are Overseas Chinese from various areas. One-third are female. Admission based on student's and family's political reliability. CPR pays all expenses plus monthly subsidy.
36. (C) Espionage and Guerrilla Training Center (U)	Hsu-loh (3930N/7630E), Sinkiang	Communist Indoctrination; Arabic, Russian, local Central Asian dialects; communications; military training; medical training.	3, 6, or 9 months	Trainees are local Moslems and PLA personnel. Trainees sent to Kirgiz, the USSR, and NW India as merchants or doctors to conduct espionage.
37. (C/NFD) Special Foreign Military Cadre Training Center (U)	Ta-li (2542N/10011E), Yunnan	Political/insurgent training	Unknown	Student body composed of communist military cadre from Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, North Vietnam, and Cambodia.
38. (C/NFD) Intelligence School (U)	Kunming, Yunnan	Intelligence courses in technical and cultural operations	6 months	Operated by VIETNAM, LAOS, THAILAND Special Operations Service Office. Each class has 400 students. Graduates sent to own countries to conduct operations.

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21. (C/NFD) Guerrilla Training Center	Chieh-yang (2333N/11920E), Kwangtung	Guerrilla warfare	Unknown	Youths recruited from Ch'ao-chou/ Shan-t'ou areas of Kuangtung. After training, they are dispatched to SEA where a large number of Overseas Chinese from Ch'ao-chou area reside.
22. (C) Military Training Camp	Vicinity of Meng Pang (1332N/2761E), Chen-K'ang (2407N/9925E) County, Yunnan	Military	Unknown	Military training for Burmese Communists.
23. (S/NFD) Military Training Camp	Mong Yong (2150N/9941E), Burma	Guerrilla warfare/ espionage training	Unknown	Trains Lahu, Kaw, and Wa tribesmen.
24. (S/NFD) Officer Training School	Meng-tzu (2324N/10306E), Yunnan	Unknown	3 months	Under control of Kunming Cadre Training Center. Thai and Lao officers trained.
25. (C) Military Training School	Kunming, Yunnan	Military training/ indoctrination	Unknown	In late 1968, about 2,000 Thais completed training and returned to a base area in Laos by early 1969.
26. (C) Unknown	Meng-tzu (2322N/10324E), Yunnan area	Unknown	Unknown	Kaohin, Muser, Ekaw, Tai Leu, Tai Yai, and Yang tribesmen trained.
27. (C) Guerrilla Training Center	Nan-ning (2249N/10819E), Kwangsi	Unknown	Unknown	To train Thai Communists. Center was to be established in early 1969.
28. (C) Senior Espionage School	#16, TA-KIN Street, CH'ENG TU (3040N/10404E), Szech'uan	Unknown	Unknown	
29. (C) Kunming Espionage School	Wen-Ling (2429N/2651E), Ta-hsi-men (CTC 1129/6007/ 7024), Kunming (2504N/ 10241E), Yunnan	Agent/espionage courses; psy war; assassination; communications	Unknown	Offers four main courses: Special course: Political Agent course; General Service course; Troop Agitation course. Main radio station at JUI-LI (2427N/9750E), Yunnan.
30. (C/NFD) Special Professional School aka HSIA SHAN Guest House (CTC 7209/1472/7414)	LU TA (3848N/12116E), Liaoning	Espionage/language	Unknown	Japanese language instructors recruited in Japan. Language emphasis on technical terms. Graduates may operate under trade mission/delegation cover.

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46. (C/NFD) SEA Language School (U)	Hai-feng (2258N/11520E), Kwangtung	SEA languages; customs and habits of SEA; subversion; communications; explosive preparation	Unknown	Trainees selected from Overseas Chinese returnees and students from SEA. Graduates sent to SEA for political agitation.
47. (C/NFD) Ta-Li Frontier Language School (U)	Ta-Li (2545N/10010E), Yunnan	Military and guerrilla tactics; languages; sabotage techniques; medical training; photography	18 months	Pai-I, Lahu, Meo, Ehaw, Yao, Thai, and Burman hill tribes recruited from China/Burma border areas. Graduates divided into 12-man teams.
48. (C) Viet Cong Cadre Training Class (U)	Chen-nan-kuan (2200N/10643E), Kwangsi	Political	Unknown	Trainees selected by Viet Cong. After training, they are sent to the Republic of Vietnam as cadre.
49. (C) Technical Assistance Column (U)	Nan-ning (2247N/10818E), Kwangsi	Military and guerrilla tactics; languages; organizing political organizations; communications	3 to 8 months	Trainees include foreign communists, ethnic Chinese youths from Kweichou, Kuangsi and Yunnan; superior cadre (including females) from various CC organizations.
50. (C) Guerrilla Warfare Training Schools (U)	Chen-nan-kuan, Kwangsi Hsu-wen (2019N/11008E), Hainan, Kwangtung	Military and guerrilla tactics: languages; organizing political organizations; communications	3 to 8 months	Trainees include foreign communists, ethnic Chinese youths from Kweichou, Kuangsi and Yunnan; superior cadre (including females) from various CC organizations.
51. (C) Sino-Burmese People's Liberation Training School (U)	Pao-shan (2505N/9910E), Yunnan	Military and guerrilla tactics; languages; organizing political organizations; communications	3 to 8 months	Trainees include foreign communists, ethnic Chinese youths from Kweichou, Kuangsi and Yunnan; superior cadre (including females) from various CC organizations.
52. (C) Language Training Schools (U)	Pao-shan; Meng-tzu (2325N/1032E), Yunnan	Military and guerrilla tactics; languages; organizing political organizations; communications	3 to 8 months	Trainees include foreign communists, ethnic Chinese youths from Kweichou, Kuangsi and Yunnan; superior cadre (including females) from various CC organizations.

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39. (C) Intelligence School	Peking (3956N/11624E), Hopei	Language and intelligence training	Unknown	Buddhist monks recruited by Chinese Buddhist Society to conduct agent operations in the Republic of Vietnam
40. (C/NFD) Labor Committee for Cultural Support of Indonesian Revolution.	Swatou (2322N/11640E), Kwangtung	Espionage/subversive training	Unknown	Agents dispatched to Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
41. (C/NFD) Cadre/Agent Training Centers	Ching-hai (2308N/10625E), Nan-ning (2249N/10819E), Che-nan (2320N/10637E), Kwangsi; Hsu-men (2020N/11009E), Hainan Island; Pao-shan (2507N/9909E), Meng-tzu (2322N/10324E), Kunming, Yunnan	Unknown	Unknown	Vietnamese and Laotian Communist cadre and ethnic Chinese agents are trained in these areas.
42. (C/NFD) Youth Training Camp	Hsing-ning (2408N/11534E), Kwangtung	Military/agent training	Unknown	Select Overseas Chinese youths from the Repbulic of Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Singapore, Laos, and Burma who return to visit relatives are sent by CPR for training.
43. (C/NFD) Intelligence School	Che-li (2159N/10049E), Yunnan	Intelligence course	6 to 12 months	Twenty female agents were graduated in 1966 and dispatched to Shan States, Burma. Thais and Laos also being trained.
44. (C/NFD) Intelligence School	Vicinity of Karta Shika (2804N/8719E), Tibet	Military/intelligence/ counterintelligence training	Unknown	Trainees were all Tibetans.
45. (C/NFD) Shanghai Central Public Security Institute aka CC Agent Training Center	#73-77, Chien Kuo Hsi Lu (CTC 1696/0948/6007/6424), Shanghai, Kiangsu	Espionage/communications; Refresher political courses	Variable 1 year	Two courses offered: one a special course for espionage agents; the other a refresher political course for PS cadre above county bureau chief.

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61. (C/NFD) Propaganda School (U)	Peking, Hopei	Propaganda/ ideological	6 months	Training course for members of Afro-Asian Journalists Association conducted annually.
62. (C/NFD) Marx-Lenin Institute, Annex 2 aka China People's University, Annex 2 (U)	Vicinity of Peking, Hopei	Political/ideological/ espionage	4 years	Provide leadership elements for Japanese Communist Party and train espionage/subversive elements. Primarily for training of Japanese, but other nationalities also attend.
63. (C) Training School (U)	Pao-shan (2507N/9909E), Yunnan	Political/subversive	3 months	Over 300 Burmans have received training and returned to Burma.
64. (C/NFD) Political Training Center (U)	Vicinity Chiang-hsin-po (CTC 3068/1800/0980), Sino-Burma	Basic political course	Unknown	Provides training for Burmese Communists.
65. (C/NFD) Political Training Center (U)	Pao-shan, Yunnan	Intermediate political courses	Unknown	Provides training for Burmese Communists.
66. (C/NFD) Political Training Center (U)	Vicinity of Peking, Hopei	Advanced political courses	Unknown	Located about 17 miles from Pei-p'ing. In 1968, over 300 Burmese Communists were undergoing training.
67. (C/NFD) Vietnamese Language Course (U)	Canton (2307N/11315E), Kwangtung	Vietnamese language	3 weeks	Children of Overseas Chinese in Vietnam who understand Vietnamese recruited. Strong emphasis on various Viet dialects.
68. (C) Training Center (U)	Wuhan (3032N/11418E), Hupei	Sabotage/subversion	Unknown	Primarily Indonesians receive training.
69. (C) Language School (U)	Vicinity of Lu-hsi (Mang-Shih) (2419N/9828E), Yunnan	Languages	Unknown	Thai Yai residents of Lu-hsi taught Thai prior to dispatch to North Thailand.
70. (C) Training School (U)	Che-li (2159N/10049E), Yunnan	Subversive techniques	5 months	Laotians trained for subversive activity in Laos and Thailand.

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53. (C) Political and Guerrilla Training School	Kunming, Yunnan	Political and insurgency courses	3 months	Trainees are from Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, and ethnic Chinese.
54. (C) Propaganda School	Wuhan (3032N/11418E), Hupei	Propaganda	9 months	Political refugees trained. After training, returned to respective countries. In 1967, North Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians, Africans, Burmese, Indonesians, Nepalese, and Congolese students were in training.
55. (S/NFD) Political Training School	Peking (N/ E) Hopei	Political/ideological	3 months	Courses were taught in student's residence. Courses for foreign communists believed sponsored by ILD.
56. (C) Language School	Wu-jung (2745/2837) Primary School; Hsi-p'ing (6007N/1627E) Street, Wu-chou (N/ E), Kwangsi	Language studies; military and technical subjects	1 year	Operation of school was classified. Reportedly, in early 1967, there were 60 students; 40 Chinese, and 20 non-Chinese.
57. (C/NFD) Military Language College	Pang-ch'iao (3144N/11839E), Nanking, Kiangsu	Language training	4 to 5 years	Responsible for training linguists to be assigned to CPR embassies as diplomats, interpreters, or agents. Prior to late 1962, college was located in CH'ANG CH'UN (N/ E), KIRIN.
58. (C/NFD) Language School	Vicinity of Ssu-mao (2247N/10104E), Yunnan	Language studies	7 months	Students were active duty military personnel in Yunnan who received Thai language training.
59. (C) Political Training Camp	Vicinity of Tu Ch-ng Hsiang (CTC 3248/1004/6763), Ch'eng-hai (2328N/1164E) County, Kwangtung	Political/military training	Unknown	In December 1968, 240 Overseas Chinese youths with close relatives in Thailand and Malaysia were undergoing training.
60. (S/NFD) Chinese Military Academy	Peking, Hopei Area	Military/guerrilla/subversive training	Unknown	Students included personnel from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

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71. (S/NFD) (U) Ideology University	Kai-yuan (2342N/10314E), Yunnan	Political	1 to 2 years	Trains cadre from North Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Burma.
72. (S/NFD) (U) Nationalities University	Mang-shih (2427N/9836E), Yunnan	Chinese langauge/ political/military	1 year	Trains Burmans and ethnic minorities from Yunnan and Sino/Burma border areas.
73. (S/NFD) (U) Language School	Lung-Ch'uan (2423N/9754E), Yunnan	SEA languages/military training	Unknown	Thai, Chingpu, Pai'i, and Lili dialects taught. Graduates sent to Thailand, Laos, and Burma for subversive activity.
74. (C) (U) Military Training Camp	Unknown	Language training/ military/political subjects	3 months	Young male/female Chuangs from Kuangsi trained to conduct subversive activities in Laos and Thailand. By late 1968 over 5,000 had been trained.
75. (C) (U) African Military Affairs School	Wuhan (3035N/1416E), Hupei	Guerrilla Tactics & CBR Warfare	2 years	Students from United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar have attended this school.
76. (C) (U) Military Training Center	Che-fang (2416N/9817E) Yunnan	Military Tactics	4 months	Unspecified minority tribesmen trained for assignment to Burmese Communist units as instructors, squad, or platoon leaders.
77. (C) (U) Agent Training Camp	Heng-yang (2658N/1122E), Hunan	Intelligence collection/ propaganda/sabotage/ agitation	1 1/2 years	Trains Chinese to infiltrate SE Asia.

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APPENDIX 2

MAP SECTION

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MAP OF CHINA SHOWING PROVINCES IN WHICH CHICOM SCHOOLS ARE LOCATED


Numbers on this map are keyed to page numbers in this appendix. The following maps of provinces show locations of ChiCom schools within each province.

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SITES IN BURMA/LAOS/SINO-BURMA BORDER



The numbers following the locations are keyed to the list in Appendix 1.

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SITES IN FUKIEN PROVINCE


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SITES IN HOPEI PROVINCE



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SITE IN HUNAN PROVINCE

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SITES IN SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

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SITES IN HUPEI PROVINCE

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SITES IN KIANGSU PROVINCE

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
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SITES IN KWANGSI CHUANG AUTONOMOUS REGION

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


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SITES IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE



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SITES IN LIAONING PROVINCE

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SITES IN SZECH'UAN PROVINCE

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
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APPENDIX 3

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GAPS

27 SEP 2000

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APPENDIX 3. (S/~~NFD~~) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GAPS (U)

(b)(1) per DIA

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

a. [redacted]

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

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B2 - DIA

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Page(s) 437-438

IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Copy to: 1 - U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
San Diego (REGISTERED)
2 - 115th MI Group, San Diego (REGISTERED)

CONUS INTEL

Report of: [redacted] (b7C) Per FBI
Date: March 5, 1990
Office: SAN DIEGO

Field Office File #: San Diego [redacted] (S) (b1) Per FBI
Bureau File #: [redacted] (S) (b1) Per FBI

Title: [redacted] (S)

Character: [redacted] Per FBI (b1) (S) (b1) Per FBI

Synopsis: [redacted]

(b1) Per FBI

[redacted]

DETAILS:

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☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1987-O-273-878

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☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
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FBI/DOJ

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

San Diego, California
March 5, 1969

Title (b)(7)(C) Pvt FBI

Character (b)(7)(C) Pvt FBI

Reference Report of SA dated (b)(7)(C) Pvt FBI and captioned above at San Diego

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☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
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Army referral pages 447-457

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FD-336 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Diego (REG)
Copy to: 2 - 115th Military Intelligence Group, San Diego (REGISTERED)

(b7C) Per FBI

Report of:
Date: February 9, 1953

Office: SAN DIEGO (b1) Per FBI

Field Office File #: San Diego (S) (b1) Per FBI

Bureau File #: (S) 010937

Title:

Character:

(b1) Per FBI

Synopsis:

(b1) Per FBI

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☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
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☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
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Army referral pages 459-473

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FBI/DOJ

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Diego, California
February 9, 1968

(b1)

Per FBI

Title [redacted] (S)

(b7)

Character [redacted] (S)

Reference Report of SA [redacted] dated and captioned as above at San Diego.

(b7C)

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471

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☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
_____	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
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Army referral pages 475 - 477

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

67199 2316

[redacted] SECRET

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: Communist China (Chicom)

2. SUBJECT: CHICOM ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 11 January 1967

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 11 January 1967 Kobe, Japan

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B -F INFORMATION 3-6

7. SOURCE: (U) [redacted] from a sub-source who often travels to Chingtao, Chicom.

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 225 0032 67

9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 January 1967

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6b

12. ORIGINATOR: US Army Liaison Detachment, Japan
OACofS, G2/G3, US Army, Japan

13. PREPARED BY: WILLIAM C.M. RUBY, Ch, CE Sec,
USA Ln Det, Japan, G2/G3, USARJ

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: WILLIAM J. HODGES
for LTC, GS
Deputy for G-2

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information regarding the contact of a sub-source in Chicom by Chicom intelligence agents.

(Leave Blank)

(U)

(U) On 10 and 11 January 1967, sub-source, a Japanese National, who is a crewman on a Japanese ship which transports sea products from Chingtao, Chicom to Japanese ports, reported that on the night of 10 November 1966, for approximately four hours, Kyoku (TKU), supposedly the manager of the Chingtao Seamen's Club, and Son (TKU), an official of the same club, entertained him at the club with dinner and several different alcoholic beverages. On the night of 27 December 1966, three Chicom intelligence agents, including the two aforementioned, again entertained him for approximately four hours. On both occasions, the agents asked him detailed questions regarding his place of birth, residence, family background, relatives, employment, wages, the number of ships owned by his employer, and the routes of the various ships.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA	1
CINCPAC	1
G-2, USARPAC	6
J-2, USFJ	1
500th MI Gp	1
DO 46, OSI, Fuchu	4
USNISO, FPO 96662	2
441st MI Det	1
ALCD/USFJ	1
CRF	1
CIA	1
FILE	8

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

478

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
None

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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[redacted] SECRET

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1 SEP 62 1396

REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

They also asked him to obtain a copy of the Japan Shipping Specifications (Nippon Sempaku Meisaisho), and the Japan Shipping Manual (Nippon Sempaku Meikan), and bring them on his next trip. (The first publication is published by a firm previously located in Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken, but is now believed to be located in Tokyo-to. The latter is published by a Kobe firm.) These manuals, both similar in content, and costing approximately ¥1,800 (US $5.00) apiece, contain specifications of almost every ship in Japan with gross tonnage of over 500 tons, and can be purchased at various bookstores. The description of the ships listed therein include owner, operator, date and place of construction, and type and horsepower of power plant, tonnage, speed, length, width, draft fore and aft, call signs, number of hatches, cargo handling equipment, etc.)

Prior to his departure from Chingtao on 31 December 1966, and in order to determine the reactions of the agents, sub-source remarked about the resignation of Sato Cabinet ministers, the dissolution of the House of Representatives, and the announcement that the nuclear-powered carrier, USS Enterprise, may make a port call to a Japanese port. The agents expressed great surprise and interest in the news, and sub-source interpreted this to mean that intelligence agents in some parts of Chicom have no early access to international news. He is also of the opinion that the Chingtao-based agents have been unable to obtain the publications thus far, even though agents in other parts of Chicom may have them. This may indicate the existence of very limited or no coordination and/or liaison between agencies or regional divisions of the same agency.

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

[redacted]
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Page(s) 480-487

IACPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-15)

CONFIDENTIAL CE-SP-305

OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE	SUBJECT
AETCIO-SO(LCS)	KUO-CHUN MI, DPOB: [redacted] (U) (b)(7)(C)

TO	FROM	DATE	CMT 1
CO, 66th INTC Group ATTN.: AETCIO-SO(LCS) APO 09154	Seventh Army Intel LnO American Consulate General APO 09108	15 Sept 66 Mr. Schwenbacher/ls Mun M 8265	

1. (C) Submitted is a report concerning subject who is the new Chief, Red China Trade Mission, Vienna, Austria.

2. (U) Report was received from the: [redacted]

3. Distribution: USAFE Representative and 513th INTC Group, Region II. The latter indicated an interest in personnel of this mission.

Louis Schwenbacher

LOUIS SCHWENBACHER, DAC
Liaison Representative

1 Incl.:
a/s

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
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DOD DIR 5200.10

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488

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DA FORM 1 FEB 62 2496 REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED. 66-3786 O-684

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Page(s) 489

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X-90857

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20 JUL 1966

AEUM(DSC)ANG-437-66

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal (U)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
ATTN: AEAGB-C(SO)
APO 09403

1. (U) Reference: TWX AEAGB-C(SO), H-1035, dated 13 July 1966.

2. (U) In compliance with above reference, forwarded herewith are two copies of RODCA Report pertaining to Project 0229 (CHICOM Collection Project (C)). (U)

Obl Mil 849

1 Incl
as

for RICHARD L. ROLFE
Colonel, AIS
Deputy Commander for Special Collection

X-90857

OFFICER DOSSIER

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth.Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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GROUP - 3
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Not automatically declassified

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~~SECRET~~

513th ICG REG. NO.
20-6-4076

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[redacted]

PROJECT 0229: CHICOM Collection Project (C)(U) 18 July 66

I. (U) (S) IDENTIFICATION:

A. Designation: CHICOM Collection

B. Date Project was initiated: The Project was initiated on 7 June 1966.

C. Location: Centralized control is exercised by Headquarters, 513th INTC Group, in Oberursel, Germany. Operation elements are located in Berlin, Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Munich, Germany and Vicenza, Italy.

D. Type of Project: [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

II. (C) (S) OBJECTIVES:

A.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

1. Project responsible to: The Project is responsible to CINCUSAREUR through requirements levied by DIRM, SICRS and DCSI Directives, and to DIA through DIRM and SICRs.

2. Other: The Project is equally responsible to all other US intelligence agencies and allied intelligence agencies through SICRS.

B. Target Countries and Specific Targets: The target country is the Chinese People's Republic. The following listed SICR is applicable for this Project: U-OSP-13020

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513th INTG REG. NO. 20-6-4076

GROUP - 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals

[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

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(b)(1)
(b)(7)(E)

C. Unique Activities: None

III. (S) COORDINATION:

A. Dates and level of coordination of Project: Projects are not coordinated as entities but by individual Source (). Both Source recruitments and individual dispatches into the denied area are coordinated. (b)(1) per CIA

B. Bilateral operations: None

IV. (S) BACKGROUND:

A. Summary:

1. Relationship with other Projects conducted by the 513th INTC Group: () Primarily the Maritime Project (Project: 0211) has the capability of supporting this effort by providing Leads of interest who travel via commercial vessels to CHICOM ports.

(b)(7)(E)

2. Relationship with governmental agencies: The Project receives direct support from through Special Publications. () (b)(1) per CIA (b)(3)

B. Special Restrictions:

1. The Chinese Government is principally approving visas for tourists (group travel) and businessmen. The travel of newspapermen, free-lance writers, etc. are in a minority.

()

(b)(1)(a)

V. (S) OPERATIONAL ASSETS:

A. US Personnel:

1. Strength of US military and civilian personnel assigned to the Project:

492

RECRADED SECRET
ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Reg. Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R
Per CIA

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

a. Military Civilian

7 2

b. It is anticipated that within the near future an ICCP Chinese linguist with considerable Far East experience will be assigned to this Project.

(b)(7)(E) [redacted]

3. Foreign language capability: Personnel assigned to this Project have the following foreign language capabilities: German, Serbo-Croatian.

B. Agent Personnel:

1. Source Control numbers:

a. The following Sources are being utilized in this Project. The following Sources are actually assigned to other Projects of this Group, but are also connected with or in support of this Project:

8559	8744	8577
8723	8763	13226

b. The following is a list of Leads under development for specific utilization within this Project:

X-37480	X-38005
X-37581	X-38397
X-37951	X-38745
	X-38856

c. In addition, the following number of Leads, by type, have been forwarded to various field elements for exploitation purposes:

(b)(7)(E) [redacted] 3 1 [redacted] 1 19

(b)(7)(E) [redacted] 2.

3. Problems encountered in agent training: To date this Project has not sufficiently developed any assets eligible for training. It can be anticipated that the major problem in the training of Agent personnel will be [redacted] who possess a complete knowledge of the background, characteristics, customs, and habits of the Chinese people. In addition, the limited operational data regarding the target area can increase the number of future problems within this Project.

VI. (S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. Primary and alternate means of communications: [redacted]

(b)(7)(E)

B. Areas through which the Project is routed and mode of travel: Area through which the travel will be performed will be dependent upon the individual Source, his base area, and the purpose of his travel. It can be visualized that travel to and from CHICOM will be mostly by air and to a lesser degree by ship. Travel within the denied area will be mostly by air or rail and to a lesser degree by highway.

VII. (S) TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT:

A. Special equipment used in the Project:

1. Items on Hand: [redacted]

(b)(7)(E)

2. Items requisitioned but not yet received: None

3. Items under development: No items are under local development at this time.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. Adequacy of equipment: Although this Project has not been advanced to this stage, equipment on hand is considered adequate.

5. Equipment required but not yet available: None

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

B. Documentation and [redacted]

VIII. (U) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT:

Special logistical support is readily available to the Project for US personnel and Sources in the form of ground and air travel as the need arises.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

IX. (U) BUDGETING AND FUNDING:

No funds have yet been expended as a result of this Project [redacted]

X. (U) EMERGENCY AND TERMINATION:

A. [redacted]

5 USC 552a

B. [redacted]

XI. (U) SECURITY EVALUATION:

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

XII. (S) OTHER INFORMATION PERTINENT TO EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT:

A. Major successes achieved: None. This Project was initiated on 7 June 1966 and is presently in the first stages of development. A number of Leads have been uncovered and forwarded to the various field elements for exploitation. Various operations are presently being developed for the specific utilization in this Project.

B. Major problems encountered: To date no major problems have been encountered in this Project.

C. Number of consumer evaluation reports received and indicated degree of value:

	Reports Submitted	Reports Evaluated	Evaluations Received
USAREUR	13	0	0
DIA	0	0	0

D. Additional future potential: This Project is in its initial stages; however, certain groundwork has been accomplished and sufficient Leads have been obtained to commence the actual recruitment of Sources within the levied requirements. It is anticipated that any difficulties encountered will not be of a nature that cannot be overcome with the personnel and equipment presently assigned and projected for assignment to this Group. At present, the primary consideration in this Project is given to the time which will be needed to get it into full operation. The future potential of this Project is good.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

496

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[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
20-6-4076

PAGE 6 .. 6 ..
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

[redacted]

FILE SYMBOL: AEUM(DSC)ANG-437-66 DATE: 18 Jul 66
SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal (U)

[redacted]

(U)

MR: (U) On 13 Jul 66 this Group received a TWX from DCSI requesting information regarding the progress being made in regard to the CHICOM Project (0229). The TWX asked specific questions and stated that the reply to the TWX could be in the form of an abbreviated RODCA Report. The above letter forwards the completed report to DCSI. Disposition of the report is as follows: two (2) copies - DCSI, two (2) copies to Capt Hylbom for RODCA Project; one (1) copy to CHICOM Desk Officer. SEFCIK/jm/849 RTS 19.7.66

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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COORDINATION: [signature]

[redacted]-SECTION CHIEF: EJ for RTS 497

GROUP - 3
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~~SECTION CHIEF: Classification reviewed and approved by; approved for release by:~~

BRANCH CHIEF: Riggin 19/7/66

OPS OFFICER: [signature] 19/7/66

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
APO 09154

JUL 15 1966

AETCIO-SO(CE)

SUBJECT: Trade Mission of Peoples' Republic of China (U)

TO: 66th INTC Group Liaison Officer
To the 513th INTC Group
APO 09757

1. (U) Reference your letter, dated 3 June 1966, subject as above.

2. (C) The Seventh Army Intelligence Liaison Officer, American Consulate General, APO 09108, supplied this office with the following information: The following members of the Trade Mission of the Chinese Peoples' Republic in Vienna are under surveillance ordered by the State Police in Vienna, because of the suspicion of their engagement in intelligence activities:

1. () born ()
Trade Representative
Wife: () born ()

2. () born ()
Deputy Trade Representative
Wife: () born ()

3. () born ()
cook.

4. () born ()
Employee of the Trade Representation
Wife: () born ()

5. () born ()
Employee of the Trade Representation
Wife: () born ()

6. () born ()
Interpreter
Wife: () (Photo not available)

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

CE DOSSIER COPY

CE LOG NR. 82475

RETURN TO REGISTRY

Included From General Declassification Schedule

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ON 3 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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AETCIG-SO(CE)
SUBJECT: Trade Mission of Peoples' Republic of China (U)

7. () born () Driver.

All of the above mentioned persons are residing in () Attached as Exhibit I are photos of the above mentioned persons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

FRED J. GOLDSMITH
Lt Col AIS
S3

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8472

MR: 13 Jul 66/pk (C)

SUBJ: Same as above

BKGD: The above info is being forwarded to Liaison Officer, 503th INTC Gp at 513th INTC Group, through 66th INTC Group Liaison Officer at 513th INTC Group per his request.

COORD: None

CONTROL: KENNEDY

REVIEW: CENTGRAF

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
LIAISON OFFICE at 513TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
APO US Forces 09757

AETCIO-LF
Refer to 6-285-66

3 June 1966

SUBJECT: Trade Mission of People's Republic of China (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th Intelligence Corps Group
ATTN: AETCIO-SO(LCS)
APO US Forces 09154

(b)(7)(D)

(S)

1. (C) Liaison Officer, 500th INTC Group to 513th INTC Group, has been informed that [redacted] have provided your office with identifying data and photos of 12 members of subject mission. Report and photos were forwarded to your office by [redacted] by disposition form on 4 April 1966.

(b)(1) + (b)(3) per CIA

(U)

2. (C) 500th Liaison Officer requests a copy of the report and photos for transmittal to 500th INTC Group. Information is requested to increase and/or verify information on hand at 500th INTC Group.

Charles R. Frey
CHARLES R. FREY
Captain, AIS
Officer in Charge

Telephone: Obl Mil 743 or 883

RECRADED SECRET
ON 27 SEP 2000
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R
Per CIA

500

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[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

AEUMC-A-19-66

13. Mai 1966

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) Reference letter, AEUMC, subject: Assistance for 500th LnO to 513th INTC Group (U), dated 4 March 1966.

2. (S) Effective 30 April 1966, this Group has the mission of

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

3. (S) It is desired that all Group field elements share in the

personnel become available. A separate numbered project will be established for this new effort.

4. (S) The following information is furnished for planning purposes and shows the

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

base.

a.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

b.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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501

[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
13-6-3225

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES

DESK OFFICER DOSSIER

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

(b)(7)(E)

[redacted]

a.

[redacted]

d.

[redacted]

e.

[redacted]

f. Tourist Travel: Indications are that tourist travel from West Europe to the PRC is heavy. It appears that Pakistan International Airline (PIA) and Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) handle the bulk of the traffic.

g. Journalists: The PRC is allowing increasingly more West European journalists and free lance writers to visit the country.

h. Chinese Population in West Europe: From [redacted] take, it appears that Chinese population in West Europe is considerable (no estimate available). Correspondence from and to the PRC is heavy. It is very possible that [redacted] could be effected.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5. (S) Also for your information and for future benefit to this Group, the 7115th SAG, in approximately October 1965, received a requirement to initiate action to identify CHICOM [redacted] 7115th SAG is now collecting and banking information on the following:

a. [redacted]

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

d. [redacted]

e. [redacted]

f. [redacted]

g. [redacted]

h. [redacted]

i. [redacted]

j. [redacted]

k. [redacted]

5. (S) The following is a broad outline of pertinent intelligence objectives for use in targeting against Communist China's military establishment:

a. Intentions, both short-term and long-term, with respect to both Communist-world and non-Communist-world, especially early indicators of hostile and subversive intent.

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

(1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

AEIMC-A-19-65
SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

(5) [redacted]
(6) [redacted]

d. General purpose forces:

(1) [redacted]
(2) [redacted]
(3) [redacted]
(4) [redacted]

e. [redacted]

f. [redacted]

g. [redacted]

h. [redacted]

i. [redacted]

j. [redacted]

k. [redacted]

l. [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[redacted]

Page 4 of 5 Pages
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[redacted]

AEUHC-A-19-65
SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

[redacted]

7. (S) The Group approach to this new high priority target, in general terms, is as follows:

a. We will use all available assets for reduction of the target, to include peripheral observation coverage.

b. The 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer will act as staff advisor.

c. There will be a refinement of present [redacted] Leads will be passed to the field expeditiously.

d. IRs resulting from the effort will be published by the 513th INTC Group. Under Item 7 (Source), the source number will be followed by the notation, "Project Disbelief (C)", and extra copies of each IR will be made at field level for Headquarters' passage to G2, USARPAC and the 500th INTC Group.

8. (U) Addressees will be kept informed of developments.

Obl Mil 852

JBF

GERALD W. DAVIS
Colonel, AIS
Commanding

505

DISTRIBUTION:
CO, Berlin Station
CO, Bremerhaven Station
CO, Frankfurt Station
CO, Region II
CO, Region IV

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

513th ICG REG. NO.
13-6-3225

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES
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[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
APO US FORCES 09403

GB 56-0362

[redacted]

AEAGB-C(SO)

[redacted]

11 MAY 1966

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
513th Intelligence Corps Group
ATTN: AEUMC
APO US Forces 09757

(U) In compliance with telephonic request of Major Vieler, your Headquarters, this letter forwards a copy of letter, this Headquarters, dated 27 April 1966, subject as above.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

William A Rhodey

1 Incl
as

WILLIAM A. RHODEY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Collection Branch

X-40857 Just

[redacted]

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

506

513th ICG REG. NO.
18-6-3308

[redacted]

GROUP-3
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[redacted]

GB 46-10SC

AEAGB-C(SO)

27 APR 1966

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

TO: Director, J-2
United States European Command
ATTN: ECJB-R
APO US Forces 09128

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

1. (U) Reference your letter, file ECJB-R, dated 11 March 1966, Subject as above.

2. (S) At the present time,

a. [redacted]

[redacted]

507

513th ICG REG. NO.
18-6-3308

GROUP-3
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[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PA
COPY 4 OF 4

[redacted]

AFAGB-C(SO)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

The 513th Liaison Officer to 500th Group, Lt Col O'Neil, has not yet reached such an active stage. He arrived in Hawaii in January 1966, and has reported to his parent unit that he is still in the process of orienting himself and conducting exploratory research to determine the potential in USARPAC to support USAREUR operations.

b. 513th INTC Group has instructed its field elements to report through channels to the 500th Liaison Officer all [redacted]

c. 513th Source 8559, [redacted] still plans to travel to that country. He has applied for a visa again with expected travel dates in April-May 1966. Upon notification that his visa is at hand, 513th will brief him on requirements which 500th INTC Group has furnished. 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer will assist in briefing and later debriefing.

3. (S) As a result of your letter of 11 March 1966 and previous correspondence on the subject, 513th INTC Group has conducted an extensive survey of possibilities for expanding [redacted]

General findings of the survey are:

[redacted]

AEACE-C(SO)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

a. [redacted]

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. Tourist Travel. A relatively large volume of tourists travel to the PRC from West Europe. Several West German travel agencies advertise trips to PRC. [redacted] Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) appear to handle the bulk of the tourist traffic.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES
COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

[redacted]

AEAGB-C(SO)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

f. Journalists. The PRC is allowing an increasing number of Western European journalists and free-lance writers to enter the country.

g. Chinese population in West Germany. There is a large Chinese population in West Germany [redacted] Further survey will establish the exact size and nature of this population and the susceptibility of individuals to clandestine use.

4. (S) I estimate the potential intelligence value of these elements to be as follows:

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

a. [redacted]

b. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES
COPY 4 OF 4

[redacted]

[redacted]

AEAGB-C(SO)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

c. Western tourists can undoubtedly supply a mass of low-level data of a wide gamut. Because of PRC controls over their travel within the country, within a relatively short time their observations will probably become stereotyped and the value of the information will fall to very slight levels.

e. Western journalists can supply information of somewhat better quality than the average tourist because of their sharper powers of observation and retention and also because they generally obtain more access than the casual tourist. However, it is probable that they will color much of their information according to their own or their editors' ideological leanings, and that they will obtain much "fed" material, making their reliability doubtful.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

f. At the present time, I cannot judge the potential intelligence value of the Chinese population of West Germany (cf., para 3g above) due to lack of data and experience. The 513th INTC Group will attempt to determine these factors by further research.

5. (S) I believe that it will be [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

AEAGB-C(SO)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

[redacted]

[redacted] these are:

a. 8526, a business man in Vienna, Austria, who can report the identity of Austrian business travellers to PRC.

b. 8559, [redacted] (cf., para 2c above)

c. 8734, [redacted]

d. 8744, an East German business representative, who spent about a month in PRC in January 1966, and who may have occasion to go there again.

e. 13157, [redacted]

f. 13226, [redacted]

g. X-11816, [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

6. (S) I have approved a plan of the 513th INTC Group to commence [redacted] immediately. The essential elements of the plan are:

a. Adoption of the mission throughout the field elements of the group.

b. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

AEAGB-C(SO)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

[redacted]

c. Realignment of the operational staff at 513th Headquarters to accommodate the new mission. The 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer will serve as advisor to the Group and provide [redacted] and operational guidance within the framework of his current Letter of Instruction from his parent unit.

d. Close coordination with 7113th Special Activities Group to achieve maximum value from the automated leads bank.

7. (S) To implement the 513th plan, it will be necessary for the Unit to obtain at least [redacted] I am taking steps to determine the availability of such [redacted] within USAREUR, and to assign them immediately to the 513th INTC Group. If there are none locally available, I will refer the need to Headquarters, Department of the Army.

8. (S) I foresee no immediate requirement for an increase [redacted] to support this effort. It is probable that about a year's experience will be necessary before any firm forecast of fund needs becomes apparent.

ROBERT R. GLASS
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence

Copy furnished:
USARPAC

513

513th ICG REG. NO.
18-6-3808

[redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
COPY [redacted] OF 4

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
APO US FORCES 09403

GB 46-1323

30 APR 1966

AEAGB-C(SO)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
513th Intelligence Corps Group
ATTN: AEUM-CO
APO US Forces 09757

1. (U) References:

a. Letter, this office, 29 March 1966, Subject as above.

b. Letter, your Headquarters, 1 April 1966, Subject as above.

2. (S) I approve your concept for assuming the mission of [redacted] I have informed USEUCOM and USARPAC of this approval and of the general nature of your concept.

3. (U) I expect you to establish a separate numbered project for this new effort and initiate requisite budgetary, personnel and operational planning.

4. (S) In addition to instituting [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

X 49453

[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
4-6-2986

[redacted]

514-1

[redacted]

GROUP-3
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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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[redacted]

AFAGB-C(SO) 30 Apr 1966

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

5. (U) For your information and as a matter of record, I have directed my staff to accomplish the following as of 26 April 1966:

a. Place a hold upon one Sfc [redacted] of the 527th MI Company and refer him to your Headquarters for interview on 27 April 1966. Records indicate that Sfc [redacted] is a Chinese linguist. If your staff determines that he is suitable for the position, we will effect his transfer to the 513th INTC Group.

b. Initiate an emergency requisition through personnel channels to Headquarters, Department of the Army, for an officer (Lieutenant Colonel or Major), MOS 9668, Chinese linguist, for assignment to the 513th INTC Group.

ROBERT R. GLASS
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence

5USC552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

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[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
4-6-2986

[redacted]

AEUMC-A-15-66

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U) 11 APR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
ATTN: AEAGB-C(SO)
APO US Forces 09403

1. (S) Reference:

a. Letter, subject: Exchange of [redacted] (S), AEAGB-C(SC), dated 26 June 1965, to AC of S, G2, USARPAC, with 1 inclosure (a draft memorandum of understanding), and 1st Indorsement from OAC of S, G2, Headquarters USARPAC, GPIN-OP, dated 13 July 1965, which concurs in the memorandum of understanding.

b. Letter of Instructions (U), GPI-OP, dated 9 December 1965, from Headquarters, 500th INTC Group to 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer with 513th INTC Group.

c. Discussion between Colonel Rhodey/Colonel Rolfe at DCSI, mid-March 1966, on subject of intelligence effort against Communist China.

d. Headquarters, 513th INTC Group electrical message K-2041-66, AEUMC, to DCSI, dated 18 March 1966.

(e.) Letter, subject: Intelligence Effort against Communist China (U), from AEAGB-C(SO) to CO, 513th INTC Group, dated 29 March 1966, with two inclosures (JCS message 4816 and Diagram 3-65A).

2. (S) Upon this Group's receipt of the high priority [redacted] as embodied in Reference 1e above, this letter is forwarded as a status report and a vehicle for setting forth our concept for implementation.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

GROUP - 3
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516

[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
1-6-2163

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
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[redacted]

AEUMC-A-15-66
SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

3. (S) With the Group goal of fulfilling and sustaining the mission of [redacted] against Communist China, the following is the situation:

a. Assumptions:

(1) That Project Disbelief (U) will be continued.

(2) That the 513th INTC Group collection effort against Communist China will be commensurate in priority to the highest priority targets now held.

(3) That 513th INTC Group will be able to conduct collection operations against Communist China by all available means, to include peripheral observation missions. This assumption is deemed justified by the great emphasis now placed on this target and the paucity of intelligence holdings indicated in the inclosures to Reference 1e.

b. Present Status/Implementation:

(1) This Group, prior to receipt of Reference 1e, was already moving on Chinese Communist collection in conjunction with the 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer. The mission of the 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer, as set forth especially in Paragraph 5, Reference 1b, will serve as an important part of the framework in emphasizing the Chinese Communist mission.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(2) The 500th Liaison Officer has initiated, through [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(3) Appropriate elements within Operations Branch at Group Headquarters are being regeared to reflect the emphasis on Communist China collection and will work even more closely in concert with the 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer who will serve as advisor to the Group in over-all direction of the effort and provide informal staff guidance, to include targeting and operational guidance, under the agreed-upon letter of instructions, Reference 1b.

[redacted]

[redacted]

AEUMC-A-15-66
SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

(4) As to the question of crediting the originator of IRs deriving from the Chinese Communist collection effort: It is proposed that the 513th INTC Group publish the IRs and be shown as the originator in Item 12, DD Form 1396, and that in Item 7 (Source), the (U) source number be shown followed by the notation, "Project Disbelief (C)". In each case, the 500th INTC Group and G2, USARPAC, would receive copies of the IR.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(5) [redacted]

(6) [redacted]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(7) The field elements of this Group, through Command correspondence, have been previously made cognizant of their role in giving full operational support to the mission of the 500th INTC Group Liaison Officer. Upon your office's approval of the over-all concept of implementation contained in this letter, the Group field elements will be directed to fully accommodate the highest priority now assigned to Communist China. The concept for the field will not be a rigid allotment of a set number of [redacted] but rather direction to the field to remain flexible as the mission grows. Within each field element, upon initiation of the emphasized mission, the operations officers of the field elements will guide the gradual buildup of effort.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (E)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(8) It will be necessary, in view of the great emphasis placed on this mission, to obtain the assignment to this Group [redacted] Request approval.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

(9) It will also be necessary to obtain assignment to this Group of an [redacted] Request approval.

[redacted]

[redacted]

AEUMC-A-15-66
SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

4. (U) In summary, this Group will accomplish this mission of high priority targeting against Communist China. It is considered worthy of reemphasis that we need to be allowed to attach this objective by any and all means, to include use of assets even if they are capable of only casual observation. At the present time, either exploited or to be exploited are Sources: 8526, 8734, 8744, 8559, 13157, 11816 and 13226.

5. (U) Request approval of this Group's above approach to implementation of the subject mission assignment.

Obl Mil 852

RICHARD L. ROLFE
Colonel, AIS
Acting Commander

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 June 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
1-6-2163

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-15)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE	SUBJECT
AETCIO-LN	Trade Mission of Peoples Republic of China (U)

TO	FROM	DATE	CMT 1
Commanding Officer 66th INTC Group ATTN.: AETCIO-LN APO US Forces 09154	Seventh Army Intel LnO American Consulate General APO US Forces 09108	4 April 1966	Mr.Schwenbacher/ls/ Munich Mil.8265

1.(U) Submitted is a report concerning subject mission in Vienna,Austria, whos members are suspected to be engaged in Intelligence activity by the Austrian Police.

2.(U) Above report was received from the () Police.

Louis Schwenbacher
LOUIS SCHWENBACHER,DAC
Liaison Representative

2 Incl.:
Report,1 cy
Photographs

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

520

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CE LOG
NR. 2399

66-1180

DA FORM 1 FEB 62 2496 REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

O-634

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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5 USC 552a (b) (1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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
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Page(s) 521-523

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[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
APO US FORCES 09403

[redacted]

AEAGB-C(SO)

29 MAR 19[illegible]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Intelligence Effort Against Communist China (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
513th Intelligence Corps Group
ATTN: AEUMC
APO US Forces 09757

1. (U) This letter forwards copies of JCS message 4816, subject as above, and Diagram 3-65A, Subject: Communist China's Military Establishment (U).

2. (U) This office will forward additional guidance in the near future.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

[signature]
Lt Colonel, GS

2 Incls
as

for WILLIAM A. RHODEY
Colonel, GS
Chief, Collection Branch

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[redacted]

513th ICG REG. NO.
30-6-2091

GB 36-1200

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Page(s) 531-587

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(b)(7)(C)

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACSI-DSCO

25 FEB 1965

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chin, aka CHI CHIN, Lau, aka LAU David C. C., aka LAU Davey Ying (C)

TO: United States Army Attache
American Embassy
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. (U) Reference is made to your First Indorsement dated 28 January 1965, to letter, ACSI-DSCO, dated 15 January 1965, subject as above.

2. (U) Based on your answer contained in the above referenced indorsement, the opinion of the office of the Judge Advocate General is that Sergeant [redacted] has not violated any laws or regulations.

3. (U) It is recommended that [redacted] future activities be closely monitored and your office take appropriate action if you deem his activities are not considered in the best interests of the United States.

(b)(6)

SIGNED
Colonel, GS
Deputy Director of Security

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (23 Feb 65) (CONF) Maj Barrett/57471/jcb

CURRENT: Ltr to ARMA, Yugoslavia rec ARMA monitor subj's activities and take approp act if nec in the future.

BACKGROUND: [redacted] has had contact w/subj while stationed in Luxenburg. Currently selling suits to US personnel in Belgrade. JAG states no law or reg violated based on ARMA's stated facts.

RATIONALE: Ans ARMA req for guidance.

COORDINATION: Concur GILBERT G. ACKROYD, COLONEL, JAGC, CHIEF, MILITARY JUSTICE DIVISION — OJAG

588

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Br Ch
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ACSI-DSCO

15 JAN 1965

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chin, aka CHI CHIN, Lau, aka LAU, David C. C., aka LAU Davey Ying (C)

TO: United States Army Attache
American Embassy
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

1. (U) Reference is made to your First Indorsement, dated 30 December 1964, subject as above.

2. (C) In order to provide guidance to your office concerning Sergeant [redacted] actions, it is requested that your office provide the answers to the following questions:

a. Is the Yugoslavian Government aware of [redacted] activities?

b. Has [redacted] violated any Yugoslavian customs or import laws?

c. Has [redacted] utilized only the APO facilities or has he imported clothing through other mail facilities such as Diplomatic or Yugoslavian mail?

3. (U) Upon receipt of the above questions, your office will be advised as to what course of action to pursue.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

SIGNED
GORDON FLAHERTY
Colonel, GS
Deputy Director of Security

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Major Barrett/57471/jcb

ACSI-DSCO
SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chin, aka CHI CHIN, Lau, aka LAU, David C.C.
aka LAU Davey Ying (U)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (14 Jan 65) (CONF)

CURRENT: Ltr to USARMA, Belgrade, Yugoslavia req'ing further info conc activities of SSgt [redacted] Vet Det, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

BACKGROUND: By ltr, dtd 16 Dec 64, CI Div req'd ARMA, Belgrade to question [redacted] about his connection w/subj and sale of clothing fr Hong Kong. By 1st Ind, dtd 30 Dec 64, and ltr dtd 30 Dec 64, ARMA related that [redacted] had ordered and sold clothing fr Pan Eurasia Trading Co, Luxenbourg. [redacted] does not consider himself an agent of Lau's and considers Lau to be honest. [redacted] is still doing business by mail thru Lau's firm while [redacted] is stationed in Yugoslavia. ARMA req'd guidance. Questions unanswered were related to:

a. Yugoslavian law re import of clothing.
b. Use ofAPO or diplo mail facilities.

(b)(6)

RATIONALE: JAGO needs ans to base guidance.

(b)(7)(C)

COORDINATION: concur _____ GILBERT G. ACKROYD, COLONEL, JAGC, CHIEF, MILITARY JUSTICE DIVISION JAGO

Att Sgt Rel

Maj K. Barrett
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

27 SEP 2000

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ACSI-DSCO

CRF? 16 DEC 1964

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chia, aka CHICHIA Lau, aka LAU David C.C., aka LAU DAVEY Ying (C) (U)

TO: United States Army Attache
American Embassy
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

1. (U) Forwarded for your information and return to this office upon completion of action requested in paragraph 3 below is a Summary of Information, dated 13 April 1964 and three Agent Reports, dated 8 October 1964 concerning subject.

2. (U) On 20 November 1964 Headquarters, US Army Communications Zone, Europe reported that Sergeant [redacted] mentioned in the inclosures, was currently assigned to the US Army Veterinary Detachment, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

3. (C) (U) Request your office interview [redacted] to ascertain his knowledge of subject and the degree of relationship between them. (b)(6)

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE (b)(7)(C)

SIGNED
CHARLES R. WRIGHT, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief, Counterintelligence Division

4 Incl
as (CONF)

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18 Dec 64

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Ops Branch, CI Division

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HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY COMMUNICATIONS ZONE, EUROPE
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 58, US Forces

AEZID-I(INV)

20 NOV 1964

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chin, aka CHICHIN Lau, aka LAU David C.C., aka LAU DAVEY Ying (c)(u)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Forces

1. (U) Attached is an SOI on SUBJECT; it will be noted that there are no items of intelligence interest thus far. Accordingly, this office will have SUBJECT turned over to French authorities upon HIS apprehension on US installations in France. It is noted that HE is disbarred from entry into France and lacks a French work permit.

2. (c) (GS) Reference attached Agent Reports it is noted that SUBJECT is on the disbarment list of this command. [redacted] (c)(u)

(b)(1) per CIA

3. (c) It has been determined that EM mentioned in attached AR's has been transferred to the US Army Veterinary Detachment in Yugoslavia, and is stationed with Captain Mylo M. Hagberg and SFC William C. Elliot in Belgrade.

for George Rubin Lt Col GS

2 Incl
as

WILLIAM H. ADAMS, JR.
Lt Colonel, GS
ACofS, G2

Telephone: Orleans Mil 8302

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AEAGB-S(CI)(20 Nov 64) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chin, aka CHICHIN Lau, aka LAU David C. C., aka LAU DAVEY Ying (C)(U)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, APO New York, 09403

DEC 4 1964

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSI-SCD, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The attached is passed as a matter of possible intelligence interest.

2. (C) (U) Request USARMA, Belgrade, be asked to interview SSgt [redacted] Yugoslavia Element US Army Veterinary Detachment, Europe, APO New York, 09695 to ascertain his knowledge of SUBJECT and the degree of relationship between SUBJECT and [redacted].

3. (U) Request return of one copy of all inclosures.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

Marion R. Panell

2 Incl
nc

MARION R. PANELL
Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Branch

27 SEP 2000

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Major Barrett/57471/jcb

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

ACSI-DSCO
SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
LAU, Chi Chin, aka CHICHIN Lau, aka LAU David C. C., aka LAU DAVEY Ying (C)(U)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: (14 Dec 64) (C)

(b)(6)

CURRENT: Ltr to USARMA, Belgrade, Yugoslavia req'ing interv of SSgt () determ knowledge of subj and degree of assn.

(b)(7)(C)

BACKGROUND: Subj auth a Comm Business Solicitation permit in USACOMZEUR. Permit suspended because of Ger customs violation. () ident as an associate of subj at the Toul Depot Activity, France. On several occasions, () has made collections for subj and has checked on deliveries of merchandise that have been purchased.

RATIONALE: Req to USARMA, Belgrade nec as no other assets avail in that area.

COORDINATION: concur Wemelsfelder 12976
Attache Support Detachment

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Act Off K. Barrett
Sec Ch W. Bundy
Br Ch A. V. Peterson
Div Ch Wright

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0104 36

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
(AR 381-131)

DATE: 20 May 1965

PREPARING OFFICE: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence J-2-65-5-104
Headquarters Sixth United States Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intelligence Collection Activities (U) W/C

Chinese Com Intell Act

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OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. (U) Information received this headquarters regarding a method utilized by Communist China to gather information of intelligence, economic, and scientific value is as follows:

a. Since diplomatic ties do not exist between the United States and Communist China, the Chinese have been active in their attempt to gather information of intelligence, economic and scientific value from publication of doctoral dissertations (theses) submitted by students and accepted by American Colleges and Universities when granting degrees.

b. University Microfilms, Incorporated, Ann Arbor, Michigan, a subsidiary of Xerox Corporation, recently has been fulfilling orders for doctoral theses from Communist China. University Microfilms, Incorporated, operates a business which consists of microfilming Ph.D. thesis materials from American universities. This process is accepted by mose universities in lieu of formal publication of doctoral dissertation. The firm publishes a catalogue of all thesis material available in its microfilm library and microfilm copies are sold in typical "mail-order" fashion.

c. Over 100 doctoral dissertations were recently shipped by University Microfilms to Waiwen Shudian, Post Office Box 88, Peking, China (Cover address of Chinese Communist Intelligence agency). Examples of the material included in the shipment to Communist China were data in code analysis; control and guidance systems; IBM and other computer data; masers; radar back-scattering theories; Explorer aircraft missile failures; Minutemen; qualities of gases and fluids; and a variety of electronic and scientific studies. All were specific theses prepared by doctoral candidates at various American Universities and were from the regular stock of thesis material sold by the University Microfilms Corporation. None of the material was from United States Government sources and none was classified.

2. (U) It is noteworthy that the Communist Chinese concentrated on the acquisition of theses related to technical and scientific endeavors. Acquisition and analysis of such material can save many years in research activities for a technologically slow country such as Communist China. — A-2

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